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ABSTRACT 
This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium tax model to gauge the 
incidence and growth effects of the 1980s major UK tax policy changes. The model 
focuses on forward-looking investment decisions and adjustment dynamics, on 
intertemporal consumption decisions, on endogenous financial capital decisions and on 
the influence of international financial capital flows. The model permits a satisfactory 
assessments of short-run effects of tax policy on assets values as well as long-term 
impacts on capital accumulation. 
Simulation results suggest that the major UK tax policy changes would generate 
capital accumulation but yield large windfall to shareholders. It is observed that in the 
long run the reform would increase aggregate investment by about 7.6 per cent. 
Simulation results indicate that the announcement of the UK tax reform hastens 
the gains to be achieved in terms of capital formation and real incomes. Results from 
this experiment reveal that in the short run total investment increases by around 9.2 per 
cent compared with an increase of approximately 5.5 per cent in the unannounced policy 
case in the corresponding period. 
Simulation results also suggest that the endogenous adjustment of the financial 
structure will allow us to predict the response of investment to changes in the taxes that 
affect the relative attractiveness of debt finance and retention. Simulation results indicate 
significant changes in debt-equity ratios as a response to tax changes and thus changes 
in the cost of finance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
2 
The purpose of this study is to gauge the incidence and growth effects of the 
1980s major UK tax policy changes. Major tax policy changes such as the recent UK 
tax reform can produce substantial alterations in the rate of accumulation and the 
allocation of capital among sectors and types of assets. To capture these alterations 
requires a comprehensive account of intra- and intertemporal aspects of decision-making. 
We therefore develop a dynamic model of the UK economy in order to evaluate the tax 
reform. The model focuses on forward-looking investment decisions and adjustment 
dynamics, on intertemporal consumption decisions, on endogenous financial decisions, 
and on the influence of international financial capital flows. 
Economists long ago recognised that in order to evaluate the effects of changing 
a major tax, important economy-wide effects must be taken into account, and thus built 
models based on the well-known Arrow-Debreu (general equilibrium) model to provide 
quantitative measurement of general equilibrium impacts of taxes. General equilibrium 
analysis of taxation started with Harberger's model (Harberger 1962) and was 
implemented subsequently on a large scale by Shoven and Whalley (1972) and others. 
These traditional applied general equilibrium tax models shed light on the allocative and 
incidence effects of taxes. However, it has been recognised that the models' main 
purposes were limited to the allocation of a fixed stock of the capital factor with its 
perfect mobility across sectors. In other words, the traditional model does not 
incorporate time and adjustment dynamics. In these models, policy shocks cause the 
fixed economy-wide capital stock to be immediately reallocated across industries so that 
the rental rate of capital is equalized across all industries. This gives rise to a question 
of the relevance of the standard comparative static applied general equilibrium tax 
models in analyzing intertemporal distortions of taxes and the capitalization effects of 
tax changes. 
Savings and investment are essentially intertemporal decisions and hence tax 
policy impacts on saving and investment cannot be properly assessed in essentially static 
standard tax models. Instantaneous adjustment makes it impossible to capture 
capitalization effects that are central to tax incidence. This is because immediate 
equalization of the rate of returns across industries implies that the tax reform might 
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have the same effect on investors in the taxed sector and in other sectors. It would be 
argued that in reality capital is not perfectly mobile and thus increases in capital taxes 
in a given sector particularly reduce the prospective profitability of capital in that sector 
and disproportionately lower its market value. (See Goulder and Summers 1989). 
More recent works incorporate the features to which the static models have paid 
little attention. The new models include forward-looking behaviour under the 
specification of perfect-foresight expectations. Following the work of Hayashi (1982) 
they in general tend to use q-theory type of investment functions. Q-theory offers several 
attractions for tax policy analysis. The first is that it links the real sector with the 
financial sector. Financial assets can be introduced and they can be interpreted as claims 
on physical capital. This permits us to estimate the effects of tax policies on investment 
by assessing their impact on firms' values. The second is to capture the capitalization 
effects of tax changes through asset valuations. 
Hence, this approach provides a more satisfactory basis for estimating the short- 
run impacts, growth effects, incidence effects and welfare effects of tax policy. It has 
been shown that works that ignore the transition path and do not treat adjustment 
dynamics would overstate the welfare gains of tax reform. New studies found that 
capital immobilities would result in significant capitalization effects rather than 
efficiency effects. Hence, asset prices rather than intersectoral capital allocation absorb 
short-run adjustments to policy changes. 
The new approach also enables us to make useful distinctions between savings 
incentives (for example, corporate income tax) and investment incentives (for example, 
changes in depreciation rules) and between announced policies and surprise policies. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Goulder and Summers (1989) showed that 
investment incentives would yield significant increases in investment without conferring 
windfall gains to existing capital owners whereas savings incentives would yield large 
windfalls to shareholders while providing only modest investment stimulus. As for 
policy prediction effects, it was shown that announced policies would generate 
significant short-run effects without changing long-term impacts on capital accumulation. 
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However, it appears that new models tend to disregard the financial effects of tax 
policies. In the context of static models, work done by Slemrod (1983,1985), Fullerton 
and Gordon (1983) and Galper, Lucke and Toder (1988) showed the importance of 
incorporating endogenous financial behaviour. However, difficulties encountered in 
incorporating uncertainty into intertemporal models led dynamic model builders to 
specify exogenous financial behaviour. Osterberg (1989) pointed out that debt-equity 
ratios can be optimally determined by agency cost of debt together with tax rates 
favouring debt. Osterberg also modified q-ratios so as to take account of financial 
structure. The endogenous adjustment of financial structure is shown to create real 
effects. Therefore we attempt to incorporate endogenous choice of debt-equity ratio, as 
suggested by Osterberg, to capture the financial effects of taxes. This permits us analyze 
adequately the effects of policies that introduce a wedge between debt finance and 
retained earnings. A tax-induced change in this wedge would then affect decisions as to 
how investment is financed. In turn, this would affect firms' cost of capital. As a result, 
the tax-induced change would result in real effects through changes in the cost of 
capital. Also, changes in debt-equity ratios imply wealth effects. The wealth effects 
represents distributional effects. 
Although there is a growing interest in the mobility of capital across countries, 
dynamic applied general equilibrium models seem to be slow to respond to this interest. 
Theoretical analysis has demonstrated that international capital mobility may 
substantially influence the impact of tax policies. However, theoretical works have paid 
little attention to international taxation practice. Recently, Bovenberg (1986,1989); 
Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991); Sinn (1987); Slemrod (1988) elaborated the influence 
of international capital flows under international taxation rules. Recently, Goulder and 
Eichengreen (1989) and Perrauddin and Pujol (1991) have included international 
financial capital flows in dynamic applied general equilibrium models. Goulder and 
Eichengreen's work showed that, in the presence of international capital mobility, saving- 
and investment-promoting policies differ significantly in the effects on net trade and on 
capital accumulation. Perrauddin and Pujol stressed the influence of the terms of trade 
effects on welfare and indicated the influence of international financial capital flows on 
growth. We also introduce endogenous international financial capital flows in our model. 
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Differences in after-tax interest rates between the United Kingdom and the rest of the 
world induce financial capital flows. Initial debt stock is taken as zero which has the 
effect of constraining long-run effects to zero. Hence we concentrate on the short-run 
effects of capital flows on the terms of trade, domestic saving and investment, and trade 
balance. 
The study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of the UK economy 
to study the incidence and growth effects of the 1980 major tax changes, by extending 
the dynamic general equilibrium tax model developed by Goulder and Summers (1989) 
in two ways; endogenous financial behaviour in the context of optimal debt-equity ratio 
choices is included; and a well-developed external sector is developed. The model, in 
essence, is based on commonly used intertemporal approach initiated by Brock and 
Turnovsky (1981) and Abel and Blanchard (1983). Economic behaviour of agents is 
derived from intertemporal optimization. Economic agents have forward-looking 
behaviour with perfect foresight. Households optimize intertemporal utility over an 
infinite horizon. Thus, saving behaviour is derived from standard microeconomic 
principles. Firms maximize the present value of its after-tax cash flow in a technology 
with adjustment costs of investment and agency costs of debt. Hence, investment 
demand functions are derived from the intertemporal optimizing behaviour of forward- 
looking firms. Also, the cost of capital is endogenously determined by optimal choices 
of debt-equity ratios which is determined by agency costs of debt together with tax rates 
favouring debt. Following the works of Hayashi (1982) and Osterberg (1989), q-theory 
type of investment functions are derived. Hence, our q ratios differ from those in 
Goulder and Summers (1989) and others; q ratios in the model are affected by the 
endogenous adjustment of financial structure. 
Given that British product and capital markets are closely integrated with those 
of its neighbours, a well-developed external sector is considered to add realism to the 
model, which is absent in most applied dynamic general equilibrium tax models. The 
demand for exports and mobility of international financial capital are assumed to be 
imperfectly elastic. 
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In order to examine interindustry and intersectoral effects, the model allows for 
producer disaggregation. It distinguishes five industries, and take into account 
differences between corporate and noncorporate sectors. The model simplifies the 
household sector by specifying them as an aggregate household. The model incorporates 
each of the major taxes in the United Kingdom. 
In this study we employ the model to simulate the effects of the major UK tax 
policy changes to have taken place during the 1980s. Our results reveal that saving- 
promoting policies (the personal and corporate income tax cuts) outweigh the negative 
effects of the write-off (first year and initial) depreciation allowances elimination. Our 
experiments with the UK major tax policy changes in the 1980s suggest that the increase 
in investment in the long run could be approximately 7.6 per cent above the base case 
steady-state value. 
We observe that differences across industries appear to be negligible. All 
industries gain from the overall tax policy changes almost at the same extent. As 
residential sector, the housing sector, largely benefit from the VAT rate rise, non- 
residential sectors largely benefit from the personal and corporate tax cuts. When 
policies are considered separately, simulation results indicate significant differences 
across sectors in the effects of various tax policy changes. Industry effects are significant 
especially between residential and non-residential sectors. Policy changes, in general, 
cause adverse consequences for the housing sector, particularly in the short run. These 
different effects are largely attributable to the existence of costs of adjustment. 
Adjustment costs to investment greatly reduce the immediate sharing of policy benefits 
and losses. For example, while the elimination of write-off capital allowances decreases 
in investment in most sectors, investment in the housing sector rises by 8.2 per cent. But 
over the longer term investment in the housing sector declines by 0.4 per cent below the 
base case steady-state value. 
Simulation results from the announced policy experiment cast light on the 
importance of incorporating forward-looking investment behaviour. In the short-run total 
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investment increases by approximately 9.2 per cent as compared with 5.5 per cent in the 
announced policy scenario 
Simulation results also suggest that models which ignore the endogenous 
adjustment of the financial structure will systematically err in predicting the response 
of investment to changes in the taxes that affect the relative attractiveness of debt 
finance and retention. In sensitivity analysis, we observe that alternative specification 
of agency costs of debt generates different investment levels, implying that opportunities 
in adjusting financial structure yield real effect. Simulation results indicate that 
companies respond to the reduced attractiveness of debt finance by shifting from debt 
finance to retention. 
The results of the simulation experiments with international financial capital 
mobility suggest that the short run effects of tax policies from differ the long-run 
outcomes. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
major aspects of the UK tax system and the major tax policy changes to have taken 
place in the 1980s. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on applied dynamic general 
equilibrium tax models. Chapter 4 describe the structure of the model. Chapter 5 focuses 
on model implementation issues. The chapter describes the model's data sources, 
parameterization methods and solution methods. Chapter 6 reports and analyzes results 
from policy simulations. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the results in the study and 
provides some concluding remarks. 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The incidence and allocation effects of tax changes have long been a principal 
concern of both policy makers and public finance economists. They were first analyzed 
in the context of 'partial equilibrium'. Partial equilibrium allow for highly disaggregated 
analysis at the cost of not considering market interactions. The second approach is 
'macroeconomics' which allows for market interactions in the context of aggregated 
models. As an alternative, the third approach is 'general equilibrium'. General 
equilibrium approach allows for both disaggregated analysis and full consideration of 
market interactions. However, unlike partial and macroeconomic analysis, general 
equilibrium fails, in general, to produce clear-cut quantitative and qualitative 
comparative statics results. This is due to the complexity and dimensionality added to 
afford full-market feedbacks in a disaggregated setting. In this chapter we will survey 
general equilibrium models, in particular, the applied model. 
Since Arrow-Debreu proved the existence of the general equilibrium, formalised 
by Leon Walras a long time ago, 'applied general equilibrium, AGE, models' have been 
used by many economists. The AGE model for tax policy evaluation was first done by 
Arnold Harberger in the late 1950s. The Harberger approach enabled general equilibrium 
effects of taxes to be quantified in the structure of a series of differential equations with 
two sectors, two factors and two goods. However, Harberger's analyses have their own 
shortcomings. In particular, the Harberger model quickly becomes intractable in dealing 
with more than two sectors or two factors. Also, the model is not suitable for 
considering large policy changes. 
The work of Scarf (1967) which develops a reliable algorithm to compute 
equilibrium prices for an Arrow-Debreu economy give rise to the emergence of 
'computable general equilibrium, CGE, models'. CGE models that rely on computational 
techniques enable one to analyze economies with many more sectors, goods, and factors. 
Furthermore, with the computational approach, the modeller does not have to be 
confined to small changes in parameters as with an analytic approach. As CGE keeps 
the desirable features of analytic general equilibrium, it is based on the use of flexible 
10 
numeric -as opposed to analytic- techniques to obtain clear unambiguous comparative 
results. 
Shoven and Whalley (1972) and subsequently several others' used CGE models 
to investigate the medium-run effects (i. e., efficiency, allocation, income distribution and 
so on) of tax policy changes. Early examples of CGE models are static; they do not 
model time and the amount of production factors are taken as fixed. This is undesirable 
in the sense that taxes, in general, affect savings and investment decisions leading to 
effects on capital accumulation which, in turn, alter the marginal productivities of both 
capital and labour and, thus factor returns. Fullerton et al., FSW, (1981,1984,1985) 
first considered time in a recursive equilibrium context, which permits CGE tax models 
to be employed to explore long-run capital accumulation and growth effects. The FSW 
model is dynamic only on the consumer side in which consumers face a choice between 
current consumption and leisure versus future consumption. The dynamics of the model 
are limited, however, in that future consumption is collapsed into a composite 
commodity. The main weaknesses of this standard CGE tax models are instantaneous 
adjustment and the lack of forward-looking behaviour. If capital adjusts instantaneously 
to changes in tax policies so that the return to capital is equalised in all sectors, then it 
is impossible to capture the capitalization effects that are central to tax incidence. 
Recently, a new generation of CGE models that are fully dynamic and incorporate 
adjustments and forward-looking behaviour has emerged. The new generation of CGE 
models have made it possible to analyze the short-, medium- and long-run effects of tax 
policy changes in an integrated way. Also it can be employed to study a number of 
issues including adjustments and capitalization effects of tax policy, announcements 
effects and permanent-temporary policy issues. Major developments in dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (DCGE) tax models have been done by Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (987); Goulder and Summers (1989); Pereira (988a, 1988b) and Perraudin and 
Pujol (1991). 
'Whalley (1988) surveys recent CGE tax models. CGE model application is not confined to tax issues. 
Trade, development and other issues such as energy and environment have been analyzed in CGE models. 
De Melo and Robinson (1989) provides recent trade and development models for developing countries. 
Also, constructive financial CGE models recently gain importance. Robinson (1991) reviews this issue. 
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In this section, we will overview DCGE tax models in great detail. Since DCGE 
tax models keeps the features of the previous CGE models, literature survey opens with 
a brief overview of 'non-dynamic' CGE models. 
2.1.1 Brief Overview of 'Non-dynamic' General Equilibrium Models 
The history of developments in general equilibrium model can be started with 
the Leon Walras' formulation of a general equilibrium. In the 1950s Arrow-Debreu 
proved the existence of Walrasian general equilibrium. After Arrow-Debreu's proof it 
was possible to convert the Walrasian general equilibrium structure from an abstract 
representation of an economy into realistic models of actual economies. The idea of 
using these models is to evaluate policy options by specifying production and demand 
parameters and defining equilibrium conditions and incorporating data reflective of real 
economies. 
Arnold Harberger (1962,1966) first introduced a general equilibrium model of 
taxation three decades ago. Harberger's model was designed to examine the interindustry 
distortion from the corporate income tax. He assigned industries to the corporate and 
non-corporate sectors based on whether they were 'heavily' or 'lightly' taxed. Each sector 
produces a single output in perfect competition using homogeneous, perfectly mobile 
labour and capital, the supplies of which were fixed in the aggregate. Harberger's results 
on the burden of the corporate income tax depended on 'factor substitution effect', and 
'output effect'. The first effect was due to the fact that the corporate income tax was 
viewed as a differential tax on capital income only. The second, referred to as the effect 
on the demand for the output of industry where a factor of production is being taxed, 
resulted from the fact that each sector's output could have a different price elasticity of 
demand, and each output could have different ý factor intensities. However, since there 
was only one consumer, using Mieszkowski's (1967) terminology there was no 'demand 
effect'. The solution technique involved total differentiation, so that, technically 
speaking, the model was appropriate only for small changes in the tax code. 
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The work of Herbert E. Scarf and Harold W. Kuhn in the middle to late 1960s 
provided a reliable algorithm for computing equilibrium prices for an Arrow-Debreu 
economy. The algorithm used simplicial subdivision techniques and can be shown to be 
the computational analog of the fixed point theorems previously used to prove the 
existence of equilibrium. With this computational technique that could solve much more 
disaggregated versions of the Harberger model, Shoven and Whalley (1972,1973) first 
examined large changes in the corporate tax rate. 
Their model has several industrial sector, in which fully mobile and 
homogeneous labour and capital are used in production in a cost minimising 
combination with a zero profit condition as a result of constant returns to scale 
assumption. There are several household groups, defined by income, that are endowed 
with labour and capital in varying amounts. These groups also derive income from 
government transfers. Households allocate their income across consumption goods 
according to principles of budget-constrained utility maximisation. There are usually ad 
valorem taxes on incomes, factors, and outputs, and these enter into the appropriate 
production and consumption decisions. Equilibrium is reached when demand and supply 
are equal for all goods and factors. The model is based on social accounting matrix, 
SAM, approach, in that data are arranged in a SAM. The model's specification and 
calibration are checked by solving it in the presence of the base set of taxes. The result 
should be exactly the initial SAM. Then the model was used to solve for a 
counterfactual equilibrium in the presence of a new tax design, which gives again a 
SAM. The equilibria were compared in order to assess the impact of the new tax plan. 
Examples of this type of modelling, surveyed in Shoven and Whalley (1984) and 
Fullerton, Henderson and Shoven (1984), can be given as, with differences in many 
aspects, Keller (1980) for Holland, Piggott-Whalley (1985) for U. K., Serra-Punche 
(1984) for Mexico, Slemrod (1893) for U. S., and Whalley (1975) for U. K.. 
These models are static in that aggregate supplies of productive factors, 
especially capital, are taken as fixed. If the capital intensity of the economy is fixed, 
many tax reform issues, such as corporate tax integration, effects of investment tax 
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credits, effects of accelerated depreciations, consumer or expenditure taxes and 
importance of saving subsidies, etc., can not be examined satisfactorily. In essence, the 
capital accumulation and capital reallocation take time and may involve adjustment 
costs. Because of these issues, FSW took the first steps towards developing a dynamic 
model. FSW built a model to solve for a time sequence. 
The dynamic feature of the FSW model is that consumers face a choice between 
consumption and leisure future consumption (which can be purchased via savings). 
Saving is equivalent to the purchase of a fixed-weight bundle of capital goods. To 
simplify the computations, these models assume that the capital stock is augmented with 
a one-year lag. Thus, the FSW model computes a sequence of static equilibria rather 
than dynamic equilibria. The production side of the model is completely static. 
2.1.2 Overview of Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Models 
2.1.2.1 Modelling Economic Decisions of Agents 
In the non-dynamic models, on the producer side and government side, there is 
no attempt for dynamic setting. Likewise, on the consumer side, the dynamics of the 
models are limited in that future consumption is collapsed into a composite commodity. 
The lack of dynamic properties of the non-dynamic model was first elaborated on the 
consumer side by Ballard (1983), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983,1984). Household 
behaviour is determined by maximisation of an additively separable, time invariant 
intertemporal utility function under an intertemporal budget constraint which equalises 
the present value of consumers' income and expenditure. Hence, consumers have the 
flexibility to plan for varying amounts of consumption in different future periods. This 
is in contrast to the FSW model, where consumers must plan for a constant level of 
consumption in all future periods. These new models also allow each consumer's 
planned allocations of consumption over time to be based on expected lifetime income, 
rather than on current income alone. In the FSW model, tax policy affected 
consumption-savings choices by influencing the expected relative prices of present and 
future consumption and by influencing current income. With these new models, policy 
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changes can influence the consumption-savings decision not only through these channels 
but also through effects on expected future incomes. 
In general, the recent models adopt the main framework of dynamic specification 
of household behaviour done by Ballard (1983), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). 
Since the main motives to save are to finance future consumption, and inter-generational 
altruism, the consumer's behaviour is modelled in a way that the motives to save are 
captured. In these models, each generation decides on its consumption and saving 
allocation for its entire lifetime. Each of them has 55 age cohorts simultaneously alive. 
Also, in Ballard (1983) and Ballard and Goulder (1985), consumers derive utility 
directly from bequeathing part of their wealth. The difference between models lies on 
the specification of budget constraint, introduction of inter-generational setting whether 
or not with bequest motives and allocation of savings. In Bovenberg (1985,1986,1989), 
Goulder and Eichengreen (1989), Pereira (1988a, 1988b), and Perraudin and Pujol 
(1991), the intertemporal budget constraint is defined as a sequence of recursive 
equations of motion on wealth. The potential advantage of doing so is to accommodate 
liquidity constraints. Perraudin and Pujol introduces liquidity constraints in a way that 
poor households face liquidity constraints that prevent them from borrowing against their 
future labour income. However, it should be recognised that in the absence of liquidity 
constraints, the two specifications of the household intertemporal budget constraint are 
essentially equivalent. 
Depending on whether financial assets are introduced or not, allocation of saving 
should be under consideration. If there is only one consumer and one financial asset 
besides physical capital, allocation of saving is a straightforward issue. This type of 
models, used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff, and Feltenstein (1984,1986), enable one to 
analyze crowding-out effects of tax changes. Having financial assets such as private 
bonds and equity into model involves tying physical capital to firms, and thereby 
allocating savings into the financial assets. This allocation of savings has been done 
endogenously by Feltenstein, Goulder and Summers, and Pereira under exogenous 
financial behaviour. Obviously, this is not an optimal allocation. An exceptional work 
in this area is done by Goulder and Eichengreen. Under certainty conditions, they 
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Table 1 
Dynamic applied general equilibrium models 
CAPABILITIES 
Horizon 
Efficiency Effects 
Inter-gene- Intertemp 
rational Savings 
oral 
Inter-sectoral 
Capital 
intensity 
decisions 
Fb. noil dec. 
Debt/ 
Equity 
Auerbach- Infinite Yes Optimal 1 Sector Optimal No 
Kotlikoff 
(1987) 
Ballard- Infinite No Optimal 19 Sectors Not No 
Goulder 
(1985) 
Bovenberg Infinite No Optimal 2 Sectors Optimal No 
(1985,1986) 
Erlich et al. No Optimal 24 Sectors Not No 
(1987) 
Feltenstein Two years No Optimal 30 Sectors Not No 
(1986) 
Goulder- Infinite No Optimal 9 Sectors Optimal Exogenous 
Eichengreen 
(1989) 
Goulder- Infinite No Optimal 5 Sectors Optimal Exogenous 
Summers 
(1989) 
Jorgenson- Infinite No Optimal 1 Sector Optimal No 
Yun (1990) 
Pereira Finite No Optimal 4 Sectors Optimal Exogenous 
(1988) 
Perraudin- Infinite Yes Optimal 3 Sectors Optimal No 
Pujol (1991) 
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Table 1. (continued) 
CAPABILITIES 
Financial Effects 
Dividend/ Portfolio Liquidity Crowding- Capital Private fin. 
Retention Selection constraint out effects flows Asset 
Auerbach- No No No 
Kotlikoff 
(1987) 
Ballard- No No No 
Goulder 
(1985) 
Bovenberg No Non-optimal No 
(1985,1986) 
Erlich et al. No Non-optimal No 
(1987) 
Feltenstein No Non-optimal No 
(1986) 
Goulder- Exogenous Optimal No 
Eichengreen 
(1989) 
Goulder- Exogenous Non-optimal No 
Summers 
(1989) 
Jorgenson- No No No 
Yun (1990) 
Pereira Exogenous Non-optimal No 
(1988) 
Perraudin- No Non-optimal Yes 
Pujol (1991) 
Yes Closed No private 
economy fin. assets 
No No No 
No Yes No private 
fin. assets 
No Yes No private 
fin. assets 
Yes No No private 
fin. assets 
No No Domestic and 
fmign equities 
and bonds 
No No Equity and 
bond 
No Closed 
economy 
Yes Closed 
economy 
Yes Yes 
No private 
fin. assets 
Equity, and 
bond 
No private 
fin. assets 
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Table 1. (continued) 
CAPABILITIES FtNCI L 
Labour Product Endogenous FORMS 
supply Government different. terms of Trade Consumption 
decisions expenditures in imports trade effect balance function 
Auerbach- Endogenous Exogenous Closed Closed Closed CES 
Kotlikoff economy economy economy 
(1987) 
Ballard- Endogenous Exogenous Yes Yes Balanced Stone-Geary 
Goulder trade 
(1985) 
Bovenberg Exogenous Exogenous Yes Yes Two country CES 
(1985,1986) model 
Erlich et al. Exogenous Exogenous No No Interna. trade Stone-Geary 
(1987) welfare func. 
Feltenstein Endogenous Exogenous Yes No Foreign cons. Two period 
(1986) specification 
Goulder- Exogenous Endogenous Yes Yes Two country CES 
Eichengreen Composition model 
(1989) 
Goulder Exogenous Endogenous Yes No Balanced CES 
-Summers composition trade 
(1989) 
Jorgenson Endogenous Exogenous Closed Closed Closed CES 
-Yun (1990) economy economy economy 
Pereira(1988) Endogenous Endo. level Closed Closed Closed CD 
and comp. economy economy economy 
Perraudin- Endogenous Exogenous Yes Yes Semi-small CES 
Pujol (1991) economy 
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Table 1. (continued) 
FUNCTIONAL FORMS IMPLEMENTATION 
Budget Production Investment Adjustment Country Computation 
constraints functions specification cost func. data/year Algorithm 
Auerbach- Intertemporal CES q-theory 
Kotlikoff 
(1987) 
Ballard- Intertemporal CES Exogenous 
Goulder 
(1985) 
Bovenberg Dynamic CD q-theory 
(1985,1986) 
Erlich et al. Intertemporal Leontief, Exogenous 
(1987) CD in VA 
Feltenstein Two yearly Leontief, Exogenous 
(1986) constraint CES in VA 
Goulder- Dynamic Leontief, q-theory 
Eichengreen CES in VA 
(1989) 
Goulder- Intertemporal Leontief, q-theory 
Summers CES in VA 
(1989) 
Jorgenson- Intertemporal Dual translog Neoclassical 
Yun (1990) price func. 
Pereira Dynamic Leontief, Neoclassical 
(1988) CD in VA 
Quadratic 
in I/K 
No 
Quadratic 
in I/K 
No 
No 
U. S. 
plausible/ 
hypothetical 
U. S. 
1973 
U. S. 
plausible/ 
hypothetical 
Belgium 
Gauss-Seidel 
Fair-Taylor 
method (int. ) 
Tato. (sta. ) 
Dynamic vets. 
Jorgenson's 
linearisation 
Negishi's 
optimisation 
Merrill's 
optimisation 
Fair-Taylor 
method (int. ) 
III alg. (sta) 
Fair-Taylor 
method (int. ) 
Powell alg. (sta) 
Econometric 
estimation 
NPSOL 
optimisation 
algorithm 
Gauss-Seidel 
Quadratic 
in I/K 
Quadratic 
in I/K 
No 
Quadratic 
in I 
Perraudin- Dynamic CES q-theory Quadratic 
Pujol (1991) in I/K 
Australia 
1981-1982 
U. S. 
1973 
U. S. 
1973 
U. S. 
1955-1980 
U. S. 
1973 
France 
plausible/ 
hypothetical 
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Table 1. (continued) 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Policy issues 
Auerbach- Consumption tax, capital income versus wage income taxation, effects of 
Kotlikoff taxation on capital formation, dynamic fiscal policy issues and effects 
(1987) of government deficits. 
Ballard- Effects of the adoptation of a pure consumption tax, importance of consumers' foresight 
Goulder in terms of welfare. 
(1985) 
Bovenberg Effects of pure consumption taxation, capital income taxation in open 
(1985,1986) economy. 
Erlich et al. Real wage policies in Belgium. 
(1987) 
Feltenstein Financial crowding-out in Australia. 
(1986) 
Goulder- Saving and investment incentives policies in open economy. 
Eichengreen 
(1989) 
Goulder- Corporate tax cut, reduced investment tax credit and announcement effects of these policies. 
Summers 
(1989) 
Jorgenson- Effects of several programs of tax reform on the allocation of capital. 
Yun (1990) 
Pereira Corporate tax integration, effects of re-introducing investment tax credit. 
(1988) 
Perraudin- Consumption tax, capital income versus wage income taxation, influential role of 
Pujol (1991) government debt stocks, terms of trade effects and tax evaluation, capital flows. 
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allocate savings between domestic and foreign assets. They posit a portfolio preference 
function that is consistent with the observed home-country preference can be embedded 
within a utility maximizing framework that allows households to adjust asset shares in 
accordance with differences in rates of return. 
The framework of the standard general equilibrium models that capital is 
homogeneous mobile across industries, and fixed in total supply was less helpful in 
analyzing tax incidence, particularly over time. Because in the real world, capital is 
industry-specific factor and thereby becomes imperfectly mobile between industries. 
Capital could increase in an industry only as a result of investment being greater than 
depreciation and could not be physically moved from one industry to another. Fullerton 
(1983) analyzed the effects of imperfectly mobile capital in a model with constraints 
limiting the scope of capital adjustment in each industry within a given time interval. 
Given the fact that in the real world investments are irreversible, and there are 
installation costs of capital when adjusting capital toward its optimal level, the 
shortcomings of the Fullerton's analysis are obvious in that forward-looking investment 
behaviour and adjustment costs are lacking. For example, the fact of irreversible 
investment decisions is clearly going to affect a firm's attitude to the future, taking great 
care to avoid mistakes. A profit-maximising firm will have to consider the expected 
profitability of potential new capital goods over the whole of their lifetime if, once 
purchased, they cannot be resold. A particular worry will be the possibility of a fall in 
demand at some future date leaving the firm with a lot of expensive new equipment and 
little demand for the potential product of this new capacity. Adjustment costs have also 
an importance on investment decisions, in that capital is a quasi-fixed factor; it can be 
changed but only if the firm is prepared to bear an adjustment cost. On the other hand, 
with adjustment costs, optimal profits will, in general, be non-zero even with constant 
returns to scale technology. Hence, the intertemporal output path for the firm is 
endogenously, optimally, and uniquely determined. 
In the DCGE tax models firms maximise either their market value as the present 
discounted value of the future stream of dividends or the present discounted value of net 
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cash flow. In the first specification, dynamic production and investment behaviour are 
linked to Tobin's q theory. This maximisation is constrained by the adjustment-cost 
technology and equation of motion describing the motion of the capital stock. 
In most non-dynamic models, the authors have assumed that the government 
budget is in balance. In particular, a balanced budget is a necessary assumption in a 
model without paper assets, due to the fact that deficits must be financed by an increase 
in government securities or by money creation. On the other hand, even if paper assets 
exist, there is no need to specify government budget deficit. The reason is that general 
equilibrium models provide a solution for relative prices, and thus allocation of 
resources depends only on relative prices, and not on absolute prices. However, since 
the tax systems are generally non-neutral with respect to inflation, and policies that 
affect absolute prices have allocational impacts. 
Hence, allowing government to run deficits that creates crowding-out effects 
would be considered as another area which causes non-optimality of resource allocation, 
to be modelled. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983,1987), Feltenstein (1984,1986) and 
Perraudin and Pujol (1991) modelled the economy with government budget deficits. In 
the Auerbach and Kotlikoff deficits are financed by an issuance of government bond. 
Feltenstein included money into his model and hence financed deficits with a mix of 
creation of money and issuance of bond. Clearly, the specification of government budget 
constraint with deficits requires a dynamic setting. Because at the end, government debt 
should be repaid to the household sector, and considerable by an increase in taxes and/or 
a reduction in spending but not again borrowing. With this fact, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 
and Perraudin and Pujol specified an intertemporal government budget constraint. 
Feltenstein did not consider the future repayment of public debt, that is that government 
is not subject to any intertemporal constraint, which is, in a sense, an ad-hoc 
specification. In Pereira (1988a, 1988b), a sequence of recursive equations of motion 
reflecting the evolution of the public debt, allowing for government budget imbalances 
in which liquidity constraints on government borrowing can be implemented was used. 
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From the fact that government behaviour is constrained by balanced budget, 
either the level of government spending or tax revenues can be determined endogenously 
within the model as long as specifying one of them exogenously. In general, tax 
parameters are given, therefore the amount of government revenue can be calculated, in 
turn, the level of government spending is determined endogenously. However, in order 
to determine the level of government expenditure optimally, the model needs specifying 
a social welfare function which would be, as adopted in the literature, over indirect 
utility function of households, as more theoretical way. This type of treatment of 
government behaviour has been done in static CGE models by few modellers. In most 
of CGE tax models, the level of government expenditure are determined only 
endogenously but not optimally. However, the composition of public expenditures is 
often optimally determined, giving the government a utility function, and keeping utility 
as constant when replication analysis is done, in Ballard et al. (1985), Erlich et al. 
(1987), and Goulder and Summers (1989). 
Only Pereira (1988a, 1988b) attempts to address both the incorporation of deficits 
and the determination of government expenditures. The path of government expenditures 
and deficits/surpluses (and therefore the path for debt) are endogenously and optimally 
determined, with a social welfare function over the domain of an aggregate public good. 
Such public good is assumed to be produced using capital, labour, and intermediate 
inputs according to a well behaved production function. Pereira states that this 
optimisation objective is consistent with a modelling of consumer behaviour in which 
the public good does not enter the set of budget constraints and is not a decision 
variable. He adds that this is equivalent to having the public good enter additively in 
time t to the private functions. Thus the marginal rates of substitution between private 
goods do not depend on the level of availability of public good. The government is then 
assumed to act emphatically with the private consumers according to a constrained social 
utility maximising problem. 
In the tradition of CGE modelling, the emphasis on external side is given to 
commodity flows between countries rather than capital flows. No model include flows 
of international reserves or a role for monetary policy. Within the area of commodity 
23 
flows, most of the open economy models (e. g.. Ballard (1983) and Ballard and Goulder 
(1985)) follow the assumptions of balanced trade, with import and export net demands 
characterised by constant elasticities along the lines of Ballard et al. (1985); hereafter, 
BFSW (1985). In the models, a common approach is to use the so-called 'Armington' 
formulation which treats similar products produced in different countries as different 
goods. Among other reasons, the Armington formulation is usually adopted in order to 
accommodate the phenomenon of countries both importing and exporting the same good 
(cross hauling). 
Among the CGE tax models, Goulder et al. (1983) first attempted to incorporate 
the international capital flows, allowing a foreign consumer who is endowed with large 
quantities of those commodities that the United States imports, and with a large amount 
of capital services rent some of his endowment to be used in U. S. production if the U. S. 
rental price of capital increases above the benchmark level (capital inflow). On the other 
hand, if the U. S. rental price of capital were to fall below the benchmark level, the 
foreigner would rent U. S. capital for his foreign consumption (capital outflow). They 
also attempted to model direct foreign investment, allowing the foreigners to purchase 
capital goods instead of renting them. 
In Feltenstein (1984,1986), international financial flows are introduced by adding 
foreign bond. The rest of the world is treated as an additional consumer group endowed 
with financial assets, money and bonds. Both foreign and home consumer groups 
demand these financial assets. Bovenberg (1986,1989) develops a model in which two 
economies are considered, each following intertemporal perfect-foresight paths. These 
economies meet in the international forum. His papers continue the work on two country 
model in Goulder et al. (1983) but differ from their study in several important respects. 
Most importantly on contrary to this previous study, his papers explicitly distinguish 
between the mobility of financial capital and the mobility of physical capital. The 
framework developed by Bovenberg also adds to Goulder et al. (1983) by modelling 
production both at home and abroad. This allows international capital flows to affect the 
productivity of capital in both parts of the world. 
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Among the new generation of DCGE tax models, only Erlich et al. (1987) 
incorporated the international capital flows in the context that foreign trade is generated 
according to an intertemporal trade welfare function with constant import and export 
elasticities. In the short run the model allows international trade imbalances, which 
generate capital flows to the domestic households. In the long run, however, trade 
balance is assumed. 
The aspects of non-dynamic general equilibrium tax models have highlighted 
their use in studying intersectoral distortions. The new generation of dynamic CGE tax 
models added studying intertemporal distortions. Models with financial behaviour may 
be used for analyzing three additional distortions caused by personal and corporate 
income taxes. These are inefficiencies in portfolio allocation, in the choice between debt 
and equity finance, and in dividend payout rates. Given that countries experience large 
government deficits, current account trade imbalances, and sizeable accumulated foreign 
debt, the inclusion of these features in policy models requires an explicit treatment of 
financial assets. 
Mainly the new generation of DCGE tax models devoted attention to the real 
side of the economy. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983,1987) allow for government debt 
thereby introducing government budget deficit into their model. Feltenstein (1984,1986) 
also allows for government debt, adding money in a way that it is demanded by 
consumers for transaction motives and exogenously given fraction as a store of value, 
as well. In these models savings finances changes in government debt and physical 
capital. Private and public assets are perceived by the households as perfect substitutes. 
The allocation of savings merely adjusts to the relative demands for funds. 
Goulder and Summers (1989) and Pereira (1988a, 1988b) introduce a whole 
menu of financial assets as well as firm-specific equity capital. Pereira also allows for 
government bond. The treatment of the rate of return of assets are different, in that 
assets earn different rates of return in Goulder and Summers whereas Pereira model 
assets are seen as to be expected to yield the same rate of return and therefore are 
perceived as perfect substitutes. However, in Goulder and Summers, such rates are equal 
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up to constant and exogenous sector-specific risk premiums. Hence, the different asset 
types allow consideration of debt/equity and dividend/retention rules and therefore 
several sources of investment financing; bonds, equity, and retained earnings. 
Although a few of DCGE tax models, in particular, Goulder and Summers, and 
Pereira (1988a, 1988b) introduce endogenous financial behaviour, the decisions on 
financial assets, the allocation of savings, investment financing and government debt 
path, are not optimally determined. Only, Pereira(1988a, 1988b) determines government 
debt path optimally. In order to determine endogenous portfolio selection of households 
the model requires a treatment of uncertainty. Slemrod (1985) has attempted to 
incorporate modern portfolio behaviour on the part of consumers, while Fullerton and 
Gordon (1983) have capital intensity and optimal financial decisions jointly determined 
through a two-stage process. 
As stated before, virtually all the surveyed models are based on Walrasian 
market-clearing assumptions, perfectly competitive markets and atomistic competition 
among agents. Almost, none of the surveyed models consider Keynesian economic 
issues, such as market disequilibria or price stickiness. The only exception is Erlich et 
al. (1987)'s treatment of rigidity of wage rate in the short-run leading to a disequilibrium 
in the labour market and thereby generating an endogenous unemployment in the 
short-run. 
Since given the dynamic nature of the economy's behaviour, market-clearing 
prices in each period depend on expectations of future prices and tax variables, the 
importance of expectations in effecting policy outcomes turns out to be obvious. 
Expectations affect short-run stabilisation policy outcomes, as mostly have focused on, 
and also long-run policy outcomes, capital accumulation and welfare effects, as worked 
on by Ballard (1987). Moreover, expectations lead to implications on type of equilibrium 
and computation of models. In the surveyed models, modellers adopt three different 
approaches to expectations. With the first approach, the researcher assumes that it 
depends only on previous or current prices and not on any prices to be realised in the 
future. Both myopic expectations (where only current prices determine expectations and 
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influence behaviour) and adaptive expectations (where previous prices also enter in) are 
consistent with this approach. CGE models adopting this approach include FSW (1983) 
with myopic expectation assumption and Ballard (1987) and Pereira (1988a, 1988b) as 
a comparison. 
The second, popular, approach assumes perfect foresight on the part of key 
economic agents. Some of them are Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and Goulder and 
Summers (1989). The third approach considers a flexible amount of foresight in terms 
of years over which price movements are foreseen. Pereira°s model (1988a, 1988b) is 
an example of this approach, and also includes a wide range of expectation rules. 
The choice of one of these approaches is ultimately made on philosophic 
grounds. In terms of equilibrium, these approaches imply two concepts of equilibrium, 
perfect-foresight and temporary equilibrium (in the case of non-perfect expectations). In 
what follows, the concepts of equilibrium have different implications. The 
dimensionality of the equilibrium solution algorithm with perfect-foresight grows and 
becomes the number of periods times the number of markets whereas a temporary 
equilibrium requires dimension as much as the number of markets, in each year. 
2.1.2.2 Implementing Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Tax Analysis 
The technical aspects of operating applied general equilibrium models are 
parameterisation procedure, solution methods, and measurement of efficiency and 
distributional gains. 
In order to find values of parameters, having the fact that the size of models and 
their integrated structure make it impossible to simultaneously estimate all parameter 
values using conventional simultaneous equation econometric techniques, pointed out by 
Mansur-Whalley (1984), the so-called, non-stochastic, 'calibration method' has been 
mainly used. With this fact, only one year's data suffice to carry out parameterisation 
procedure. 
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Two calibration approaches have been used in the literature. The first approach 
is referred to as 'quantitative approach". With this approach, calibration procedure must 
satisfy two sorts of requirements: first, replication of base-year data is required; second, 
in the base case, the model must generate an intertemporal balanced growth path. 
Accordingly, the parameterisation procedure involves selecting certain parameters, such 
as substitution elasticities, from outside sources and identifying remaining parameters 
and economic flows restrictions implied by the two requirements above, using a set data. 
In general, data are gathered from available sources for a particular year and are 
inconsistent, and therefore the data must be adjusted for consistency. In this way the 
model satisfy the strong assumption that the data represent an equilibrium of the 
economy. The consistent data set represents what is often referred to as the 'benchmark 
equilibrium'. The quantitative calibration approach has been adopted by Ballard (1983), 
Ballard and Goulder (1985), and Goulder and Summers (1989), following the practice 
of the FSW work. 
The second approach, called as 'qualitative calibration', chooses the structural 
parameters exogenously so that the economy follows a reasonable path into the future. 
With this approach, given the recursive nature of the dynamic economy, only initial 
stock values are needed by the model. With initial conditions on the stocks of say, 
private wealth, capital and government debt, agents optimise and thereby generate a first 
round of net demands and equilibrium conditions. In turn, the equilibrium prices will 
determine the evolution of stock variables in the next period. The qualitative calibration 
approach has been followed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983,1987), Bovenberg (1985, 
1986,1989) and Pereira (1988a, 1988b). 
Once the parameterisation procedure has been done and the data set available, 
the next job is to solve the model. Given the existing state of the art, there is no 'canned' 
program that one can use to solve all CGE models. The modeller must therefore exploit 
the mathematical (and economic) properties of the system in order to reduce the number 
of nonlinear equations that must eventually be solved. The modeller then must choose 
among existing algorithms of varying complexity and applicability, no one which 
dominates for all models. First a solution strategy should be adopted to establish 
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numerically a set of simultaneous nonlinear functions (generally excess demand 
equations) whose solution will provide the equilibrium values of all the endogenous 
variables in the model. Then a solution algorithm (computational technique) is necessary 
to solve the set of simultaneous nonlinear equations numerically. 
In dynamic models, there are sets of markets that must be cleared: factor 
markets, product markets, and asset markets. Although it is possible to attack all three 
sets of markets simultaneously, it is usually more efficient in computational terms to 
separate them. Depending on the assumptions made in the models, it would be possible 
to make dimensionality reduction and only some of the markets would matter. In the 
case of recursive dynamic general equilibrium models, with the assumptions that factors 
of production are fully mobile across industries, no profits occur in any of the available 
activities that have fixed input-output coefficients, and the demand functions are 
homogeneous of order zero, the product markets and asset markets are essentially 
substituted out and there is no need to compute excess demands for products. However, 
it cannot be used in such models in which some factor such as capital is fixed by sector 
('putt-clay' model of capital), due to the fact that cost prices will not then be independent 
of production levels. It also cannot be used easily if the demands for products depends 
in any way on the sectoral structure of production (i. e. government tax revenues depend 
on the structure of production). Finally, if there are financial assets, we must take into 
account that asset markets generate wealth incomes to consumers. 
Furthermore, in the case of perfect-foresight equilibrium, the solution strategy 
must extend to include intertemporal equilibrium condition. Besides within-period 
equilibrium, which requires that the overall demand for labour equal its supply that 
output demand equal supply for each sector, that firms' demands for funds (total 
borrowing exclusive of retained earnings) equal total household saving, and that 
government expenditures equal government revenues, intertemporal equilibrium 
condition under perfect foresight expectations requires a three-stage procedure, a 
base-case steady-state, a revised case steady-state, and a transition path for the economy 
between these two steady states. 
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Finally, there are a variety of solution algorithms that work directly with the 
various excess demand equations, using the kind of solution strategies described above. 
These algorithms can be divided into three types: (1) those based on fixed-point 
theorems (2) those based on a tatonnement process and (3) those exploiting information 
about the derivatives of the excess demand functions. 
Algorithms based on fixed-point theorems (Scarfs simplicial search method and 
Merrill's grid search algorithm) are truly elegant mathematically and a major advantage 
of this approach is that convergence is guaranteed within a finite number of dimensions 
on the simplex. All the Shoven and Whalley type models and Feltenstein utilised this 
method. 
Algorithms based on a tatonnement process simply adjust the price in each sector 
in response to that sector's excess demand. The Gauss-Seidel iteration procedure is a 
special version of tatonnoment process. In particular, in the case of Gauss-Seidel 
iteration, successful convergence to an equilibrium depends in principle upon judicial 
selection of starting values and step size. The costs of the Gauss-Seidel method depend 
on efficient ordering of equations into simultaneous and recursive blocks. Among the 
surveyed models, only Auerbach and Kotlikoff has used Gauss-Seidel method. 
The third class of algorithms that deals directly with the set of algebraic excess 
demand equations is defined by their use of derivatives of the functions. In the case of 
Newton's method, the search involves a movement across the simplex in directions 
indicated by the local behaviour of excess demand functions at any point under 
consideration. Steps can be large or small and there is no guarantee that the search 
procedure will terminate with an equilibrium solution. A preferable algorithm has been 
considered by Powell as an extension of Newton. The Powell algorithm has mainly 
been chosen due to that it does not require the analytic specification of the derivatives 
of the excess demand functions. The Powell algorithm is employed by Goulder and 
Summers. 
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To solve intertemporal equilibrium, the following algorithms are used: a variant 
of Fair-Taylor (by Goulder and Summers), a variant of Negishi's linearisation method 
(by Erlich et al. ) and dynamic version of Johanson's linearisation method (by 
Bovenberg). Fair-Taylor method is similar to Gauss-Seidel procedure in algorithmic 
terms. Therefore , Auerbach and Kotlikoff adopted Gauss-Seidel iteration procedure, 
with a different solution strategy than Goulder and Summers. With the Negishi's 
approach, the economic equilibrium can be generated as a solution of a mathematical 
program whose objective function is a weighted sum of utility functions of the various 
agents, while the constraint set consists of the market clearing conditions. The 
Johanson's linearisation method employed by Bovenberg is to reduce the CGE model 
to a set of log-linear equations (linear in growth rates) in all the endogenous variables. 
The system of linear equations can be solved by inverting the resulting matrix of 
coefficients, which is the simplest possible solution algorithm. Being essentially 
determined by the continuous time nature of the model, Bovenberg's linearisation 
method has the disadvantage of confining the analysis to infinitesimal changes around 
the base-case equilibrium. Pereira relies on an optimisation algorithm developed by Gill, 
et al. (1986). In this algorithm the equilibrium conditions are seen as nonlinear equality 
constraints in the minimisation of an artificial objective function. 
Although it is the fact that without a social welfare function, it is impossible to 
state unambiguously that one equilibrium or a path of equilibria is better than an 
alternative, unless the improvement follows Pareto's law -that is, no-one is worse off. 
What the investigators do in the CGE models in measuring the change in economic 
efficiency of the welfare of a policy change is analogous to the measurement of costs 
and benefits in cost-benefit analysis. With a dynamic structure of the model, a dynamic 
path of prices and endowments is computed, and then this path is compared with the 
path of the economy when there is no policy change by using individual utility functions 
over future horizon. 
For those infinite time models, with steady-state equilibrium condition, it is 
possible to approximate the contribution to discounted utility of these infinite streams 
using results from simulations over a finite time interval. To assess the welfare change 
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implied by the adoption of a new policy, a welfare measure which is dynamic analog 
of the Hicksian compensating variation or equivalent variation is employed. When 
perfect foresight is assumed there are no difficulties associated with the use of the 
standard Hicksian indicators. 
If expectations are not self-fulfilling, Ballard and Goulder take some steps in that 
direction by defining an indicator that accommodates periods in the future. However, the 
issue is more fundamental in the context of a general temporary equilibrium framework. 
In such circumstances, Pereira (1988a, 1988b) develops a dynamic generalisation of the 
Hicksian indicators obtained from the present discounted value of a sequence of 
short-run optimal expenditures functions consistent with a base-case expected future 
stream of utilities. No model enter the government's expenditures into this calculation. 
However, this is less serious owing to the equal revenue-equal expenditure constraint; 
that is the government has the same real resources available to it under both the old and 
new policy regimes. A related problem arises for the models that use an equal-yield 
strategy, the question is how to interpret the concept of equal-yield when the 
government is allowed to run deficits. 
2.1.2.3 Empirical Evidence from Selected Policy Issues 
Early quantitative public finance models emphasised the incidence effects of 
taxes in a general equilibrium framework which allows modellers to capture demand 
side (utility substitution and income) effects and supply side (factor substitution and 
output) effects of taxes, simultaneously. Recently CGE modellers incorporated other tax 
effects, such as capital accumulation, capitalization and financial effects. The emphasis 
has been extended so as to investigate the effects of taxes on savings and investment 
decisions of agents under closed economy assumption and open economy assumption 
with international capital flows as well, and with financial assets. In addition to tax 
effects, the new generation dynamic CGE tax models considered real and financial 
crowding-out effects of government debt policy. 
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Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) list key issues in the area of dynamic fiscal policy 
as follows: Effects of the choice of tax base on saving, welfare and efficiency gains, the 
impact of business tax and tax incentives on the investment behaviour, the impact of 
deficit finance on short- and long-term interest rates and thereby private investment 
(crowding out effect of government deficits), the efficiency costs of progressive taxation 
in comparison with the costs of proportional taxation, and announcement effects of 
policy changes and the role of expectations. These theoretical issues have been 
investigated in the examples of the integration of corporate and personal income tax, 
replacement of income with consumption tax, introduction of the investment tax credit, 
financial crowding-out effects of government deficits and announcement effects of policy 
changes and the role of consumer expectations. 
The policy that has received the most attention from CGE modellers is the 
integration of the corporate and personal income tax, probably because Harberger 
originally examined the incidence and efficiency consequences of the corporate income 
tax with his two-sector model. It has long been recognised that the existence of separate 
taxes on corporate income and personal income may reduce the efficiency of the 
allocation of capital because this separate taxation is widely acknowledged to lead to a 
number of problems associated with the 'double' taxation of corporate income. BFSW 
(1985) and Pereira (1988b) provide some evidence on integration. Goulder and Summers 
also reports the effects of a corporate tax cut. They all use the same data of the U. S. 
economy for 1973. Such a complete elimination of the corporate tax and its replacement 
by increased personal income tax rates in the Pereira's work yields a very moderate 
long-run benefits which is never larger than 0.17% of the present value of future 
consumption and leisure. This is almost four times lower than the figure supplied by 
BFSW (1985) in the case of additive scaling of marginal personal income tax to 
maintain the assumption of equal revenue yield. It could be argued that the difference 
may be due to that Pereira (1988b) incorporates the distortions resulted from financial 
crowding-out effects of government deficits, and the existence of costs of adjustment 
reflecting an adjustment lag in the interindustry investment decisions and in turn restrict 
the mobility of capital across industries, and considers a whole set of different financial 
assets which allows the model to capture the fact that different assets are treated 
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differently by the tax code both at the personal and corporate income levels and defines 
the financial behaviour of the firms. 
However, Slemrod (1983,1985), going further on the work of Pereira (1988a, 
1988b), has modelled optimal household portfolio decisions but in a static environment 
and has obtained benefits from integration which are twice as large as those reported 
in BFSW (1985). Part of the difference has been attributed to the fact that Slemrod's 
model is static and labour supply is exogenous. On the other hand, by not letting the 
households optimally adjust their portfolio to the new conditions after integration, a 
source of efficiency is not accounted for. Therefore, the results in the works of BFSW 
and Pereira may be biased downwardly. 
Fullerton and Gordon (1983) focused on financial decisions of firms, reporting 
efficiency gains of 0.6 per cent of GNP from the elimination of the tax distortions 
favouring debt. However, when they eliminate the corporate tax and replace it with 
increased personal income taxes, additional distortions are created in the optimal labour 
and leisure decisions. 
The results reported in Slemrod (1983,1985), Fullerton and Gordon (1983), and 
BFSW (1985) are important, but they may be severely biased. Several aspects of 
economic behaviour and modelling that are crucial for the study of income tax 
integration, such as the absence of government deficits (which creates financial 
crowding-out effects), the lack of forward-looking investment behaviour and the 
introduction of financial assets, have not been captured in any of these models. 
Goulder and Summers (1989) does not provide efficiency effects of tax changes. 
Therefore it is not comparable to the other studies above. A corporate tax cut, from 0.46 
to 0.34 in all industries, leads to simulate investment through higher q values and in turn 
results in steady increases in the capital stock. In the new steady state, the capital stock 
is above the base case value by 9.1 per cent in the case of manufacturing sector. 
However, short-run effects of policy changes are different depending on whether policy 
change is announced or surprise. In first year and fifth year, the rates of increases in the 
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capital stock of manufacturing industry are 4.9 (9.3) per cent 6.0 (6.6) per cent 
respectively with surprise (announced) policy changes. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) analyses the impact on capital formation of tax 
reform. From their results, it could, for example, be said that the increase in the steady 
state value of the capital stock from switching to consumption taxation is about 25 per 
cent. They examine the financial crowding-out effects of government deficits on capital 
formation, unlike Goulder and Summers (1989). They concluded that deficit finance and 
government consumption can significantly crowd out capital formation. Tax cuts of short 
duration can lead to short-run crowding in, although substantial crowding out occurs in 
the long-run. Hence, short-term changes in capital formation may provide little or no 
guide to the ultimate impact of deficit finance. Crowding out from deficit finance is a 
very slow process because it results from increased consumption spending over 
potentially long horizons. Deficit policies that lead to a very sizeable increases in 
long-term interest rates may involve no change or even declines in short-term interest 
rates. The inclusion of adjustment costs to the life cycle model has only a trivial affect 
on time path of interest rates arising from a policy of deficit finance, despite its 
smoothing of the path of the capital stock. 
Feltenstein (1986) also allows for crowding-out analysis and concludes that small 
increases in real government spending are found not to lead to crowding out, while an 
increase in the debt financed portion of the government's budget deficit does lead to 
crowding out. 
A related topic to capital income taxation is the impact of business tax incentives 
on capital formation and investment. The term 'business tax incentives' is used to 
comprise saving incentives and investment incentives. The distinction is made such that 
investment incentives treat old and new capital equally. The emphasis is given to 
investment incentives. It may be due to the fact that saving incentives represent a shift 
from income to wage taxation, whereas investment incentives represent a shift from 
income to consumption tax which is more efficient than labour income taxes. 
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The well-known investment incentive, investment tax credit is addressed in 
Goulder and Summers (1989) and Pereira (1988b). Goulder and Summers show that 
eliminating the investment tax credit causes a reduction of about 12 per cent in the rate 
of investment in the new long-run steady state. With a previous policy announcement, 
the overall attractiveness of investment has declined leading to a downward shift in the 
investment profile. However, the reduction in investment is slight in years prior to 
implementation of the new policy. The steady-state effects of this policy change are the 
same as in the pre-announced policy case previously described. In the experiment of the 
elimination of the investment tax credit accompanied by a reduction of the corporate tax 
rate, which is 'revenue neutral' early years of policy change and then starts revenue 
losing as a result of behaviourial adjustment to the new tax regime, this combined policy 
reduces the aggregate capital stock by 3.5 percent. They conclude, after carrying out an 
opposite type of combined policy -a doubling of the investment tax credit combined with 
a revenue preserving increase in the corporate tax- increasing investment tax credit 
would be preferable in terms of capital formation. 
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CHAPTER 3 TAX REFORM 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The whole direction of tax policy in the United Kingdom in the 1980s has 
changed significantly, compared with the dominant approach of the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, tax policy was concerned with conjunctural policy (demand 
management), with the aim of achieving a "better" distribution of income, and devising 
incentives to correct market failures and intervene selectively to increase the growth of 
productive potential. Economic incentives are designed to stimulate the level of 
investment in order to achieve a desirable rate of growth of productive potential. 
The changes in the economic environment that took place during the 1970s have 
led to a different approach to economic policy, which has been reflected in taxation 
policy. The almost universal recognition of the distortions and inequities created by high 
tax burden and rates, years of inflation, and ineffective tax preferences led many 
industrial countries of the world including the United Kingdom to reform their tax 
systems. 
Analysts have recognized that despite their names, neither the "personal income 
tax" not the "corporate income tax" was a true income tax. The facts that unrealized 
capital gains and imputed income are not taxed, generous exemptions are provided, and 
savings are greatly sheltered in the tax system resemble the rules that would apply under 
a consumption tax, so the UK income tax system, like other countries is a mixed or a 
hybrid system that contain both income tax and consumption tax features. ' Accordingly, 
as in other countries, the UK government faced a choice in deciding the elements of a 
comprehensive tax reform. They could have affirmed the principles of income taxation 
or they could have moved decisively to convert the hybrid tax to a true consumption tax. 
Although in the 1970s there was an interest in the consumption tax, which is reflected 
in the Meade Report (Meade 1978) - the same interest is reflected in Blueprints for 
Basic Tax Reform (1977) in the United States as well - in many respects the former 
"income taxation" was chosen, repealing a number of provisions that are inconsistent 
2For a comprehensive discussion see Aaron, Galper and Pechman (1988), and Bird and Cnossen 
(1990) 
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with income taxation, broadening both personal and corporation tax bases, and lowering 
and flattening marginal rates of the personal and corporate income taxes. The conviction 
behind this base-broadening/rate-flattening approach is that as a less distortionary tax 
system requires low marginal tax rates, a horizontally equitable tax system may be 
achieved with taxes levied on broad bases. The striking feature in the UK tax reform is 
to eliminate capital subsidies, in accordance with the belief that freely operating markets 
allocate resources much more effectively than those driven by tax incentives. To offset 
part of the revenue loss from these changes, the British government doubled the standard 
rate of value-added tax. 
3.2 TAXATION THEORY 
Taxes affect important macroeconomic aggregates such as investment, saving, 
the current account, the market value of firms, and the stock of net foreign assets. 
Microeconomic effects of taxation cause such impacts. These effects are brought about 
either directly (that corresponds to real economic effects of taxes) or indirectly through 
financial effects of taxes. To analyze these effects of taxes requires taking account of 
a large number of details in the tax code, including the rate of corporation tax, the 
nature and scope of depreciation allowances, investment subsidies, the system of 
corporation tax, personal income taxation, capital gains taxation, wealth taxation, the 
interaction of inflation with the tax system and indirect taxes such as value added taxes 
and specific excises. 
In analyzing the effects of taxation on macroeconomic aggregates, public 
economists work with the saving-investment identity. To assess the impact of taxation 
on this identity, they increasingly tend to directly compute the tax "wedge" between the 
rate of return on investment and the rate of return on savings. The size of the tax wedge 
depends upon the system of corporation taxation, the tax treatment of depreciation, the 
personal income taxation, the capital gains taxation, the existence of wealth taxes, other 
taxes and issues, and the interaction of these taxes with inflation. 
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Corporate taxes reduce the marginal benefit from investing which discourages 
investment while the marginal cost of investing will also be reduced, to the extent that 
tax savings result from the grants and tax allowances given for the asset purchased via 
investment and the deductions of interest costs. Therefore, corporate taxes lead to a 
wedge between the rate of return on investment and the user cost of capital. Personal 
income taxes and capital gains taxes indirectly influence the investment decision of a 
firm through their impact upon the cost of finance to the firm, a determinant of the user 
cost of capital. Personal income taxation and capital gains taxation generate a further 
distortion on asset markets by driving the wedge between the cost of finance to the firm 
and the net (after-tax) return received by households on their savings. In addition to the 
distortion imposed on the financial structure of the firm by the interest deductibility 
provision of the corporate tax, the personal tax may also influence the relative costs of 
debt and equity finance. If interest is taxed less heavily under the personal tax than are 
dividends and capital gains, the relative cost of debt finance to the firm will decrease 
and thereby induce higher gearing in addition to the impact of corporate tax. 
These points can be explored as follows. The system of corporation tax puts 
impacts upon the tax wedge through its treatment of double taxation of capital income. 
It has been recognised that the existence of separate taxes on corporate income and 
personal income may reduce the efficiency of the allocation of capital. A corporate tax 
that operates separately from the personal income tax is widely acknowledged to lead 
to a number of problems associated with the "double" taxation of corporate income. 
Dividends are paid out of corporate profits net of corporate taxes. Dividends are further 
taxed under the personal income tax. Given the existence of capital gains tax, retained 
earnings are also taxed twice, to the extent they are capitalized in higher share values. 
One problem with this double taxation is that it may reduce overall rates of 
return and affect capital accumulation adversely. A second problem is that the deferral 
advantage given to retained earnings impairs the efficiency of capital markets. This is 
sometimes referred to as the "lock-in" effect. Firms can invest retained earnings in 
projects with a below-market yield, and their shareholders can still earn a higher net-of- 
tax return than if the funds were distributed as dividends and invested elsewhere. A third 
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problem is that corporate financial policies might be distorted by the existence of the 
bias toward debt finance, since only equity returns are subjected to corporate taxes. A 
final problem is that the corporate tax introduces higher effective tax rates in some 
industries than others, due to special provisions in the corporate tax law and to the 
varying degrees to which industries are incorporated. These tax rate differentials further 
disrupt an efficient allocation of capital. 
Finally, investment incentives and interest deductions on the part of the marginal 
investment financed by debt may greatly reduce or eliminate the corporate tax and effect 
the user cost of capital services. The user cost of capital will be affected in two ways: 
through the cost of finance because the firm's financial resources are locked up in fixed 
investment for a period, and through the physical cost of capital because part of the 
capital stock deteriorates during the period. To sum up, the cost of capital services is a 
function of the system of corporate taxation, the personal income tax code, the system 
of investment incentives, the rate of capital gains tax, the tax treatment of debt interest 
payments and the firm's financial policy. 
Economists disagree on the importance and even the direction of these biases. 
For example, Stiglitz (1973) argued that, when a corporate tax is the only tax imposed, 
it has no impact on the investment decision if the firm chooses debt financing at the 
margin and debt interest is deductible from the corporate tax. For equity finance, 
Feldstein and Slemrod (1980) points out that the corporate tax system can shelter income 
for a high-bracket stockholder, in which the owners of corporations could have their 
total taxes reduced by paying only the corporate tax on retained earnings. 
In defining the double taxation of dividends, there is a growing debate. 
Economists agree that dividend taxation at the individual level, when coupled with 
business taxation at the corporate level, results in double taxation of the income 
attributable to investments financed with new share issues. But they disagree on whether 
it also results in double taxation of the income attributable to investments financed with 
retained earnings. In traditional view of dividend taxation, it is argued that dividend 
taxation at individual level also results in double taxation of the income attributable to 
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investments financed with retained earnings. Two key assumptions characterize the 
traditional view. The first is that shareholders derive a positive benefit from receiving 
dividend (as opposed to an increase in retained earnings) that affects the tax penalty 
implied by the case that personal income tax rate is greater than capital gains tax rate. 
These benefits may, for example, arise from the "signalling" value of dividend 
distributions characterized by asymmetric information. Another possible explanation is 
that dividend payments may be a partial solution to the "principal-agent" problem 
associated with the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation; that 
is, such payments reduce managerial discretion over the use of profits by distributing 
earnings directly to shareholders. The second key assumption in models that adopt the 
traditional view is that marginal investments are effectively financed with new share 
issues. 
In marked contrast to the traditional view, the new view of dividend taxation 
implies that such taxes have no effect on marginal investments financed with retained 
earnings. Since the vast majority of equity finance typically takes the form of retained 
earnings, this view has significant effects on estimate of the effects of taxation on 
investment decisions. Firstly, the primary rationale for corporate/personal tax integration 
-the elimination of double taxation of equity income- becomes significantly weaker, 
because the primary effect of integration would be to eliminate a significant tax 
disincentive against equity finance in the form of new share issues. Secondly, future 
dividend taxes are capitalized in share prices. This capitalization leaves investors 
indifferent at the margin between corporations paying out dividends and retaining 
earnings. The new view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect 
shareholder wealth, they will have minor impact on corporate investment decisions3. 
The latter in turn implies that any integration scheme that reduces or eliminates dividend 
taxes would results in huge windfall gains to existing shareholders. This new view of 
dividend taxation is based on the assumptions that earnings on equity-financed 
investments can ultimately be distributed to shareholders only in the form of taxable 
dividends. This means that alternative "distributions" such as share repurchases are 
'However, the findings of Poterba and Summers (1983) suggest that dividend taxes have important 
effects on investment decisions. 
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precluded by assumption. This is a reasonable assumption, indeed; share repurchases are 
prohibited in the U. K. 
Inflation interacts with the tax system in several ways can influence the size of 
the distortion on the capital market. In the case of corporate tax, the presence of 
inflation would influence the effective tax in two ways4: (i) depreciation deductions may 
be based upon the original value of the capital being depreciated or the historic cost. 
Thus, the real value of depreciation deduction falls with inflation (ii) firms are allowed 
to deduct nominal, rather than real, interest payments, inflation thus increases the value 
of interest deductions. In the case of personal taxes, the tax base is nominal capital 
income (interest and dividends). This means that households are being taxed partly on 
nominal returns, which represent only a maintenance of their real asset values, as well 
as on real interest payments. In the case of capital gains tax, then presence of inflation 
would influence the effective tax. Since the tax base is nominal capital gains, inflation 
increases the effective tax rate of capital gains. 
In recent years, economists increasingly recognized that tax policy effects in an 
open economy might significantly differ from those in closed economy. In an open 
economy, the qualifications made above might need to be modified. The wedge between 
the rate of return on investment and the rate of return on savings caused by domestic 
tax policies leads to international financial flows and hence becomes less distortionary 
to the domestic economy. This can be better understood from the national income 
identity that the excess of domestic savings over investment must equal the trade 
balance. The identity implies that policies which increase national investment (savings) 
without increasing (affecting) national savings (investment) must necessarily lead to 
increases (decreases) in imports or decreases (increases) exports. Furthermore, Summers 
(1988) pointed out that policies aimed at stimulating saving and those targeted at 
promoting investment are likely to have opposite effects on capital flows, exchange rate 
and international competitiveness. However, the Summers' result is based on the 
assumption that capital income taxes are imposed according to residence principle. A 
'There is also a third way which is stock appreciation. 
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source-base capital income taxation, however, might reverse it; a lower capital income 
taxation, for example, induces capital inflows as opposed to neutral direct effects of the 
residence-base capital income taxation. 
Given that q-ratio -defined as the ratio of the market value of firms to the 
replacement cost of their assets- summarises the ratio of the rate of return to capital to 
the cost of capital, the tax-adjusted q-ratios in our model sufficiently reflects the 
distortion and incentive effects of taxes on savings and investment, linking the saver and 
the companies through the rate of return the company pays on the saver's financial 
claims. 
Finally, some taxes, such as national insurance contributions, make impacts on 
the demand for labour by industries. Commodity taxes differ from other taxes on 
causing less distortions. However, it depends on commodity taxes being general. 
Specific excise taxes, of course, are a disincentive to purchase the commodities on 
which they are levied. The amount by which the tax reduces purchases will depend upon 
the elasticity of demand for the commodity in question as well as the elasticity of supply 
of the commodity. It also depends on general income effects of taxes. 
3.3 THE PRE-REFORM UK TAX SYSTEM 
In this section the structure of the major UK pre-reform taxes is described, and 
their treatment in the model is outlined 5. 
3.3.1 Income Taxation 
The UK income tax is a tax on annual incomes of tax units, at progressive rates. 
The basic principle that defines household taxation is a unit one rather than an individual 
5Kay and King (1978), Meade (1978), King and Fullerton (1984), Piggott and Whalley (1985) and 
Pointon and Spratley (1988) outline many aspects of the pre-reform tax system. For the whole tax system 
Kay and King's and Piggott and Whalley's works can be referred. King and Fullerton's work deals with 
taxes that affect capital accumulation. Meade's work is primarily concerned with the direct tax system. 
Pointon and Spratley's work describes taxes that interest business. 
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one, so tax units are households with a limited amount of income splitting. Important 
features are large annual deductions, the non-taxation of imputed income of owner- 
occupied house, and a tax surcharge on investment income. Annual tax free allowances 
are given which vary both by family size and the working characteristics of the wife. 
They are a single person's allowance, an additional special 'married person's' allowance 
being given along with an allowance for each child depending on age and a wife's 
earned income allowance being given. Additional deductions besides the personal 
allowances are allowed for mortgage interest payments and one-half of life insurance 
premiums. 
The rate structure of the tax is characterized by a basic rate of 33 per cent, a top 
marginal rate of 83 per cent on earned incomes and 98 per cent on investment income. 
Investment incomes are subject to an investment income surcharge of 10 per cent or 15 
per cent depending on amounts. In addition, a dividend tax credit that the imputation 
feature of the UK corporate tax system provides since 1973, is structured such that an 
individual in the basic bracket pays no further income tax on dividends received. As 
with most countries, the imputed income from owner-occupied housing is not included 
in the tax base nor are gifts and inheritances received. 
In the model, the income tax is treated as the dominant part of a model 
equivalent income tax system in which income tax and estate duty is considered to 
operate as a single system of personal taxation. Taxable personal income consists of 
labour income, dividend receipts incorporating tax credit and interest income. Lump-sum 
transfers from the government are considered tax exempt. We calculate an average 
income tax rate by using the data taken from the national account data set which 
provides us with both personal income and tax levels. We also calculate the income tax 
revenue according to the marginal tax rate. An income intercept can then be calculated 
to reflect the difference between marginal tax rate and average tax rate6. 
6Under this treatment, households face a constant marginal tax rate. This weakens the progression 
of marginal rates from that in the true system as household will not be in a higher marginal rate bracket 
if its income rises. 
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3.3.2 Corporation Tax 
Corporation tax was introduced as a separate tax on corporation profits in 1965. 
Corporation tax is a flat rate annual tax on the trading and other profits of the UK 
companies. Important features are deductibility of interest payments from the tax base 
and accelerated depreciation provisions. In terms of how distributed profits relative to 
undistributed profits are taxed, the UK corporation tax is an imputed system under 
which shareholders receiving dividends also get a fractional dividend tax credit. This 
imputes to shareholders a portion of the corporate tax paid. The credit is structured in 
such a way that shareholders in the basic income tax rate bracket pay no further tax. To 
prevent tax avoidance, companies must pay income tax at the basic rate to the Inland 
Revenue when dividends are distributed. Such payments are made in advance of the date 
when corporation tax would normally be paid, and since they are also part of corporate 
tax bill, they are termed advance corporation tax (ACT). Hence the total company taxes 
minus ACT is usually termed "mainstream" corporation tax. The aim of the introduction 
of advanced corporation tax in 1973 was to accelerate the payments of corporation tax. 
The pre 1980 system of business taxation is characterized by a high rate of 
corporation tax combined with high initial allowances for some, but not all, investment. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the corporate tax rate was 52 per cent. During 1970s 
depreciation allowances in the UK have become progressively more generous in the 
acceleration relative to true economic depreciation. 100-per cent first year depreciation 
was allowed for investment expenditures on plant and machinery and 75-per cent initial 
allowances on industrial buildings. There are other investments incentives provided by 
the UK corporation tax. They are investment grants, regional assistance and national 
selective assistance; both are given to industrial investment. Grants are nontaxable 
receipts. 
In the early 1970s under the stock appreciation provisions nominal capital gains 
on inventory holdings were taxes on an accrual basis. Piggott and Whalley (1985) cites 
from National Income and Expenditure 1964-74 (Table 34, p. 37) that in the calender 
year 1974 approximately 50 per cent trading profits of companies were accounted for 
46 
by stock appreciation alone (p. 77). In 1974, following a corporate liquidity crisis in 
which the tax payments due in 1975 would have led to serious financial difficulties for 
a number of major firms, a temporary ( but remained until 1981) 'stock relief was 
introduced. A ceiling of 10 per cent was placed on the ratio of taxable profits from this 
source of total taxable profits. 
In the model corporate taxes are treated as ad valorem taxes paid on profits. In 
the standard general equilibrium tax models, it is assumed that marginal tax rate is equal 
to the observed average tax rate on capital income. This involves the calculation of 
effective tax rates derived from tax payments by industry. Less incorporated industries 
pay smaller amounts of corporation tax and have low ad valorem tax rates on profits 
when compared to heavily incorporated industries. 
This approach conveniently abstracts from the many detailed provisions of the 
United Kingdom tax law. However, it has many problems. Most crucial is the measured 
average tax rate which depends critically on the measure for true earnings to capital. 
This latter number is difficult to calculate appropriately in any year and varies greatly 
year to year. This variation implies that there is substantial measurement error in the 
calculated tax rates. 
Instead, recent work models tax law directly and calculates the cost of capital 
implied by the prevailing market interest rate and the existing tax code'. While this 
procedure requires many new data in order to characterize the tax law by industry, it 
does not require capital income and tax payments figures, which can fluctuate sharply 
year to year. A more important reason for this type of modelling is that the explicit 
model of the effect of taxes on capital intensity decisions implies that marginal tax 
distortions differ from average tax rates even if all figures can be measured without 
error. In calculating the tax base, bond interest payments and depreciation allowances 
are deducted from the base. Investment grants are treated as ad valorem subsidy to 
'In the standard general equilibrium tax models, capital is allocated such that the rate of return to 
capital net of taxes and depreciation is equated in all industries. It does not require an explicit calculation 
of the cost of capital. 
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investment by industry whereas nominal gains on inventory holdings and stock 
appreciation provisions are not modelled. 
3.3.3 North Sea Oil and Gas Taxation 
The profits accruing to the companies in the North Sea contain a supernormal 
component of rent on the right to exploit the oil and gas fields. In order to recover some 
of these profits the Government has imposed a special tax system on North Sea 
activities. This system contains three elements. The first tax is a royalty levied at 12.5 
per cent of the value of oil. The second is a new tax (introduced in 1978) called 
petroleum revenue tax (PRT). It is charged at the rate of 45 per cent on the receipts 
from sales of oil and gas minus expenses incurred in finding it, extracting it, and 
bringing it ashore. Royalty payments are an allowable expense. But interest payments 
will not be an allowable deduction. 
PRT is charged on each field separately, and the fact that interest deductibility 
applies to activities outside the North Sea arena means that the taxation of North Sea 
profits has to be isolated from the rest of the company's activities, the so-called 'ring- 
fence' approach. Secondly, capital expenditures is treated as an allowable cost, but 
companies may deduct not only the value of this expenditure but 1.75 times the 
expenditure (described as an 'uplift' of 75 per cent). In addition there is a special relief 
(to ensure that marginal fields are not discriminated against); an oil allowance per field 
of 1 million tons oil a year which will be exempt from PRT subject to a cumulative total 
of 10 million tons per field. The final tax charge is corporation tax which is charged on 
the usual basis with both royalties and PRT payments counting as allowable costs. 
Since PRT is a tax on rent rather than on profits, we did not attempt to model 
it. It requires fundamental changes in the model. 
3.3.4 National Insurance and Related Contributions 
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National insurance contributions (NICs) were contributed as a flat-rate tax, 
payable by all those in work and by their employers. Contributions are loosely tied to 
benefits paid to qualifying individuals (retired, unemployed, disadvantaged) for 
contributions to government operated funds which finance benefits. 
Applied tax modellers agree that all these contributions can be treated as ad 
valorem taxes on use of labour services by industry. Public finance economists query 
this treatment as a tax by the argument that, unlike other taxes, there is a direct benefit 
involved with these contributions. Since contribution levels vary with no change in 
benefits and benefits levels change with no change in contributions, and payments are 
not benefit related such that any given individual is not actually guaranteed to get back 
the some of his contributions, the treatment as a tax seems to be justified. 
The model treatment of these contributions as ad valorem taxes on the use of 
labour services by industry is based on a characterization of national insurance and 
related contributions as a payroll tax. The effect of these contributions (taxes) on saving 
through the substitution of private savings (i. e., intertemporal allocation effect) and 
anticipated future social security receipts, or the effect of social security on retirement 
decisions are not modelled. 
Since age and sex characteristics affect contributions, and different contribution 
levels are set for self-employed persons, the ad valorem treatment is not wholly 
appropriate. As the composition of the labour force and degree of incorporation changes 
by industry, the tax rate by industry will also differ. These inter-industry distortions are 
not captured in the model. 
3.3.5 Indirect Taxes 
The structure of commodity taxes in the UK is characterized by one general sales 
tax - value-added tax (VAT) - and 
heavy duties on three products - tobacco, alcoholic 
drinks, and petrol. In the 1970s, in aggregate they accounted for a significant portion of 
total tax receipts. 
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The basic principle of VAT is that it is a sales tax chargeable to the sellers of 
all output, with the proviso that in computing their liabilities, firms may deduct any 
VAT that has been levied on inputs into their products. The main advantage of VAT is 
that it is a method of levying a tax on all commodities that enter consumption while 
effectively exempting all intermediate goods - those who buy goods for further 
processing receive a refund of the tax that they have been charged with, and only those 
who are the final consumers of the goods actually pay it8. 
Prior to the tax reform, there were two rates of tax, zero and the standard rate 
of 8 per cent. A 25 per cent luxury' rate was introduced in 1975 and reduced to 12.5 per 
cent in 1978. Additionally, some products - such as financial services, education, and 
funerals - are exempted. 
In the model, VAT is treated as an ad valorem tax on final sales because of the 
complexities in explicitly modelling all of the features of the tax as it applies to 
intermediate transactions. Exports are free of tax, and the tax is applied to imports for 
final use (which corresponds to destination principle). The model applies the VAT law 
directly to 28 individual commodities modelled, instead of calculating effective tax rates. 
Since the model allows 28 commodities, applying the tax code directly is very much 
likely to reflect the effective tax rates on more aggregated products. 
Specific excise taxes in the UK are heavily concentrated on three major groups 
of products - tobacco, drink, and hydro-carbon oils9. In the model specific excise taxes 
are all treated as ad valorem taxes paid on purchases of taxed products. Both 
intermediate and final purchases of goods are taxed. Identical rates are used for 
comparable domestically produced and imported items. A similar treatment is adopted 
for customs duties. Finally, local authority housing subsidies that cover the subsidization 
'So exempting all intermediate goods does not cause the traditional problem of sales taxes, the 
cascading effect of the tax. Thus it seems an ideal tax with respect to the first of the principles of indirect 
taxation that there should be no taxes on intermediate goods. 
'Taxing these commodities heavily underlies the 'Ramsey rules' which say that a heavier tax should 
be levied on commodities for which demand is inelastic in order to induce less distortionary effects. 
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of council tenancies, are treated as an ad valorem subsidy on purchases of the services 
of housing sector. 
3.3.6 Capital Gains Tax 
The taxation of gains realised on the disposal of assets was introduced in 1965. 
Capital gains (or losses) are generally calculated as the differences between the 
consideration received on the disposal of an asset and the aggregate cost of acquiring 
the asset, expenditure incurred on the asset to enhance its value and certain costs 
incidental to the disposal of the asset. Whereas the gains of individuals and trust are 
charged to capital gains tax, the gains made by companies are charged to corporation 
tax. A large variety of asset are exempt from the capital gains tax (CGT), including 
principal residences (but not second houses), National Savings instruments and so forth. 
Gains that are less than £1,000 were exempted from the tax. The tax rates for 
individuals were less than their income tax rates. But for trusts, rates were 30 per cent. 
In the model capital gain is treated as an ad valorem tax on accrued capital gains. The 
statutory tax rate is transformed into an equivalent rate applied on accrued capital gains. 
3.3.7 Rates 
Rates are the UK form of property tax levied by local government in order to 
meet their expenses. They are an annual tax on all property based on assessed annual 
letting values of property. Unlike the United Kingdom, in most countries, values of 
property are based on the capital markets values of assets. All properties are covered; 
exemption is given to churches and agricultural buildings. In the model rates are treated 
as ad valorem taxes paid by industries on capital stock. 
3.4 PROBLEMS OF THE PRE-REFORM PERIOD 
During the 1970s taxation emerged as a prime suspect in the explanation of 
disappointing long-term economic performance. In 1978 the Meade Committee was 
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established on this ground and set out options for radical reform of the tax base, as did 
the US Treasury, publishing its Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, in 1977. 
In explaining the problems caused by the tax system in the 1970s, 
analysts emphasized the role of capital income taxation. The tax burden on income from 
capital are argued to distort the efficient allocation of capital, to the extent that the taxes 
on income from capital cause interasset, intersectoral and intertemporal distortions. 
Interasset distortions represent non-optimal allocation of saving. Intersectoral distortions 
imply misallocation of capital. Intertemporal distortions denote non-optimal 
consumption/saving choice. Studies done by King and Fullerton (1984), Meade (1978), 
Piggott and Whalley (1985), and Whalley (1973,1975) revealed that the distortionary 
effects of UK capital income taxation would cause important allocation, welfare and 
incidence effects. Whalley (1973,1975), using a general equilibrium model, showed that 
although the introduction of the imputation system improved the capital allocation 
efficiency, there is still efficiency lost due to misallocation of capital because of the 
differential taxation of capital in the corporate and incorporate sectors. Piggott and 
Whalley (1985) explored the effects of UK capital income taxation on the efficiency of 
capital allocation as well as saving decisions, using a large size general equilibrium 
model. They report that the intersectoral effects of the UK capital income taxation are 
significant. Using a simple recursive dynamic model they calculate that replacing 
personal income taxes with consumption taxes increase savings substantially in the 
region of 25-30 per cent. 
Meade (1978) studies the UK direct taxation in a comprehensive way; the report 
pointed out that the UK direct tax system would create important inter-asset, 
intersectoral and intertemporal distortionary effects. In the report several proposals were 
suggested to repair these distortions. The central theme of the Meade Report (and of 
Blueprints in the US) was the wide disparity in the tax treatment of different assets. This 
was partly a matter of particular assets being deliberately tax-favoured. In the UK, this 
refers to principally owner-occupied housing (imputed rental income and capital gain on 
sale exempted, mortgage interest payments on loans up to a ceiling deductible against 
income tax), life insurance (half of premiums deductible) and occupational pensions 
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(employee's and employer's contributions deductible against income tax, pension funds 
tax exempt and a tax-free lump-sum available at retirement)". At corporate level, plant 
and equipment were favoured over other physical investments. Also there was a 
capriciousness in the differential treatment of alternative forms of capital income. Capital 
gains, in particular, were strongly favoured relative to interest income, which was 
taxable by addition to earned income and subject to an investment income surcharge: 
gains were taxed at 30 per cent (compared to a rate of up to 98 per cent on interest 
income) and enjoyed a separate exemption, liability could be deferred until realisation 
of the asset. 
Such capriciousness has many unattractive consequences. It creates opportunities 
for pure tax arbitrage, transactions which reduce tax liability without affecting the stock 
of real assets. Capriciousness in capital income taxation can also lead to a misallocation 
of real resources. This means that the cost of capital might be affected by taxation 
through the nature of the underlying physical asset, the means by which it is financed, 
and the route through which it is held. 
Such distortions generate excess burden. Under capricious treatment of alternative 
forms of capital income, capital stock is allocated so as to equalize the post-tax returns 
across activities: Otherwise the private return on capital could be increased by 
reallocating it towards activities yielding a higher post-tax return. But then if effective 
marginal rates of tax differ, so must pre-tax returns, implying that the social return on 
capital - the private return plus taxes - could be increased by reallocating it from 
activities in which pre-tax return is low to those in which it is high. The concern grew 
such that variations in effective marginal tax rates - deviations from 'fiscal neutrality' - 
were indeed considerable. 
To summarize the impact of UK tax law that are applicable to income from 
capital, King and Fullerton (1984) employ the notion of an effective tax rate for each 
"Keen (1991) gives a figure of 53 per cent for the percentage of these assets relative to the personal 
sector's net worth in 1977, p. 53. 
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type of asset". They consider other countries as well; namely, Germany, Sweden and 
the United States and compare the marginal effective tax rates in four countries for 
1980. The effective tax rates are used to measure tax burden imposed on different forms 
of income; it reflects the tax wedge between the rate of return on investment and the 
rate of return on savings. Since with distortionary taxes the two rates of return can 
differ, the effective tax rate then is expected to move from zero. King and Fullerton's 
work takes account of a large number of details in the tax code to calculate the effective 
tax rates for three industries and physical and financial assets. 
King and Fullerton's findings reveal that there is an insignificant tax burden on 
income from capital; the overall average marginal tax rate for the fixed-p case is only 
6.6 per cent at a 10 per cent rate of inflation. This confirms widely the view that the UK 
tax system during the 1970s encouraged saving and investing rather than discouraging. 
Personal savings, indeed, hit new highs in the seventies and generous investment 
incentives and further piecemeal measures adopted to bolster capital accumulation. One 
important form of investment was strongly encouraged by the tax system, with 
deductibility against corporation tax of both interest payments and investment 
expenditures on plant and machinery. Therefore it is argued that the UK tax system 
approximates an expenditure tax as far as the corporate tax system as a whole is 
considered. But this average conceals a very wide dispersion of marginal tax rates; there 
is a striking contrast between the effective subsidy given to investment in machinery and 
the high tax rates levied on investment in buildings. The effective tax rates for these 
assets are -33.3 and 41.0 per cent, respectively (see King and Fullerton 1984, table 3.23 
p. 74). Several works such as Byatt's work (1988) confirm King and Fullerton's findings; 
Byatt's corresponding effective tax rates, respectively, are -0.2 and 7.7 per cent12. King 
"Effective tax rates are discussed by King and Fullerton (1984, especially chapters 2 and 7, pp 7-30 
and 268-302). Papers by Jorgenson and Yun (1986b, 1990) extensively utilized the approach. It is based 
on the assumption that if capital internationally immobile, national savings and investment are the same 
thing. In principle, the tax incentive to save and invest can then be described by the single number: the 
wedge between pre- and post-tax returns on the marginal investment. 
12 The difference between Byatt's and King and Fullerton's figures lays in method chosen, rate of 
inflation taken and source of investment finance assumed. Byatt assumes a 10 per cent nominal return 
post-tax on capital, 5 per cent rate of inflation, 5 per cent real return, debt-financed investment in plant 
(continued... ) 
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and Fullerton note that the differences in the effective tax rates for physical assets, plant 
and machinery and building, are reflected in the relatively low tax rates of -6.9 in 
manufacturing and other industry (mainly services and construction) compared with the 
high tax rate of 39.5 in commerce. Interestingly, the overall tax rate declines with 
inflation. They explain this by the fact that the generous depreciation allowances for 
investment and the deductibility of nominal interest payments at the corporate level 
more than offset the failure to index the personal tax system. 
In comparative country analysis, they found that the United Kingdom has the 
lowest overall effective tax rate, 3.7 per cent at the actual inflation rate of 13.6 per cent, 
compared to the highest overall rate of 48.1 per cent in Germany (see table 7.1 p. 269). 
Immediate expensing of machinery is seen to be a major reason for the low overall rate 
in the United Kingdom. The effective tax rate on machinery is minus 37 per cent, while 
other assets are taxed at over 39 per cent. Britain has the lowest total tax on machinery 
and the highest share of machinery in its capital stock. Machinery is 47 per cent of total 
capital in Britain whereas it is only 22 per cent in the United States. This difference is 
mainly explained by the tax advantages afforded machinery in Britain. In the breakdown 
by source of finance, the United Kingdom again provides the most striking contrast. 
Debt-financed investments are heavily subsidized, since assets receive accelerated or 
immediate depreciation and corporate interest payments are fully deductible from taxable 
income. 
The sorry state of capital income taxation was most evident in the virtual 
collapse of corporation tax. Low profitability, stock relief, interest deductibility and the 
generosity of investment incentives had led to a substantial erosion of the corporate tax 
base. The share of mainstream corporation tax in the central government current receipts 
fell form about 12 per cent in the late sixties to around 4 per cent in the eighties, by 
when 40 per cent of industrial and commercial companies paid no mainstream 
"(... continued) 
and machinery, equity-financed investment in commercial building. In comparison, King and Fullerton 
assume 10 per cent pre-tax return on capital, 10 per cent inflation and a different source of investment 
finance. 
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corporation tax at all. Awareness grew that non-neutrality of the kind described above 
could have real costs in terms of both investment decisions and the public finances. 
On the other hand, concentration centred on redistribution in the 1970s. More 
detailed studies suggested that the tax system was doing surprisingly little redistribution. 
Kay and King (1978) showed that all the complexities of the UK direct and indirect 
taxation seemed approach to something pretty close to a linear tax. 
3.5 THE 1980S TAX REFORM 
Economists argue that academic thinking did play an important role in persuading 
policy-makers that the solution to the growing problems of the UK tax system lay in 
moving toward fiscal neutrality. The objective of fiscal neutrality was recognized as 
desirable both to reduce distortions and to limit tax avoidance. In particular, fiscal 
neutrality is believed to be achieved to the extent that a tax system avoids high marginal 
tax rates and those rates do not differ for essentially similar activities. This tax system 
can be either a comprehensive income tax or an expenditure tax. It was believed that the 
measures required to move to comprehensive income tax involve less upheaval that 
those necessary for the transition to an expenditure tax13. Steps were taken in the 
direction to the comprehensive income tax; tax bases have been broadened, discrepancies 
in the tax treatment of different types of assets have been narrowed and a limited 
inflation indexation has been introduced. The base-broadening has let the British 
government to cut the high marginal tax rates. 
Since 1979 major steps taken in this direction and in general changes in the UK 
tax system can be summarized as follows. In 1979 the British government made a sharp 
cut in marginal tax rates in income tax; the basic rate was reduced from 33 to 30 per 
cent and the top marginal tax rate on earned income was reduced from 83 to 60 per 
"However, two members of the Meade committee whose report inspired policy-makers to reform the 
system, John Kay and Mervyn King do not share the view held by the government arguing that the 
transition to the expenditure tax would cause less problems that one might anticipate. See Kay and King 
(1990) p. 225. 
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cent. A long-term aim was announced; the basic rate will be reduced to 25 per cent. 
Over the years the basic rate in 1987 was lowered to a rate of 25 per cent. The number 
of bands in the personal income tax was cut from 12 to 6. Another marked change was 
made in the taxation of capital gains by allowing indexation of capital gains for tax 
purposes in 1982. To offset the revenue lost caused by this tax-cutting changes the 
government raised the value-added tax rate, the 8-percent of the standard rate almost 
doubled to 15 per cent. In subsequent years, the raise in the VAT was insufficient to 
balance the government budget and supplementary measures were needed. The revenue 
need was met by increases in the petroleum revenue tax, excise duties and by 
introducing a new tax called supplementary petroleum revenue tax. 
In 1984 a major reform of corporation taxation took place; the government 
eliminated the 100-percent first-year write-off for plan and equipment and the 75-percent 
initial allowance for industrial building, using the revenue gain to reduce the corporate 
tax rate from 52 per cent to 35 per cent. As seen from table 3.1, the changes are put into 
effect over a time period. Other elements of the 1984 tax reform are that the partial 
deductibility of life assurance premiums was removed and that the investment surcharge 
and the composite rate were abolished. 
In 1988, another market reform proposals were passed through the parliament. 
The reform's marked changes were reflected in personal income taxation. The top 
marginal tax rate was reduced from 60 per cent to 40 per cent. The British government 
cut the number of tax bands; only two bands remain to which a basic rate of 25 per cent 
and a higher rate of 40 per cent are applied. The reform aimed at reducing the 
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discrepancies in the tax treatment of income from capital. Since 1988 capital gains 
above a threshold are taxed as ordinary income - as the top slice of income. 
Since 1988 there have been more changes in the UK tax system; the corporate tax 
was reduced to 33 per cent and the VAT standard rate raised to 17.5 per cent. 
Deductibility of pension contributions was limited in 1989. The real value of the ceiling 
for mortgage relief was allowed to decline substantially, and relief restricted to the basic 
rate in 1991. Local authority rates were replaced by community charge or poll tax but 
recently it is modified. 
3.6 EVALUATING REFORM 
It appears that the base-broadening feature of the tax reform outweighed the rate- 
flattening and lowering feature; over the years the tax burden on the economy, the share 
of taxes in GDP were raised from 34 in 1979 to 37.5 in 1989. The increase in the share 
of taxes in GDP allowed the government to keep the public sector borrowing 
requirement at a low level, even a negative value representing a surplus in the late 
1980s. As for the breakdown of the sources of revenue, there is a salient shift from 
direct taxation to indirect taxation. The share of indirect taxes in central government tax 
revenue (including national insurance) increased from 34 per cent in the late 1970s to 
about 40 per cent in 1990 (see Keen 1991 p. 58). Although corporation tax had dwindled 
almost to insignificance at the beginning of the decade, it recently become an important 
revenue-raiser once more. 
It is hard to interpret this broad structure of the tax system. To assess the tax 
reform, individual tax burden should be examined. In order to evaluate the distortionary 
effects of taxes, one should look at marginal tax rates, in particular. As implied by 
changes in the personal income tax, empirical works tend to find lower marginal rates 
of income tax for certain income forms of capital. Robson (1988) estimates, for instance, 
that in 1978 the average marginal rates on dividend and interest income stood at about 
54 and 49 per cent respectively; now both will be below 40 per cent. Devereux (1987) 
finds that the effective marginal rate of corporation tax rose by about 25 percentage 
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points over the decade. This reflects that the reduction in capital allowances outweighed 
the cut in corporate tax rates. On the other hand, the effects of the tax cut and the 
reduction in capital subsidies require a closer look. The cut in corporate rate represents 
a saving incentive whereas the reduction in capital allowances implies investment 
incentives. As pointed out by the basic finance equivalence theorem in a closed 
economy, economically meaningful distinctions between saving and investment 
incentives do not arise. But there are meaningful distinctions between policies that affect 
savings; the sum of past and current saving, and those that directly affect only current 
saving, or, in equilibrium, current investment. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and 
Goulder and Summers (1989) show that although types of policies alter marginal 
incentives to accumulate new capital, investment incentives can generate significant 
infra-marginal redistribution from current holder of wealth to those with small or zero 
claims on the existing stock of capital. In other words, investment incentives are likely 
to hurt capital owners by causing substantial declines in stock market values while 
increasing investment. 
Accordingly, while the cuts in (personal and corporate) income taxes would 
stimulate capital accumulation and lead to increases in stock market valuation, the 
reduction in capital allowances discourages investment and bolsters the increases in 
stock market valuation caused by the cuts in personal and corporate income taxes. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) also notes that while savings incentives represent a shift 
from income to wage taxation, investment incentives represent a shift from income to 
consumption taxation. They found that consumption taxation stimulates considerably 
greater savings (i. e., capital accumulation) than does wage taxation. From this point it 
would be argued that the UK tax reform would mean a capital de-accumulation and 
hence a lower growth. 
As far as open economy is concerned, economists such as Harberger and Summers 
increasingly recognized that there is another meaningful distinction between policies that 
affect savings and those that affect investment. While saving policies might result in 
capital outflows and thereby lessens domestic capital accumulation, investment 
incentives might attract capital inflows. This reverse capital effects in turn generate 
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opposite effects on exchange rates and competitiveness. Given that the recent UK tax 
reform would lead to a positive saving incentives and negative investment incentives 
(investment disincentives), one would expect that the reform will result in capital 
outflows, depreciation in exchange rate and deterioration in competitiveness. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The 1980s UK tax reform offers an interesting case study. Changes in the various UK 
taxes are often discussed in the taxation theory. The reform includes a shift from income 
taxation to consumption taxation. On the other hand the reform represent a change in 
the treatment of old capital and new capital. Investment incentives that were targeted 
toward new capital were phased out. Instead, saving-promoting policies that treat new 
and old capital equally were adopted. These two policies have different effects on asset 
values as well as capital formation. 
We take the 1980's major tax policy changes rather the reform as a whole to study. 
We concentrate on the cut in the personal income tax, the corporation tax, the write-off 
depreciation allowances elimination and the rise in the VAT rates. We left out several 
aspects of the UK taxation system. Tax exhaustion is one of them, public finance 
economists have been increasingly discussing this issue. The tax system interaction with 
inflation rate is also left out. 
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CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURE OF THE DYNAMIC APPLIED GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM TAX MODEL 
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4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL AND TREATMENT OF THE U. K. TAX 
SYSTEM 
4.1.1 Overview of Structure of the Model 
The model built in this study incorporates the behaviour of the production, 
household, government and foreign sectors. Households and firms derive their behaviour 
from intertemporal optimisation without direct co-ordination with other agents. The 
model contains not only real economic decisions, such as consumption, saving, 
production and investment, but also financial decisions, such as financing investment. 
All real economic decisions are optimally and endogenously determined while on the 
financial side only financing behaviour of investment is taken as an optimal and 
endogenous decision. 
Accordingly, in the model there are physical commodities and financial assets, 
which is consistent with the modelling of real economic decisions as well as financial 
decisions of agents. Physical commodities are four types: (i) scarce factors, which 
include all non-produced goods, namely labour and capital stock; (ii) intermediate and 
final goods, which are the outputs of, and inputs to , production activities; 
(iii) imported 
goods, which may include both inputs to production and consumption goods, and (iv) 
investment goods. Financial assets are of two types: equity and bond. 
The model distinguishes five industries: (1) agriculture; (2) energy; (3) 
manufacturing; (4) services, trade, and utilities; and (5) housing services. Each industry 
produces a single output using inputs of labour, capital, intermediate goods. In each 
industry at each point in time, the given stock of capital combines with a variable 
quantity of labour in a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce value added. Value 
added combines with composite intermediate inputs in fixed proportions to produce 
gross output. Labour supply is fixed in the aggregate within period while its aggregate 
force grows at a constant exogenous rate over time. But it is perfectly mobile across 
sectors. The capital stock of each sector, in contrast, is fixed at each point in time. 
Capital stocks at the industry level and in the aggregate, also change over time. But in 
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contrast with labour, they evolve endogenously in a response to the investment decisions 
of firms in each industry. In the long run, tax-adjusted marginal value products of capital 
are equalized across sectors. 
As for investment decisions, managers consider not just current profits but future 
profitability as well. In each industry, managers choose levels of investment to maximize 
the market value of the firm. Because of adjustment costs associated with the 
installation, firms find it optimal, in response to a change in economic conditions, to 
approach new long-run capital intensities gradually over time. So, investment decisions 
balance the costs of new capital (acquisition costs plus costs of installation) against the 
higher revenues made possible by large capital stock. 
In financing investments, managers choose an optimal mix of bond issuance and 
retained earnings. Given the fact that taxes favour debt-finance for instance, interest 
payments are deductible from the corporate tax base, debt-equity ratios are optimally 
determined by agency costs of debt together with tax favouring debt. To find optimal 
debt-equity ratios, managers are assumed to maximize the market value of debt plus 
equity, instead of the market value of equity. 
On the consumer side, the analysis is conducted for one aggregate household. The 
aggregate household derive total consumption and saving optimally in an intertemporal 
optimisation context. So, their current consumption and saving decisions depend not only 
on current income and interest rate but on the entire paths of these and other variables 
from the present onwards. The capital income of a household consists of dividends, 
interest earnings, and capital gains on existing company shares. Households also earn 
labour income for their labour supply to firms and receive transfer payments from the 
government. 
In the study the government is engaged in three economic activities; collecting 
taxes, transferring discretionary lump-sum amounts to the private sector, purchasing 
consumption goods, and to accomplish general government activities. In the model, taxes 
are collected according to an exogenously given tax regime, and the tax system and tax 
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policies are institutionally given as the outcome of a process is not captured by the 
model. The path of government expenditure and transfers to households are also 
exogenously given. Hence, the policy instrument of the government is tax policy or 
tax/debt policy. 
Finally, the model trace foreign economic transactions in a semi-small open 
economy assumption. Foreign economic transactions consists of not only trade flows but 
also capital flows. However, neither labour nor physical (as distinct from financial) 
capital is mobile internationally. By the semi-small economy, we mean that the country 
can influence the world prices when exporting. Product differentiation in imported goods 
is made in order to add realism. This gives rise to the Armington (1969) assumption that 
domestic and foreign goods substitute imperfectly for one another. In each commodity, 
these are combined in a CES function to produce a composite commodity. These 
composite commodities are demanded in several different ways. Firstly, they serve as 
intermediate inputs for each of industries. Secondly, they meet the demands for final 
goods by the government. Thirdly, they combine, according to fixed coefficients, to 
produce a representative capital good; thus satisfy the total demand for new capital 
goods given by the aggregate level of investment. Finally, they combine, according to 
fixed coefficients, to create the 28 types of consumer goods demanded by households14 
In modelling exports, we allow for inelastic demand for the country's exports, which 
create endogenous terms of trade effects. As for financial capital flows, the model 
considers that financial capital flows occur between the host (the home country) and the 
rest of the world when there is a net (after-tax) interest rate difference in the home 
country and the rest of the world. However, capital flows are assumed imperfect rather 
than perfect. 
Since this is a perfect foresight model, equilibrium requires two sorts of 
conditions: intratemporal equilibrium requirements and intertemporal equilibrium 
requirements. The intratemporal requirements are that current supplies and demands 
The transformation of producer goods into consumer goods is necessary. This is because the 
categories for outputs from production data differ from the categories for goods from consumer 
expenditure data. Also, consumer taxes are best applied if they are sufficiently categorised. 
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balance at each point in time given the expectations of future variables. The 
intertemporal requirements are that expected values must conform to the values realized 
in later periods. 
Intratemporal equilibrium requires that each point in time: (1) the supply of each 
good equal the sum of home and foreign demands; (2) the aggregate labour supply equal 
its aggregate demand; (3) total national savings equal the aggregate demand for external 
funds by home firms; (4) the government budget constraint must be satisfied; and (5) 
balance of payments constraint must be satisfied. These equilibrium requirements are 
met through the adjustment of commodity prices, wage level, interest rate, lump-sum 
adjustments to personal income taxes to yield government budget balance, and the 
nominal exchange rate. 
The whole menu of financial assets in the model are bonds and equities. In an 
endogenous international financial capital mobility, the model includes foreign bonds. 
In terms of equilibrium analysis, the consumer supplies funds and production sectors 
demand funds by issuing bonds. Depending on the interest rate differential between the 
home country and the rest of the world, the latter would either be fund supplier or fund 
demander. For instance, if interest rate at home is higher than the world interest rate, the 
rest of the world supplies funds to the home country. As a result, the current interest 
rates as well as the market availability of funds are endogenously determined by the 
equilibrium conditions. 
The tax system of the economy consists of a consumption tax, personal income 
tax, corporate income tax, labour tax, and capital gain tax. Apart from personal income 
tax, which is considered to be a linear progressive tax, all other taxes in the economy 
are modelled in an ad valorem context. The consumption tax is an European value-added 
tax. The U. K. corporate tax is a partial imputation system. There is a tax credit, in the 
determination of personal income taxes on dividends, that relates to part of the 
underlying corporation tax. The labour tax is levied on labour services used by firms. 
And finally, the capital gains tax is considered as a tax on the appreciation of shares. 
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0 To sum up the analysis is conducted for one aggregate consumer and five different 
industries, namely, agriculture, energy, manufacturing, services and housing sectors. 
Firms produce consumption goods with the aid of labour, intermediate goods and capital 
and the latter can appear as equity and debt. The optimal short-run intensities for labour 
and long-run intensities for both capital and labour are determined from Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) value added functions. Intermediate and final production is represented by an 
input-output matrix. The intensities of intermediate goods are fixed. Goods produced by 
firms are demanded in several different ways. First, they serve as intermediate goods for 
each of the industries. In addition, they meet the demands for final goods by the 
household and government and the exports demands of the foreign sector. Finally, they 
combine, according to fixed coefficients, to produce a representative capital (investment) 
good. 
The model is characterised by Walrasian market clearing assumptions and all 
markets are perfectly competitive, like most of CGE tax models. Market-clearing prices 
in each period depend on expectations of future prices and tax variables in the economy, 
and these expectations are self-fulfilling, that is perfect, Hence a perfect foresight 
equilibrium prevails. In this context, the factor price paths, interest rate and wage, and 
commodity prices that are exogenous to the individual planning problems are 
endogenous to the market equilibrium. It is assumed that the paths are determined such 
that the plans of all market agents are compatible with one another. The compatibility 
is assured if the individual optimisation condition of market agents are satisfied and if, 
in addition, at each period, the labour, the commodity, and the financial markets are 
clearing. Perfect capital and labour markets are sufficient for coordinating private plans 
in all markets of the model, hence forward markets are not necessary for an 
intertemporal general equilibrium. The reason for this result is what could be called the 
67 
intertemporal linking function of the capital market15. Finally, plans of agents are 
mainly formulated in continuous time" 
4.2 THE PRODUCTION SECTOR 
In building an intertemporal model of producer behaviour, we make two 
fundamental assumptions: first, that managers seek to maximize the value of the firm, 
and second, that an arbitrage equation governs the relationship between returns on debt 
and returns to equities. The first assumption establishes the basis for both the firm's 
investment behaviour and its financial structure. The second is needed to define how the 
firm's market value is determined by asset holders. 
Standard intertemporal models trace the market value of firm as the market value 
of its shares. In a departure from these models, the model in this paper, following the 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), assumes that managers seek to maximize the 
market value of debt plus equity. Jensen and Meckling viewed firms differently as a 
"contracting arena" in which the conflicting interests of bondholders, stockholders, and 
managers are negotiated. It is assumed that bond covenants and other constraints force 
stockholders to maximize the market value of debt plus equity. Accordingly, managers 
choose levels of investment to maximise the value of the firm in accordance with the 
optimal choice of its debt level that minimizes financial costs. Furthermore, we assume 
that investment incurs adjustment costs. This accounts for adjustments dynamics in the 
producer side of the model. With this adjustment costs associated with investment, firms 
find it optimal, in response to a change in economic conditions, to approach new long- 
run capital intensities gradually over time. The length of time necessary to attain the 
"See, Sinn (1987) 
"Although discrete time analysis is often very useful in making explicit crucial roles of 'periods' in 
certain economic occurrences, in the literature 'continuous time analysis' is preferred to discrete time 
analysis by theoreticians because there are many more readily available theorem in the mathematical 
theory of differential equations associated with continuous time analysis than the theory of difference 
equations associated with discrete time analysis. 
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optimal capital intensity depends critically on the adjustment costs faced by the firm. 
Thus, in making investment decisions, firms balance the costs of new capital (acquisition 
costs plus adjustment costs) against the higher cash flows made possible by a large 
capital stock. 
In what follows, the maximization of the market value of the firm subject to the 
adjustment technology gives rise to q-theory type investment functions. Q-theory, 
representing the ratio of the financial market value of capital and the production cost of 
capital, was introduced by Tobin (1969)17. The theory predicts that firms will invest 
when the stock market value of their assets exceeds the cost of replacement". 
The theory behind this prediction can be summarised as follows: Given the 
assumption that managers seek to maximize the market value of the outstanding 
common shares and bonds, an investment project should be undertaken if and only if it 
increased the value of the shares and bonds. The securities markets apprise the project, 
its expected contributions to the future earnings of the company and its risks. If the 
value of the project as appraised by investors exceeds the cost, then the value of the 
company's shares will appreciate to the benefit of existing stockholders and bondholders. 
That is, the market will value the project more than the cash used to pay for it. If new 
debt or equity securities are issued to raise the cash, the prospectus leads to an increase 
of share prices. The essential insight underlying Tobin's theory is that in a tax-less world 
firms invest as long as each dollar spent purchasing capital raises the market value of 
the firm by more than one dollar. It follows from that, depending on the existence of the 
above type adjustment costs, the level of investment would be different were no such 
adjustment cost present, firms would find it optimal to invest so much in each year that 
"The q theory of investment is one of the well-known two theories of investment. The other of which 
is the neoclassical theory developed by Jorgenson, the maximisation of the present discounted value of 
net cash flows. It is increasingly recognised that the modified neoclassical investment theory with 
instalment costs and the q theory are equivalent. 
"By introducing independent industry investment, we alter the 'macro-closure' of general equilibrium 
tax models (for a recent discussion of the closure issue see Robinson 1991), investment in physical capital 
and household saving in no longer identically equal. A financial sector intermediates between decentralized 
households, storing their wealth in financial assets, and decentralized firms requiring financial capital to 
finance their investments in physical capital. 
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the gap between the market value and the replacement cost of capital goods would be 
driven to zero. With respect to adjustment costs, the high levels of investment that this 
policy would sometimes require would cause the firm to incur unacceptably large 
additional expenses. The firm would thus be motivated to "smooth" its investment over 
time. With this smoothing behaviour comes the possibility that a firm's market value 
will, from time to time, vary from the replacement costs of its assets, being higher in 
periods of strong investment and lower in periods of weak investment. 
In fact, what Tobin suggested is that the rate of investment is a function of q. 
However, what we can observe is average q, namely the ratio of the market value of 
existing capital to its replacement cost. Hayashi (1982) showed that if the firm is a 
price-taker with constant returns to scale in both installation and production, then 
marginal q is equal to average q. Dixon et al. (1992) points out the existence of another 
condition: dividends should be a function of capital stock, investment, and a vector of 
short-run variables and it must be homogenous of degree one in capital and investment. 
Although q-theory link real sector with the financial sector as explained above, 
most q models assume that neither the market value of a firm nor its cost of capital 
were affected by the decision as to how investment is financed. The assumption that 
managers are forced to maximise the market value of debt plus equity by the existence 
of financial constraints gives rise to an optimal determination of debt-equity ratios. 
Osterberg (1989) showed that the debt to equity ratio is optimally determined by agency 
costs of debt together with tax rates favouring debt. In modelling firms' behaviour based 
to the work of Jensen and Meckling, Osterberg considers only the conflict between 
bondholders and stockholders. An agency cost is associated with contractual restrictions 
intended to control the conflict between them. Agency costs of debt and taxes favouring 
debt (for instance, corporate income tax allowing interest payments to be deductible 
from the corporate tax base) combine to yield an interior solution for the endogenous 
debt-equity ratio. Now, financial structure affects q but only indirectly, through that the 
discount rate (cost of capital) varies with the debt-equity ratio since q is the present 
discounted value of after-tax marginal products of capital. 
However, this result is based 
on two more restrictions: first, that the number of shares of equity 
is assumed fixed, i. e., 
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no equity issuance, second, that the firm pays out a constant fraction of the market value 
of its shares as dividends. 
As for production technology, each of the five industries produces a single output 
using inputs of labour, capital, and intermediate goods. A multilevel structure governs 
the production of each industry output. Firms choose the input levels of labour and 
intermediate goods at each point in time to minimize real costs, given the current capital 
stock. In hierarchy, first labour and capital combine to produce a value-added composite, 
VA. Second, this composite is combined with intermediate inputs (y1, y2,......., yj) in fixed 
proportions to generate output Y. This sequence of decision making can be understood 
better in the light of the property of constant returns to scale (CRTS) of production 
function. Since production exhibit CRTS properties, we can find the optimal level of 
labour inputs and then supply functions and in turn the demand for intermediate goods, 
depending on the level of capital stock. 
4.2.1 The Decision Problem of the Firm 
In the model the firms are assumed to be domestically owned corporation. Their 
managers are assumed to maximize the market value of debt plus equity subject to a set 
of real economic and financial constraints. These constraints are production technology, 
profit identity, investment-finance identity, arbitrage condition, capital stock 
accumulation condition and initial conditions for stock variables (capital, equity and 
debt). 
We adopt the adjustment cost investment framework developed in Lucas (1967) 
in which when incorporating investment goods into the production process, the firm 
incurs adjustment costs. These costs can be viewed as internal costs; in order to install 
new capital, currently available resources - labour, existing capital, and intermediate 
goods - must be diverted from the firm's output to the 
installation of new equipment. We 
can combine the production technology with the adjustment cost technology. Hence, the 
firm's technology possesses the relation ((D[L, K, y, I]) which depends positively on labour 
(L), capital (K), (vector of) intermediate inputs (y) and value of equity (E), and 
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negatively on the remaining two arguments; namely, investment (1) and debt stock (B). 
To be more precise, the technology takes the following separable form: 
4) [L, K, Y, IJ =oOp(L, K, Y) -4od(IIK)! (1) 
where O's capture production and adjustment cost relationship, respectively. In particular, 
the production technology at every point in time is represented by a time-invariant 
Leontief structure in intermediate and final production, which is in the form: 
4Op(L, K, y) =Min {1 VA(L, K), 
yl 
,.......... 
y' 
j =1,...., J=5 (1 a) a0 a1 aJ 
where yj represents the physical quantities of input j, ao is the requirements per unit of 
output, and VA(.,. ) is the value-added function. The value added function has the 
following usual neoclassical production function properties; it is twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing in every input, and concave. The function also satisfies 
the Inada conditions: VA'(O)=oo and VA'(oo)=0. The time invariant value added 
production function will be characterised by a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas 
structure: 
VA(L, K)=E1Lý°K1 ý° (lb) 
where Eo is the share parameter and EI is the efficiency parameter. The adjustment cost 
function is assumed to be quadratic in IN of the form: 
(ad/2)[I/K_aöl2 (lc) ýd(I/X) 
I/K 
where ado and adl are parameters. 
The second constraint is the profit accounting identity which states earnings before 
interest payments and taxes, EBIT, equal the sum of the total cost of debt finance 
(interest payments plus agency costs of debt), TCD, tax liabilities, TAXF, retained 
earnings, RE, and dividends, DIV: 
EBIT=TCD+TAXF+RE+DIV (2) 
It means that the gross profits go to bondholders as interest, to government as taxes, to 
stockholders as dividends, into retained earning, or are absorbed by the agency cost. 
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The before tax and interest payments earnings (gross profits), EBIT can be defined 
as 
EBIT=PY-PLL-P)y (2a) 
Where P is the price of output, Y represents the quantity of output by the firm (net of 
adjustment cost), PL denotes the wage rate (gross of indirect tax on labour), PY is the 
vector of intermediate input prices (gross of intermediate input taxes facing the 
industry). 
In accordance with the firm behaviour of maximising the market value of debt plus 
equity so as to control the conflict between bondholder and stockholders, the cost of 
debt finance is the sum of interest payments and agency costs. We assume that there are 
bond covenants that are negotiated to restrict the level of debt for a given value of 
equity. The higher the debt-equity ratio, the more likely that the covenant will be 
violated, resulting in restrictions on investment activities and a decrease in firm value. 
Thus, the cost of issuing units of bond increases with the debt-equity ratio, 7. 
Accordingly, we postulate that agency cost function is quadratic in the debt-equity ratio 
and takes the following functional form: 
(Y)= 
(ag/2)[Y -aö]2 (2b) 
gY 
a80 and W, are agency cost parameters, and formally y is equal to the ratio of the value 
of debt stocks (B) to the value of equity (E). As for the total cost of debt finance, 
agency cost of debt is added to interest payments to existing bond stocks: 
TCD =rBB+4g(Y)B 
where, rB denotes the nominal rate of return on bonds. 
(2c) 
Firms must pay taxes on their output, use of labour inputs, use of intermediate 
inputs and profits. These taxes correspond with output tax, labour tax (National 
Insurance Contributions), indirect taxes (Specific Excises) and corporate income tax 
(Corporation Tax), respectively. Corporation tax, in contrast with other taxes, requires 
a detailed explanation because there are, broadly, three main aspects to corporation 
taxation and the interaction of these three elements determines the impact of taxation on 
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companies. In defining the corporation tax, the model specifies the tax rate, the rules 
concerning the definition of "profits" for tax purposes and the system relating to the 
taxation of corporation profits. Corporation tax rate is a flat rate applied to annual 
trading and other profits of corporation. In determining taxable profit (tax base), 
corporation is allowed to deduct interest payments on existing bond stocks and capital 
allowances (depreciation allowances). Also, the corporation tax system affects the real 
economic and financial decisions of firms. At this stage, we can still define the firm's 
tax liabilities without referring to the corporation tax system as 
TAXF=z yP 
Y+TLPLL+Tv, 
jP,, y+z, [O PY-9LPLL-O JP), y-rBB] -TDA 
(2d) 
In our notation, a tax rate will be indicated by the letter "ti" amended by a suitable 
subscript. Accordingly, tii are the various tax rates; i=y, v, L, c are the output tax, indirect 
tax, labour and corporate tax rates, respectively. Expressions of the kind 1-ti, called tax 
factors, are denoted by a "8" with the same subscript as the corresponding ti. A subscript 
j to differentiate firms is used in defining the indirect taxes on intermediate goods 
because tax rate on intermediate good for each firm consists of a vector of indirect taxes 
on particular intermediate goods. DA represents the value of currently allowable 
depreciation allowances. The calculation of DA(t) assumes that the rate of depreciation 
used for tax purposes reflects accelerated depreciation and that tax depreciation is based 
on historical cost. Depreciation allowances in a given period are calculated by 
DA(t) =öwK T(t) +(8ä +8 f)PK(t)I(t) 
(2e) 
where öTw, 5Ta and 8f describe the rates of writing down, initial and first year capital 
allowances and KT is the capital stock basis for tax purposes. KT is calculated on a 
historical rather than real cost basis. This permits the model to incorporate an important 
non-neutrality of the tax code with respect to the rate of inflation: the real value of KT 
erodes more quickly the greater the inflation rate is. 
The dividend policy of the firm is represented by a constant fraction, d, of the 
market value of shares 
DIV=aE (2t) 
Here, E is the value of equity, and has a relation such that E=PEE with PE is the price 
of equity and 9 denotes number of equity. 
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As for the investment-finance identity, it is assumed that investment is financed 
through retained earnings and/or debt issue: 
(1-z)PKI=RE+B (3) 
where (1-z) is the 'direct' costs of new capital (net of the investment tax credit), PK is 
replacement price of capital goods and z represents the investment tax credit (in the case 
of UK, investment grants). In addition, one can notice that it is also assumed that there 
is no equity issue. 
Shares and bonds are taken to be perfect substitutes and they must therefore yield 
the same expected return after tax. If PEE is the market value of outstanding shares, i, 
is the personal tax rate on income, b is dividend tax credit rate since the U. K. corporate 
tax rate is assumed to be a partial imputation system, and /tg is the effective personal tax 
rate on accrued capital gains on shares, perfect foresight on behalf of investors thus 
implies the arbitrage condition 
6p rBPEE= 
eiDIV+OgPE 
(4) 
e b 
The term on the left-hand side of eq. (4) is the after-tax income which 
shareholders could earn if they sold their shares and invested the revenue in bonds, 
while the expression on the right-hand side represents the actual after-tax earnings on 
shares, being made up of after-tax dividends and after-tax capital gains. Using 
expression (2f) and dividing condition (4) by the term PEE, we get the following formula 
9r= 
ip 
a+e E 
pB eb g« PE 
(4') 
Arbitrage condition gives rise that one can link households to firms. The link between 
them is the cost of capital, driven by the rates of return required by households. 
Another constraint on the firm behaviour is the capital stock accumulation 
condition: 
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K=I-8R K 
where SR is the economic depreciation rate19. 
(5) 
Finally, firms take the initial values of capital stock, debt and equity as given at 
t=0: 
K(0) =KO, B(0) =Ba, and E(0) =E (6) 
Hence, we can derive a closed form expression for the market value of the firm 
using expressions above because, as Osterberg showed, maximising the market value of 
debt plus equity is equivalent to maximising a particular present discounted value under 
the set of financial and production constraints explained above. This can be shown as 
follows: First, substitute equations for EBIT, TCD, TAXF, RE and DIV into equation (2), 
add PEE to the both sides of the resulting relation; and obtain the following relation: 
P =[8 
(ag/2)[Y -aö]2]8+ý 
_B+p 
(7) NCF+ 
crB + EE Y 
where NCF is the cash flow of the firm, defined as 
NCF=[PNY-OLPLL]9C+TCDA-(1-z)PPI (8) 
Here PN is the net price or per-unit value added, defined as price PN=[P(1-'ty)- 
ýýaý(1 +tiv)pvJ. Second, note that the market value of the firm relation, V=B+PEE, 
implies: 
y_B+pE (9) 
now, using (4') and (9), expression (7) can be written as: 
NCF+V=I'V (10) 
where I' is the cost of capital, defined as: 
"It is assumed that the capital stock declines exponentially at the rate of economic depreciation SR. 
It has been shown that exponential or geometric decline in the capital stock provides a satisfactory 
approximation to actual patterns of decline. See Jorgenson and Yun (1986b). 
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r=[6cre+ 
(ag/2)(Y -aö)2 
Y 
y op leg ob-0 ;j 1+y eg epeb 1+Y 
(11) 
Expression (10) is a linear differential equation in V that can be integrated to show that 
F is the discount factor which maintains the equality between the integral of V, and 
B(+PEA Finally, integrating equation (10) yields the following expression for V20: 
as 
V(t) =f exp[c)c(ts)]NCF(s)ds, 
t 
where (O`(t, s)= -f 1T(u)du. 
(12) 
One of the objectives of the model is to capture tax effects on old capital stocks 
and new capital stocks of firms. Therefore we can separate the terms reflecting the value 
of depreciation allowances on existing capital, DE, and future acquisitions, DN, which 
yields new expression for market value of the firm at t: 
00 
V(t) =f exp[cü'(t, s)INCF(s)ds+DE(t) 
(12') 
t 
Now, the net cash flow definition is modified as 
NCF=[PNY-OLPLL]OC+tCDA-(1-z-DN)PKI fig') 
"Solution method is such that: rearranging (10) as V-FV=-NCF and multiplying it by integrating 
factor, exp[uf(t, s)] converts the left side of the rearranged equation (10) into an exact differential. Thus, 
after multiplying the integrating factor, it can be integrated over [t, oo) to give 
Ca 
V(oo)exp[wc(t, oo)] -V(t)exp[wc(t, s)] =-f exp[wc(t, s)]NCF(s)ds 
t 
At this point we assume that the left most of the above equation (which is formally a limit) is zero. This 
is known as a transversality condition, and it will be true as long as the value of firm grows more slowly 
than the cost of capital as time tends toward infinity. Hence after applying the transversality condition and 
rearranging slightly, we obtain the explicit equation for the value of the 
firm at any time t. 
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The values of depreciation allowances on existing capital and future acquisitions are 
defined respectively as21 
a 
DE(t) =fi exp[w'(t, s)]K T(s)[exp(-aw)(S-t)] (12a) 
t 
co 
DN(s)=Tc(aä+öf)+ f Tcöw XPL(Oc(s, u)lexP[(-aw)(u-s)ldu" (12b) 
8 
4.2.2 Derivation of Firm Behavioral Functions 
Now, the firm's problem is to choose the sequence {L(t), yj(t), I(t), B(t) } so as to 
430 
max f exp[w'(t, s)]NCF(s)+DE(t) (13) 
t 
subject to the real and financial constraints, that is equations (1)-(6). 
Note that NCF is solely a function of 'real' variables, K and L, whereas F is a 
function of only 'financial' variables summarised by y(t). Thus, the firm can optimise in 
the following sequence: first choose L(t), yy(t) and I(t) to maximise NCF(t), then choose 
y(t) to minimise I, (t). 
"Discounting of depreciation allowances is an unresolved issue. The theory has clear implications. 
Because prospective depreciation allowances are very nearly riskless, they are more valuable than other 
prospective sources of cash flow. The appropriate discount rate for safe cash flows, like the stream of 
future deductions, is lower than the rate applicable to risky physical investments. 
In fact future depreciation deductions are subject to some risks. Depreciation deductions will be 
useless for firms that make losses and become nontaxable and are unable to make use of carryback and 
carryforward provisions. There is also the possibility of changes in tax rates, this source of uncertainty 
may drive the appropriate discount rate down rather than up. Finally there is always the possibility that 
the depreciation rules will be changed with respect to assets already in place. (See Summers 1987) 
Although this discussion suggests a lower discount rate for the discounting of depreciation 
allowances, as is commonly adopted, we discount the depreciation allowances at the rate which firms 
discount the stream of the future cash flows. The following argument might justify this: the Since 
depreciation allowances are not adjusted to inflation, one could argue that prospective depreciation 
allowances are not riskless. 
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This problem is solved using 'control theory techniques', in particular, 'Pontryagin's 
Maximum Principle', to obtain demand functions for investment and intermediate goods, 
and supply function of output and bond. With choice of functional forms the current 
value Hamiltonian associated at t with our problem becomes: 
H(L, I, B; K; k)=exp(caý[NCF-1l(I-BRIE)+C(B)l (14) 
The Hamiltonian can be thought of as measuring the total flow of cash flow is equal to 
the sum of the flow of cash flow form contemporary production activities plus the 
imputed (shadow) cash flow value of capital to be installed at s plus the cash flow yield 
from borrowing at s. ? and ý are the costate variables associated with K and B, 
respectively. X and C have the interpretation of the 'shadow price of an increment of 
capital and borrowing, respectively. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions" for optimality are: 
PNVAL=OLPL (14a) 
[(1-z-DN)PK+eCPr(I/K)4 J=? (14b) 
i =(r+8x)A _BcPN(VAK_(IfK)24 
(14c) 
op 
1' (ý[egeb-ep, ]_e T- 
ag, 
Y2+, ý_(l+agagag (14d) 6g 
[B 
epeb ýB 22 0) 0 
(14e) 
22The conditions below are necessary as well as sufficient because the equation (14b) satisfies the 
second order condition HI, <o. This can be seen from the property that (d/dI)[(I/K)od ]>O. Furthermore, the 
strict convexity of adjustment cost function guarantees the uniqueness of the solution for the above 
problem. Since production function is concave and satisfies the Inada conditions, and adjustment we can 
argue that the solution exists and we can reach this solution as long as the cost of capital, the discounting 
factor, is positive. 
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In formal terms, systems of this type are two-point boundary-value problems. In 
order to solve them uniquely, it is necessary to specify terminal conditions for the asset 
price variables as well as initial conditions for the variables. The terminal conditions 
simply involves specifying transversality conditions ensuring the model's convergence. 
K(0) =Ko, B(0) =Bo and E(0) =E (140 
TVC 
s-bHM 
lim 
ooexp[w'(t s)] 
X (s)K(s) =0 =s-b00exp[w'(ts)] C(s)B(s) (14g) 
The first order condition, equation (14a), implies that labour is hired until its value 
of marginal product and wage are equal. Expression (14b) states that marginal q differs 
from one by the after-tax decline in cash flow due to relative prices and installation 
costs, and implies that the investment rate is an increasing function of marginal q. The 
equation (14d) defines the optimal debt-equity ratio. Expression (14c) is the arbitrage 
condition that the shadow return from holding capital must equal to the required return 
on capital, (F+WR)q. Expression (14c) can be integrated subject to the transversality 
condition (14f) to obtain: 
Co s 
A(t)= f exp[_ f (r(u)+6R)du]OCPN(VAK_(I/K)24býds 
(15) 
tt 
Expression (15) shows that X(t) equals the present discounted sum of after-tax 
marginal products of a unit of capital installed at time t. Thus, since F depends on the 
debt to equity ratio, so does X. However, (14b) shows to be a 'sufficient statistic' for 
investment. In other words, the total of the market values of debt and equity captures 
the effect of financial structure on cost of capital. 
In order to derive an investment function of the industry, following Summers 
(1981b) and Summers (1987) we will define the investment function as follows. The 
first-order condition, equation (14b), characterises the investment function; it implicitly 
defines a function linking investment to the real shadow price of capital, ?, /P, the tax 
parameters, and the costs of adjustment. This equation has an intuitive explanation. The 
right-hand side is the shadow price of additional capital goods, which is equal to their 
marginal cost in after-tax corporate dollars on the left-hand side. 
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The equation (14c) describes the evolution of the shadow price, X. It guarantees 
that the shadow price equals the present value of the future marginal products of a unit 
of capital. This equation is of no operational significance, Hence, we are trying to link 
the shadow price to the market valuation of existing capital. 
PROPOSITION: In the presence of perfectly competitive output and factor 
markets, 
q(0) = 
Y(O)-DE(O) 
with q =A/Px PK(0)K(0) 
(16) 
if and only if the installation function O d(I/K) in linearly homogenous in I/K, the 
production function VA(K, L) is linearly homogenous in K and L and exponential rates 
govern the depreciation of K. 
PROOF: First suppose VA and 4d are linearly homogenous. Since the firm is a 
price-taker, we have, from (14a), 
VAL=OLPJPN (17a) 
Since VA is homogenous, (17a) implies 
(NCF+(1-z-DN)P, I+OXN4d)/K=(d/dK)4p (17b) 
Now consider 
a{X (s)K(s)exp[G)`(t, s)] I= { £K+AK-TAK}exp[(o'(t, s)] (17c) ds 
along an optimal path. Using (17a), (17b), (14c), (14b), (16), we can easily establish 
d 
ds 
{ AKexp[(o'(t, s)l }_ -NCFexp[wc(ts)] (17d) 
Integrating (17d) from t=O to infinity and using the transversality condition (14f), we 
obtain 
Co 
ß, (0)K(0) =f NCF(s)exp[(Ä)'(ts)]ds 
(17e) 
t=O 
which implies (16). 
REMARK 1: The proposition holds at any point in time along the optimal path. 
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REMARK 2: Since the installation function is concave in I/K, the optimal path is 
unique if it exists23. 
Therefore, combining equations (14b) and (16) demonstrates that 
I 
=hCQ) il8) 
where h(. )=[(I/K)Od']-' and Q is the tax-adjusted q, defined as 
Q=[ V -DE -1 +z+DN] [ 
pK 
] (19) 
PKK ®ePrr 
From the adjustment cost function, equation (lc), we can write the investment function, 
(18), as 
I 
=aö+ 
ä 
K al 
(18') 
Since we know the value of capital stock we can solve equation (14a) for L, using 
value added function, and obtain an equation for Y. 
1 
L(t) =K(t) { 8LPJE0E 1PN EO-1 
(20a) 
ý 
I (20b) Y(t) =K(t) { OLPE f EQE 1PN } 
Also, demand for intermediate inputs is obtained as: 
Eo 
1 
(20c) 
y; (t) =af(t) 
E_ 
{OLPLIE0E11 N1 
As is seen, demands for labour and intermediate inputs as well as output supply 
depend on all current prices and on the rate of returns. No future prices are relevant. 
However, investment demand is forward looking in the sense that it not only depends 
on the current prices of the investment good but also on next period's rate of returns and 
all the other future prices via the shadow price of capital. 
23See Hayashi (1982) and Summers (1981b). 
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Since there is no equity issue, y is adjusted by varying the B vs. RE financing mix. 
Hence, the equation (14d) can be numerically solved for finding the debt-equity ratio. 
Having chosen the path of the investment, labour demand, and the debt-equity ratio, the 
initial share price is determined by the condition B(0)+PE(0)E=V(0). 
4.3 THE MODEL OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR 
Households are represented as forward-looking and having perfect foresight. Since 
today's saving affects both current and future consumption (by affecting future income 
through asset accumulation), the determination of current optimal saving levels is a 
fundamentally intertemporal problem. Hence, an aggregate consumption and savings are 
derived from the utility maximising behaviour of a representative household that faces 
an infinite horizon24. Once households chose aggregate consumption level, they then 
choose specific consumers goods according to fixed expenditure shares. 
Savings are used to accumulate assets (actually bonds). Households are allowed 
to buy foreign bonds as well and hence decide on holding domestic and foreign bonds. 
In the allocation of savings between domestic bonds and foreign bonds, a simple 
approach is adopted, in which asset preferences are left out of individuals' utility 
functions25. In the model, households' asset portfolio are passive: the actual 
24Judd (1985) discusses the relevance of assuming that any person has an infinite life. In consistent 
with empirical evidence that indicates that substantial amounts of wealth are held for bequest purposes, 
in which case the true economic agent consists of several generations of a family, Judd argues that is not 
an absurd approximation. 
"However, when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes and offer different expected 
returns, portfolio and consumption choices need to be coordinated since the choice of portfolio affects the 
overall rate of return to the household. One approach to this problem would be to incorporate risk 
explicitly. But the integration of portfolio choice and consumption demands in the face of risk and 
uncertainty presents difficult, unresolved theoretical issues, particularly when there are many time periods 
and many consumption goods. Moreover, risk may only partly explain the main empirical fact of interest: 
that households hold diversified portfolios despite sustained differences in rates of return. Goulder and 
Eichengreen (1989) take an alternative approach in which they posit a portfolio preference function 
embedded within a utility-maximising framework that allows households to adjust asset shares in 
accordance with differences in rates of return. This approach is based on the observation that households 
exhibit strong home-country preference: assets from their own country often make up the bulk of their 
portfolios, even when rates of return on other-country assets are comparable or higher. However, Goulder 
and Eichengreen report that their complicated approach and our simple approach which is also used by 
them yield a very similar pattern of results. Hence, we choose the simple approach instead of Goulder and 
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composition of the portfolio holdings is driven by the equation that determines the 
supply of savings between the home country and the rest of the world. This point will 
be dealt with some length below. 
4.3.1 The Decision Problem of the Household 
The information structure underlying the economic problem of the consumer at 
each point in time t can be summarised as follows. At each point in time t, the consumer 
observes current commodity and labour prices and anticipates the parameters of future 
taxation policy. Accordingly, the value of current wealth is determined. These 
parameters are used to determine his intertemporal plans for consumption. 
Consumer decisions can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the consumer 
decides an intertemporal path of a composite consumption commodity (aggregate 
consumption). In the second stage; individuals divide the expenditures on the composite 
good among several consumer goods. 
4.3.1.1 Composite Consumption and Saving 
At any moment of time t the behaviour of the household is motivated by the 
objective of maximising its total lifetime utility for the remainder of its life. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that each household lives infinitely and that total lifetime utility 
U is the integral of the discounted flow of utility which the household expects to enjoy 
at each moment of time in the future 
co 
U(t) =f u[C(s)]exp(-p(s-t))ds 
t 
(21 a) 
where u[C(s)] measures the flow of utility which the household enjoys at each point in 
time s; C(s) is the composite consumption commodity at each point in time s. p is the 
pure rate of time preference -the rate at which the household discounts future utils in 
order to compare them with current utils. 
Eichengreen approach. 
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For the instantaneous utility or 'felicity' function, u(s), we choose a single iso- 
elastic form for all s 
K-1 
u(s) 
- 
C(s) °11 for au*1 (21b) 
auu-1 
u(s) =InC(s) for a, =1 
where ßu is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
Combining the two expressions above, above, we can rewrite the household's 
lifetime utility as: 
a ak-1 
U(t) =J 
ý" 
C(s) a" exp(- P (s -t))ds" 
(21) . 
t Qu 
1 
The household's behaviour is constrained by a dynamic set of budget constraints 
relating the intertemporal patterns of income, spending and wealth accumulation. The 
consumer's income consists of labour income, government transfers received and capital 
income. 
The consumer earns labour income PLL. In the model labour is measured in 
efficiency terms, and is assumed to grow at a time-invariant rate, g. This rate reflects 
both population growth and labour productivity growth. The household is considered to 
receive lump-sum transfers from the government, Tr. Also, individuals receive capital 
income on their non-human wealth, which is composed of earnings on shares and 
interest earnings on bonds. Earnings on shares can be broken into two categories; 
dividends and capital gains. In addition, as a requirements of Walras' law, the model 
treats the agency costs of debt stocks of firms as households' income. 
Labour income, dividends and interest earnings are taxable according to a linear 
progressive income tax schedule. Under a partial imputation system, which is the U. K. 
corporation tax system, there is a tax credit, in the determination of personal income 
taxes on dividends, that relates to part of the underlying corporation tax. Lump-sum 
transfers from the government and agency income are considered tax-exempt. Capital 
gains are taxed at a different rate tig. Accordingly, disposable income, YD, is given by: 
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YD f+YH+YK (22) 
where f is negative to reflect that the fact that marginal tax rates exceed average tax 
rates, YH represents the sum of labour income (net of personal income taxes), transfer 
received from the government and agency income, and formally defined as 
YH=9/LL+Tr+E, 
, 
(yJ)BJ (22a) 
and similarly, YK denotes the capital incomes, which is defined as 
O YK=E je DIY+eprB ZiBf+(rB + e)eBW-TgE i (22b) Ob 
Some points need to be clarified here: first, that since foreign bonds, B, are 
denominated in foreign currency as opposed to domestic private bonds, B3 oth firm's 
bond), exchange rate changes should be included in calculating returns on foreign bonds 
and second, that although capital gains are part of capital income on shares, they are not 
realized and therefore cannot be counted as disposable income. As before, tip is the 
marginal income tax and 0 stands for the tax factor representing expressions of the kind 
1-, t with the same subscript as corresponding (for example Op=1-tip); b denotes the rate 
of imputed tax credit on dividends, DIV; and e is the nominal exchange rate, the foreign 
currency price in terms of the domestic currency price. 
The consumer's expenditures on consumption is represented by PC where P is the 
price index for composite consumption. Hence, the household's supply of savings into 
the fund market is now described by 
S=YD-PC (23) 
Clearly, saving, S, is a flow variable, a surplus unit as a result of the difference between 
income and consumption/expenditure. Surplus units are stored in financial assets, i. e., 
savings are invested into assets. This implies that savings represent intertemporal 
transfers of wealth to finance future consumption. In accordance with demands for funds 
by firms and the rest of the world consist of only borrowing, savings are modelled to 
buy bonds: 
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S=eBw+Ejtj (24) 
We assume that domestic and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes and offer different 
returns. This assumption, however, leads to an allocation problem of savings between 
bonds. It is solved by ensuring that the household's supply of savings are used to buy 
the mix of domestic and foreign bonds as determined by the equilibrium conditions. 
Suppose that S2 is the share of domestic bond accumulation in savings. Accordingly, the 
average return on bonds, rB, is calculated by 
rB =0 OPrB +(1-1) [r" +e/e] (25) 
Households pay personal income taxes only on interest earnings on domestic bonds; this 
reflects that source-base taxation is applied in taxing income obtained abroad. This issue 
will be discussed below at some length. 
Combining equations (23) and (24) by using expression (25), the dynamic budget 
constraint of the household can be written as follows: 
W TBWB+f+YK+YH-PC (26) 
where WB stands for the total bondholding (i. e., the sum of the total firms' bond and 
the rest of the world bond stocks) of the household and WE, similarly denotes the total 
equityholding of the household. Thus, we can define the household's nonhuman wealth 
as 
WK=WB+WE (27) 
4.3.1.2 Consumption of specific commodities 
The variable C(t) above refers to overall consumption in each time t. This is a 
composite of consumption of several specific consumer goods. Thus, in the second 
stage, individuals maximise a Cobb-Douglas form for the sub-utility function 
C=H-C1 ' (28a) 
subject to 
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E1P`(1 +z. )C1=YD-S (28b) 
where Pi is the individual price of product i and tiv; is the value added tax on commodity 
i purchase. The p; weighting parameters are the Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares26. 
4.3.2 Derivation of Household Behavioral Functions 
The objective of household behaviour is to maximise total lifetime utility. As 
indicated above, the household's lifetime utility at time t=0 is equal to the discounted 
sum of the flow of utility which it will enjoy at every future moment of time. Without 
loss of generality, we may take the current moment of time t=0. The household's 
lifetime utility to be maximised is written as 
m au-1 
C(s) " exp(-ps)ds 
(29a) U(t) =f 
Q°" i tu 
The household seeks to maximise U by choice of the time paths of C. The 
household's choice of the time paths of 0 subject to the dynamic budget constraint, 
WB=rBWB+f+YK+YH-PC (29b) 
and the lifetime budget constraint, which the household's net borrowing at any future 
point of time, WB(T), must not exceed the household's ability to repay these borrowing 
out of its non-asset income. The latter constraint is called 'No-Ponzi-game condition' 
stating that the consumer cannot indefinitely accumulate debt at a rate higher than or 
equal to the net interest rate. 
oe S 
-WB(T)s 
f [f+YK+YH-PC]exp[- f rBdu]ds for all TA, 
(29c) 
sT 
One can also write the lifetime budget constraint27 as 
26Since we differentiate consumer goods from producer goods, the subscript i instead of j is used. 
27For the equivalence of these conditions, see Mussa (1976) p. 60-62. 
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a* 
f P(s)C(S)exp[& (t, s)ldssTW (29c') 
r=0 
where o? (t, s)=-fr rB(s)ds and TW1=o, the sum of initial assets and the present discounted 
value of the household's non-asset income, is the household's initial wealth and is 
defined by 
TW°WK+WH (30) 
where WH represents the sum of the human wealth, the present value of labour income 
and the present value of transfers: 
ob 
WH(t) =f YH(s)exp[Wh(t, s)]ds, 
(30a) 
r 
As stated in section 2.2.2, in order to solve this problem, which is a two-point 
boundary-value problem, uniquely, it is necessary to specify initial conditions for the 
state variable and terminal conditions ensuring the model's convergence. 
Initial conditions for the state variables are given as: 
WK(0) =WKo=e *B,, +EjB jo +Ejf Ej 
(29d) 
We characterise the solution using the control theory techniques, in particular, 
Pontryagrin's Maximum principle. The optimal solution is obtained by setting up the 
relevant Hamiltonian function at time s: 
a"-1 
H[C; WB; JI]=[ 
a" ]C °" +)[rBWB+f+YK+YH-PC] 
(31) 
v -1 u 
Here H can be thought of as measuring the total flow of utility (in terms of utils of time 
s) which arises out of the activities of the household at time s. This total flow of utility 
is equal to the sum of the flow of utility from consumption of commodities plus the 
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current utility value of the flow of asset accumulation, X[YD-PCJ. X (s) has the 
interpretation of the 'shadow price of unit of consumption goods at time t, and is 
measured in utils of time t. In other words, X is called the costate variable associated 
with the state variable WB. The value of X(t) is the marginal value, as of time s, of an 
additional unit of wealth at s. 
In the solution of the household's intertemporal allocation problem, WB(s) and X (s) 
are treated as the 'state variables' of the problem and C(t) is treated as the 'currently 
determined variables' of the problem. The solution of the intertemporal allocation 
problem proceeds in three steps. The first step is to determine the values of the currently 
determined variables, at each point of time s, so as to maximise H(s), taking the values 
of the state variables at time s as given. This determines the values of the currently 
determined variables at each point of time as functions of the values of the state 
variables at that point of time. The second step is to solve the differential equations 
which represent the 'transition laws' for the state variables, making use of the results of 
step one. This determines the time paths of the state variable, and, hence, of the 
currently determined variables, up to the value of one parameter, the initial value of X. 
The third step is to use the 'transversality conditions', together with the results of steps 
one and two, to determine the initial value of X. 
A rationale for this three-step procedure may be given as follows. Step one tells 
the household to maximise the total flow of utility arising out of its activities at any 
moment of time, taking appropriate account of the constraints which current activities 
will impose on future behaviour. The constraints which past decisions impose on current 
activities at time s are summarised in the state variable WB(s). Current activities affect 
future behaviour only through C(s). The value of state variable X (s) tells the household 
the value which it should assign to a unit of asset accumulation at time s. Steps two and 
three tell the household to select the time paths of the state variables in such a manner 
that they do appropriately reflect the constraints of past decisions on current activities 
and the implications of current activities for future behaviour. 
i) Step One 
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The necessary conditions for the maximisation for the maximisation of the current 
value Hamiltonian with respect to the currently determined variables are given by 
i 
C °u -)1P=0 
(31a) 
The properties of the flow of utility function insure that the solution will always 
result in the determination of unique, positive values of C, for any given, positive values 
of X. Specifically, properties (smoothness, increasing marginal utility and concavity) 
insure that the relationship between C and aui JO will be continuous, inverse, and single 
valued. The Inada conditions' insure that 0 will be strictly positive. 
The proofs of the propositions advanced in the last paragraph are, in general, both 
obvious and straightforward. Therefore we will not try to prove them. 
Formally, the condition (31 a) can be solved for C: 
ii) Step Two 
(31a') 
Having determined the values of the currently determined variable 0 as function 
of the values of the state variable X and of the exogenous variable P, the next step in 
the solution of the household's intertemporal allocation problem is to determine the time 
paths of the state variables up to the value of the constant X(0). This is accomplished 
by writing down and then solving the differential equations which characterize the 
'transition laws' for the state variables. The transition law for bonds is given by 
WB=rBWB+f+YK+YH-PC (31b) 
The transition law for the shadow price of consumption (in terms of utils of time s) is 
I=[P-rB]A (31c) 
Equations (31a) and (31c) determine the path of the rate of change of marginal 
utility. The level of this path is determined by the wealth constraint. 
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The solution to the differential equation (31b) is given by 
s 
WB(s) =exp[Wh(t s)] { WB(t) +f [f+YK+YH-PO]exp[& (t, s)]du}, 
(31 b') 
t 
where the solution to the differential equation (31c) is given by 
ý, (s) _I(t)exp[P(s) -& '(t , s)] 
Q1 c') 
The interpretation of the transition law for assets, eq. (31b), and of its solution, eq. 
(31 b'), are both relatively straight forward. The rate of accumulation of assets is equal 
to the difference between disposable income and expenditure (consumption). Total assets 
at any moment of time s are equal to the sum of what initial assets would have been if 
they had been allowed to accumulate at compound interest plus the accumulated 
difference, including compound interest between past income non-asset sources and 
expenditure. 
To interpret the transition law for the shadow price of consumption (in terms of 
utils of time t), eq. (31c), it is convenient to define 'subjective rate of time preference' 
by dividing the equation (31c) and rewriting it: 
rB=p-?. IA (31c') 
Equation (31 a) shows that, given utility function, the relative decline in marginal utility 
consists of two components. One is the subjective rate of discount p that reflects von 
Böhm-Bawerk's second reason for interest, the 'underestimation of future wants'. The 
other, A/X, is the decline in instantaneous felicity. This component reflects von Böhm- 
Bawerk's first reason which he calls the 'difference in the relationships between demand 
and supply'. 
It is straightforward to find a term for 0, from eq. (31 c). Now we can define the 
rate of return on consumption 
where a 'A' over variable denotes expressions such that x=x/x. 
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rB-P=p+-C (31c") 
G" 
From eq. (31 c') and (31 a), by introducing a new term for 2 showing the shadow 
price of consumption at time s measured in terms of utils of time t, one can obtain the 
following equation 
exp(-ps) 
(u'[C(S)]/P(S)) 
_6) h(t2, S)9, (31d) 
(u'[c(t)]/P(t)) 
The economic meaning of this equation is that the marginal rate of substitution between 
commodity consumption at time s and commodity consumption at time t must equal the 
market rate of transformation between commodities at time s and commodities at time 
t, (0h(t, s). 
Aside from the variables 0 and P which appears in eq. (31a'), the only variables 
which appear in the solutions for WB and ? given by eqs. (31b') and (31c') are X(O) and 
the exogenously determined values of WB(O), P(s), PL(s) and fB(s), namely, the total 
bondholdings, price index for composite consumption, wage rate, and average return on 
bonds, 
C(s)={A(O)(exp[P(s)+Wh(t, s)])I (s)}-Q" 
(32) 
Substituting this result into (31b') yields an expression for WB(s) written exclusively in 
terms of X(O) and the values of the exogenous variables. It follows that the time paths 
of the state variables, WB and X, and hence the time paths of the currently determined 
variable C(t), will be completely determined once the value of ), (0) is determined. 
iii) Step three 
The final step in the solution of the household's intertemporal optimisation problem 
is to use the 'transversality conditions' to determine the value of X. Transversality 
conditions are 
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S expl-P(s)II(S)ý: 
0 (33a) 
lim 
S exp[-P(s)]A(s)WB(s)=O 
(33b) 
substituting from (31c') for X(s) in condition (33a) yields the condition 
s 
lim 
s 
A(O)exp[- f rB(u)du] (33a') 
r 
which will be satisfied provided that X (O) is chosen to be >_0. If X(O) is equal to 0, then 
X(s) must equal 0 for all s, and under the assumptions that have been made concerning 
the properties of u(C), it must be true that C(s)=+oo for all s. Since this would violate 
the lifetime budget constraint, substituting from (3 lb') for W(s) and from (31c') for ? (s) 
into condition (33b) yields the condition. 
s 
SHM 
{ WB(0) +f [f+YK+YH-PC]exp[W h(t, s)]du } =0 
(34) 
t 
Using eq. (32) for C which appears in above condition (34), the condition (34) can be 
rewritten as 
00 
fP(s) {A (0)(exp[ P (s) +(Oh(t, s)l)P(s) } -°mexp[wh(t, s)l )d =TW(O) 
(34') 
r 
where TW(O), the total wealth, is given by (30). If the integral on the left-hand side of 
(34') converges for some positive value of X(0), then the assumptions which have been 
made concerning properties of the flow of utility function ensure that there is a unique 
value of X(0), for which the condition (34') is satisfied. This is so because the value of 
C which appears under the integral sign on the left-hand side of (34') has been shown 
to be a monotonically decreasing, continuous function of X (O). 
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To find a solution of the optimal path of C: solve eq. (34') for X (O) and substitute 
it into eq. (32) 
C(s) =A(s)TW(0) 
where A(s)= 
lexp[P(s)+(o h(t, s)lp(s)}-ý" 
00 (35) 
fP(s)1-a"exp[P(s)]-""exp[cdh(t 
s)]1-emds 
t 
At time t, we can write eq. (35) as 
P(t) C(t) =A(t)T'W(t) 
w 
(35') 
where A(t) =[f [F(s)/F(t)l 1-a"[exp(P (s -t))] 0"[exp[ W h(t, s)] ]' -°"dsl -i 
t 
Hence, it is clear that the consumption is homogeneous of degree one in total 
wealth, and the ratio of consumption to wealth depends on the future interest rates. The 
parameter A is the propensity to consume out of wealth. It is generally a function of the 
expected path of interest rates. An increase in interest rates, given wealth, has two 
effects. The first is to make consumption more attractive later: this is the substitution 
effect. The second is to allow for higher consumption now and later: this is the income 
effect. In general, the net effect on the marginal propensity to consume is ambiguous. 
For the logarithmic utility function, however, 6=1, and the two effects cancelled; the 
propensity to consume is then exactly equal to the rate of time preference; p, and is 
independent of the path of interest rates. 
In general, expectations of interest rates affect both the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth and the value of wealth itself, through the present discounted 
value of the household's non-asset income. Expectations of wages also affect through 
the present discounted value of the household's non-asset income. Given these 
expectations the consumer decides how much to consume and save. This in turn 
determines capital accumulation and the sequence of factor prices. 
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Finally, demand for individual consumer goods is obtained by solving equation 
(28a), which is subjected to equation (28b): 
(YD-S) Ci=µý 
D 
(36) 
An important property of the nested Cobb-Douglas function is that we can derive 
the indirect utility functions and expenditure functions easily. The expenditure function 
can be in turn used to create a composite price index, P, from the individual prices, 
Pj(] +, rvl). An especially convenient property of this kind of price index for the 
Cobb-Douglas (and CES functions as well) is that the composite price index can be 
calculated without knowing the actual quantities, C, 
=1 
owp, 
194 (37) PIII 
µi 
4.4 GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR 
On the government side, we concentrate on tax while allowing no optimal 
government behaviour. The level of overall government spending (purchases plus 
transfers) is given exogenously. It grows at a steady-state rate of growth, g. 
This model is consistent with two types of public consumption. First, the public 
consumption can be thought of as either public goods that do not affect the marginal 
rates of substitution among private goods or transfers to individuals. Both interpretations 
could be modelled formally by assuming that the private utility functional is additively 
separable in private and in such public expenditure28. Therefore, while there may be 
value to each taxpayer from public consumption or transfers to the poor, the level and 
path of such transfers do not affect the demand functions of the agents for their private 
goods. A second class of public expenditures consistent with this model are publicly 
provided private goods that are perfect substitutes for private consumption. Being perfect 
"Brock-Turnovsky (1981) states that this corresponds to the assumption of "ultrarationality". 
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substitutes, their provision is equivalent to lump-sum transfers to taxpayers. Therefore, 
our model includes both classes of public goods. Let G be the public expenditures that 
are additively separable with respect to private consumption. Lump-sum transfers will 
represent those that are perfect substitutes for private consumption. With these 
formulation we can concentrate on purely fiscal policy issues while allowing two major 
classes of public expenditures'. 
We model the government sector such that it engages in three economic activities. 
Firstly, it collects taxes according to an exogenously given tax regime. Secondly, it 
transfers discretionary lump-sum amounts to the private sector. Finally, the government 
sector purchases consumption goods to accomplish general government activities. 
4.4.1 The Government Sector Revenues 
The tax system, which consists of seven classes of taxes, and tax policies are 
institutionally given as the outcome of a process not captured by the model. Direct taxes 
in the model are corporate income tax described by partial imputation system, personal 
income tax, capital gains tax and property tax. Indirect taxes are considered ad valorem 
labour and value-added taxes. The only subsidy in the model is ad valorem investment 
tax credit. The total revenues they generate at t are accumulated as follows: 
1. Ad valorem labour tax on labour services used by the different industries, which 
generates revenue, TL: 
TL =T LPLEJLJD 
where L° represents labour demand by industry j. 
2. Ad valorem corporate income tax on industries generates revenue, Tc: 
3. Ad valorem investment tax credits on industries generate revenue, TZ: 
(38a) 
29See, Judd (1985) p. 301. 
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Tc=EjT C7 i 
1RN., 
(38b) 
where EARN= [PNY-®LPLL-rj3 B-DA] 
TZ=EjzjP I1 (38c) 
4. Ad valorem value-added tax generates revenue, Tv: 
TV-EitviPiCi+ElEiT 
vtPjyji+EiT viPiGi 
(38d) 
where in yfi, j denotes fh intermediate good demanded by i, G, denotes government 
expenditure on good i. 
5. A linear progressive personal income tax represented by linear function 
generates revenue, Tp: 
1Divj]- b EjDivj Tp - -f+Tp[PLL+rB (BN, + BBj)+EjOb 1- b 
6. Capital gains tax generates revenue, T8: 
Tg =EjzgP i 
7. Property tax (Rates) generates revenue, Tx,: 
T,, =E K-K, 
Accordingly, total taxes collected at time t are T: 
T=TL+Tc -Tz+Tv+Tp+Tg+Tw 
4.4.2 The Government Budget Constraint 
(38e) 
(380 
(38g) 
(39) 
In the model requires the government's budget to be in balance in any given year. 
This may be written as 
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>21ev, PiGi +Tr=T (40) 
where Tr is transfer payments, and T is tax collections. Total lump-sum redistributive 
transfer payments, i. e., transfers to households at t are exogenously given as Tr. Transfer 
payments grow at the steady-state growth rate. 
4.5 THE REST OF THE WORLD 
A substantial economic relations -commodity and capital flows- between 
countries necessitate modelling economies as to be opened up to the rest of the world. 
Because introducing these substantial commodity trade and capital flows could change 
the effects of taxes obtained under a closed economy assumption. For instance, in a 
closed economy, it is clear that there is no important difference between savings and 
investment taxes. But in open economies, where capital flows are possible, they will 
have quite different effects. This is apparent from the national income accounting. 
We close the model by adopting a small open country assumption. However, the 
model includes two departures from the commonly adopted small open economy 
assumption30. On the real side, it appears quite unrealistic to assume that the medium- 
size industrialised countries can sell unlimited quantities of their exports at constant 
prices. On the financial side, international financial flows are not infinitely elastic. So 
the assumption is replaced by a semi-small economy assumption. Moreover, we assume 
product differentiation for imports along with the lines of Armington (1969) assumption. 
However, even with the semi-small country assumption, closed-economy results 
might be significantly reversed. Perraudin and Pujol (1990) clarifies the role played by 
the terms of trade effects resulted from the inelastic demand for the country's exports. 
They showed that tax policies which stimulate production would cause deterioration in 
"The small country assumption means that the economy can purchase or sell unlimited quantities of 
imports and exports at constant world prices on the real side and borrow and lend freely abroad at the 
constant world interest rate on the financial side. See, De Melo and Robinson (1989) for a careful 
examination of the treatment of the external sector in CGE models. 
99 
terms of trade, to extent that the export demand is inelastic. They also stress that 
changes in the terms of trade depends upon the elasticity of substitution between imports 
and exportable for domestic consumers; the larger the elasticity of substitution between 
imports and exportable, the less changes in the terms of trade. As for welfare effects, 
the deterioration in the terms of trade leads to welfare losses for domestic households. 
Moreover, economists further argued that changes in the terms of trade or changes in 
the exchange rate could also be lowered by the degree of international capital mobility. 
Hence, introducing commodity and capital flows between countries could change the 
effects of taxes obtained under closed economy assumption. 
As Feldstein and Horioko (1980) asserted, one would expect that, with perfect 
capital mobility, there should be no relation between domestic savings and domestic 
investment: saving in each country respond to the worldwide opportunities for 
investment while investment in that country is financed by worldwide pool of capital. 
However, many empirical works found a positive correlation between national savings 
and domestic investment. Moreover, the correlation between savings and investment is 
both a short-run and very long-run phenomenon" 
Bovenberg (1989) explores conditions that result in the correlation between 
national saving and investment rates that Feldstein and Horioko (1980) found. He shows 
that capital flows may cause changes in prices and wealth that affect savings. Whether 
the induced change in savings will suffice to finance the change in investment is shown 
to depend on the values of intertemporal and trade (intratemporal) substitution 
elasticities and of trade shares. If exports and imports are imperfect substitutes, domestic 
investment and the time profile of domestic consumption are closely linked -even if 
financial capital is perfectly mobile internationally. His results also reveal how the real 
exchange rate transmits shocks in domestic investment to domestic saving, even if 
financial capital is perfectly mobile internationally; if domestic and foreign goods 
become less substitutable in demand, the real exchange rate overshoots more, which 
"It is argued that permanent, exogenous shifts in the rate of technological progress or population 
growth with imperfect labour mobility can explain the long-run co-movements between savings and 
investment. 
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implies a larger anticipated decline in the terms of trade. The anticipation of the fall in 
the terms of trade stimulates domestic saving because of both spending-smoothing 
behaviour due to anticipated income effects and intertemporal substitution due to real 
interest rate effects. 
Turnovsky and Sen (1991) incorporate government budget imbalances. This might 
explain the correlation between domestic savings and investment by correlating 
government budget imbalances with international financial capital flows. 
Our treatment of firms' financial behaviour might clarify the puzzle of the positive 
correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment with large financial 
capital flows internationally. Since with agency costs of debt, investment in our analysis 
is determined by availability of internal finance (retained earnings). Investment will be 
unaffected by financial capital flows. For example, a lower corporate tax will discourage 
borrowing but encourage retaining earnings because in the model the optimal debt-equity 
ratio is determined by agency costs of debt together with tax rates favouring debt. 
Another way of looking at these issues is to use a theory of the determination of 
current account based on factors underlying saving and/or investment behaviour. This 
theory begins with the national income identity32, S-I=Z-M that policies which increase 
national investment (savings) without increasing (effecting) national savings, S, 
(investment, I) must necessarily lead to increases (decreases) in imports, M, or decreases 
(increases) in exports, Z. In other words they will worsen (improve) the current account 
and lead the traded-goods sector to contract (expand). 
Summers (1988) pointed out that policies aimed at stimulating saving and those 
targeted at promoting investment are likely to have opposite effects on capital flows, 
exchange rate and international competitiveness. However, the Summers' result is based 
on the assumption that capital income taxes are imposed according to residence 
"The meaning of identity is that it holds that the trade balance (Z-M) must equal the excess of 
domestic savings over investment. Equivalently, as the balance of payments must, the current account (Z- 
M) must be just offset by capital account (S-I). 
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principle. A source-base capital income taxation might reverse it; a lower capital income 
taxation, for example, induces capital inflows as opposed to neutral direct effects of the 
residence-base capital income taxation. 
To be more precise, international capital flows can be considered as financial or 
physical capital flows. In terms of behaviour that drives capital flows, there would be 
a distintion between portfolio investment and direct investment. However, we will not 
deal with foreign direct investment. Since asset portfolio choice is taken as passive in 
the model we will not treat foreign portfolio investment explicitly, either. It is assumed 
that physical capital flows are negligible, therefore we concentrate on financial capital 
flows. Since the number of equities has been assumed fixed, only bonds flow 
internationally. 
4.5.1 Treatment of Imports and Exports 
There is a variety of external closure rules referring to the various assumptions 
about export demand and import supply behaviour". We adopt the one that 
incorporates product differentiation (i. e. the Armington assumption) for imports along 
with a downward-sloping foreign export demand curve with constant elasticity34. We 
then define for each tradable commodity category an aggregate or composite commodity 
f which is a CES function of commodities produced abroad (imports, M) and 
commodities produced domestically, Y. The aggregation is given by 
0M-1 CH-1 um 
41 
Y=ßllßom 0M +(1-ßdyD Om 1 um-1 
) 
where (30, ß, and 6M are parameters and M and Y° are like inputs "producing" the 
aggregate output. The demands for imports and domestically produced commodities 
33For these rules see, Whalley and Yeoung (1984) and De melo and Robinson (1989) 
34The Armington assumption with price-taking behaviour for imports along with a downward-sloping 
foreign export demand curve with constant elasticity yields a model in which both domestic and foreign 
offer curves lie on top of one another. See, De Melo and Robinson (1989). They are able to derive 
normally shaped offer curves by making a symmetric product differentiation for imports and exports. 
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become derived demands, in just the same way as the demand for factor inputs in a 
derived demand in a traditional model. 
Given the specified prices for the imported and domestic goods, the problem 
facing the user or buyer is mathematically equivalent to that faced by the firm wishes 
to produce a specified level of output at minimum cost. In mathematical terms, it means 
the optimisation is subjected to 
P Y_ pMM+P DyD (42) 
where Pj is the composite commodity prices, PM and P° are the imported and domestic 
goods prices, respectively. Therefore, solving (41) subject to (42) yields: 
D 
m=D =(P )°M( °)°"` (43) 
yD 1-ßo 
D 
M=P )°M( 
13°)°MYD 
(44) 
PM 1-00 
Since it is assumed that the economy can purchase unlimited quantities of imports 
at constant world prices a conversion factor, e, is used translate foreign prices into 
domestic prices such that 
PM=PM(1 +zm)e (45) 
where P'M is the world price of imports in foreign currency, and im is the tariff rate. 
The export good, which is consumed by domestic households and used as inputs 
to intermediate goods and investment by firms, is assumed to be demanded by the rest 
of the world. In defining the foreign demand for exported goods, similar to domestic 
consumer behaviour, an intertemporal utility optimisation approach is used 
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co 
Uw(t)=1uw[2(s)]exp(-p (S_t))ds (46a) 
t 
where uw[Z(s)] measures the flow of utility which the foreign consumer enjoys at each 
point in time s; Z(s) is the composite exported commodities at each point in time s. pµ, 
is the pure rate of time preference -the rate at which the household discounts future utils 
in order to compare them with current utils. 
Similarly, for the instantaneous utility function, u, (s), we choose a single iso- 
elastic form for all s 
v=-1 
uw(s) = 
az 
Z(s) °z for az# 1 (46b) 
Z1 
uw(s) =In2(s) for az =1 
where 6Z is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This is actually the price 
elasticity of export demand. 
Combining the above two expressions, we can rewrite the household's lifetime 
utility as: 
00 az-1 
U (t) =f i(s) °z expo -P (s-t))d" 
(46) 
t QZ 
i 
The foreign household's behaviour is also constrained by a dynamic set of budget 
constraints, the balance of payments constraint, relating the intertemporal patterns of 
interest income, imports, exports and wealth accumulation. The foreign consumer's 
income consists of the revenue of the sales of imported goods to the home country, and 
interest income. The balance of payments constraint requires that 
EW (t) _ [1 +(1-zp )]rB B w(t) +EjPý. (t)Mj(t) -p(t)Z(t) 
where 
(47) 
PZ = composite domestic export goods price, 
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B"' = foreign bond, 
tiP`" = marginal rate of personal income tax in the rest of the world. 
Individual exports prices PZj are defined such that 
P= 
Pj 
ýi (1 +z4)e 
where tiZ is the rate of export subsidy. 
(48) 
One dash of economic theory to equation (47) requires that one must rule out 
Ponzi games in international borrowing, and the result is 
C» 
B w(t) =f [Z 'M(s)M1(s) -P (s)2(s)]exp[W '(ts)I ds 
(47') 
r 
where (ow(t, s) =f str"'B(s)ds. In the model, it is assumed that B''t-0 = 0. Roughly speaking, 
equation (47') then tells us that today's trade surplus is tomorrow's trade deficit. Note 
that, because of the discounting, the absolute size of today's trade surplus is smaller than 
the absolute size of tomorrow's trade deficit. This means that the absolute size of today's 
real exchange rate appreciation has to be smaller than tomorrow's exchange rate 
depreciation. 
Accordingly, one can define real exchange rate (e), er=e/P Here P denotes the 
domestic price index. Clearly, a choice must be made with respect to the weights 
entering the aggregator for domestic price index. It is appropriate to choose CPI deflator. 
4.5.2 International Capital Flows 
In the modelling of international capital flows, only international portfolio 
investments are considered and international direct investment are left out. Since the 
allocation of domestic savings is made in the forms of bond accumulation, international 
portfolio investments accordingly take place in bond issuance. The supply of savings 
from the rest of the world (the home country) to the home country (the rest of the 
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world) is taken to depend positively on the net (after-tax) interest rate. So any net 
interest rate differential will lead to the supply of savings from one country to another. 
If the net interest rate at home is greater than that at abroad, the rest of the world will 
supply savings to the home country (capital inflows). If the net interest rate at home is 
less than that at abroad, there will be supply of savings from the home country to the 
rest of the world (capital outflows). When flexible exchange rate system is considered, 
changes in exchange rates must be taken into account. 
In defining taxation principle of international capital income, source principle is 
employed in the model. For example, capital income obtained abroad by domestic 
citizens is taxed abroad. Sinn (1987) shows that because it equalizes the post-tax market 
rates of interest, taxation at source has the advantage of implying equality of marginal 
rates of time preference of households at home and abroad and hence of satisfying an 
important condition for an intertemporal optimum in the exchange of credit contracts 
between households. Mclure (1992) also argue that inter-nation equity requires that host 
countries are entitled to a substantial portion of the tax levied on income originating 
within their borders. The principle of source entitlement naturally leads to taxation at 
source. Mclure, after defining efficient international capital allocations in terms of 
capital import neutrality and capital export neutrality, discusses whether and under what 
circumstances the source principle and the residence principle are compatible with 
capital import neutrality and capital export neutrality. Capital import neutrality requires 
that everyone doing business in a particular country face the same tax regime. It is 
consistent with source-based taxation. For it to be realized under residence-based 
taxation, all nations would need to apply identical taxes to income from business and 
capital. However, this form of neutrality is seen not necessary to achieve an efficient 
location of the world's investment. Capital export neutrality requires that income from 
capital be taxed equally, no matter where it is earned. This requirement is most usefully 
interpreted in terms of equality of marginal effective tax rates, though this is not made 
clear usually. If this requirement is not met, the world's capital will be misallocated to 
those jurisdictions where it is taxed least heavily. 
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It is assumed that the U. K. tax system advocates source principle of taxation. The 
supply of savings between the home country and the rest of the world is finally defined 
by the following expression 
AW(t)=BW[(1-r )rB Ct)-C1-zp)rB -%] (49) 
Here f3 is parameter. We choose a value for f3 in which it will indicate the degree of 
liberisation of capital flows. 
4.6 ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MODEL 
Atomistic competition in every market is assumed. Even though the number of 
agents on each side of the market is finite, it is assumed that enough agents are involved 
to render their actions negligible in terms of the overall equilibrium outcomes. Also, 
Kehoe and Levine (1985) points out that when there is a finite number of infinitely lived 
agents, perfect foresight equilibria are determinate. The concept of Perfect Foresight 
Equilibrium is adopted to capture the self-fulfilling behaviour of economic agents price 
expectations. The model is calculated to exhibit steady-state growth in the base-case (or 
benchmark) equilibrium. Following a policy shock, temporary equilibria (in the sense 
employed by Grandmont (1977) with market-clearing are generated in every period. 
These temporary equilibria form a transition path on which the economy gradually 
approaches a new long-run steady-state equilibrium. Since agents in the model are 
forward-looking with perfect foresight, solution of the model requires that expectations 
conform to actual future values. Hence equilibrium of the model must satisfy two set 
of conditions. The intratemporal requirements are that, given expectations of future 
variables, current supplies and demands balance at each point in time. The intertemporal 
conditions are those of perfect foresight: Expectations must conform to the values 
realized in later periods. 
Intratemporal equilibrium requires only that current markets for current goods 
and assets clear at current market prices. Since household demands for goods and assets 
depend on their expectations concerning the future behaviour of prices, wages, taxes, 
exchange rates and rates of return, it is clear that the intratemporal equilibrium position 
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of the economy is influenced by these expectations. Intertemporal equilibrium is a state 
in which not only are current markets for current goods and assets cleared at every 
instant of time, but also the movement of the economy from one intratemporal 
equilibrium to the next is such that expectations are continuously fulfilled and that 
previously made plans are always carried out. 
Clearly, under the assumption that all prices (hereafter prices will be used such 
that they includes product prices, wages, taxes, exchange rates and rates of return) are 
flexible, and accordingly all perfectly competitive markets clear, market-clearing prices 
at every point at time depend on expectations of future prices and on tax variables in 
the economy. There are essentially two ways of interpreting the economic equilibrium 
in such a dynamic context. If future prices are perfectly anticipated (i. e. expectations are 
self-fulfilling), a perfect foresight equilibrium prevails. However, if price expectations 
are not perfect, (i. e. agents make mistakes with respect to future prices), then a 
temporary or short-run equilibrium prevails. In the case of perfect foresight equilibrium, 
current plans for the future are precisely implemented while not in the case of temporary 
equilibrium because they will be revised as more or better information become available 
to the economic agents. 
4.6.1 Intratemporal Equilibrium 
The concept of 'equilibrium' has a different meaning in the case of intratemporal 
equilibrium. The conditions of intratemporal equilibrium determine the position of the 
economy, not where the economy is going. They provide a complete description of 
where the economy is at any moment of time. At intratemporal equilibrium, every agent 
is doing exactly what it wants to do, given the constraints which past decisions and 
current prices impose on its behaviour, and conditional on the expectations which it 
holds concerning the future behaviour of prices and other variables which are relevant 
to its current decisions but not observable in any current market. From this definition 
it is clear that there are two forces which affect the conditions of intratemporal 
equilibrium. The position of intratemporal equilibrium is conditional on the stocks of 
assets which the economy inherits from the past and on the expectations which 
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economic agents hold concerning the future behaviour of prices, wages, interest rates, 
exchange rates, taxes and transfers. Current prices must be such that all economic agents 
choose to behave in a manner which is consistent with the clearing at all markets for 
current goods and assets. This does not imply that the expectations upon which various 
agents base their current decisions will be fulfilled, nor does it imply that these agents 
do not regret some of the past decisions which have imposed constraints on their current 
behaviour. 
Intratemporal equilibrium of the model is an extension to the general equilibrium 
described by Leon Walras and developed by Arrow and Debrue (1954). Walras first 
constructed the model in which prices and quantities were simultaneously and 
interdependently determined, which is often referred to as "the Walrasian model". 
Walras used a tatonnement process to show that the economy reaches to an equilibrium 
with an auctioneer, whose job is to find out equilibrium price vector by changing prices, 
according to the adopted any price adjustment rule, up to the point the excess demand 
is zero with equality of demand and supply with this process. Although Walras did not 
prove the existence of general equilibria formally, his significant achievement, which is 
known as "Walras' Law" is usually expressed as "the value of excess demand equals 
zero" is the corner-stone of general equilibrium analysis. 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) first proved the existence of general equilibria 
considering a precise logical model of the interaction of consumers and producers, and 
using the Brouwer's (Kakutani's) 'fixed point theorem' (FPT) that did not exist at the 
time of Walras. The Arrow-Debreu model (ADM) makes a number of assumptions and 
uses axioms regarding consumer behaviour, producer behaviour and production 
technology35. According to the ADM, with m=number of producers, n=number of 
consumers, and 1=number of commodities, all finite, a competitive economy must be 
specified with (1) the endowment of consumers, (2) their preferences, (3) the production 
technology, and (4) the conditions of equilibrium (i. e., Walras' Law). The existence of 
general equilibria can thus be proved with using the FPT in the sense that normalised 
35There are numerous works on the ADM. Among them a good description and discussion of the 
ADM can be found in Cornwall (1984) p. 1-91. 
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relative prices implied by the property of homogeneous degree zero of excess demand 
functions which is on a bounded price set gives us a general equilibria. 
The model in this paper adds three new sectors, namely; financial sector, 
government and foreign sector in a detailed way, to those of Arrow and Debreu. With 
these new markets, the model's intratemporal equilibrium requires that at each point in 
time: (1) The demand for the output of each industry equal its supply; (2) the demand 
for labour equal its supply; (3) total external borrowing by firms equal total saving by 
domestic households plus the net capital inflows; and (4) total government revenue equal 
total government spending; and (5) foreign exchange receipts equal foreign exchange 
payments. 
Our model differs from the Arrow and Debreu model in the tying up of capital 
stocks to firms. So it is not necessary to define explicitly physical capital market. Values 
of physical capital stocks are reflected in financial claims, firm bonds and equities. 
Assets market equilibrium is also implicitly defined, the loanable funds market 
equilibrium thus remains only relevant flow equilibrium condition in the model. These 
five types of requirements yields nine equilibrium conditions (since there are five 
industry outputs). Equilibrium is established by (1) the prices of industry outputs and 
(2) labour, (3) the interest rate, (4) the nominal exchange rate, and (5) the lump-sum 
component of personal income tax rate to yield government budget balance. 
In the model product market equilibrium at each point in time is formally defined 
by 
YID-YES=O (50) 
Here, YSj denotes the net supply of product j obtained as deducting adjustment costs 
form gross supply. Equation (50) represents domestic product market equilibrium and 
so YSj is the domestic production by sector j. Accordingly, YD) indicates total demand 
for domestically produced good j and is defined as: 
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yjD=Dj+Zj (50a) 
where ZZ is the export demand for good j and Dj is the total demand for domestic use 
of good j. In turn, the total demand for domestic use of good j is obtained as 
Dj=dd[Cj+G, +a1ýEjlj +E jajiYjS] 
(50b) 
where CC, Gj and yj; are the demand for good j by the household, the government and 
he firms, respectively, aIj is the fixed coefficient good j of investment good (I) and dd, 
the domestic use ratio, is given by. 
dj= 1 (50c) 
m1(MJDj, 1) 
where mj is the CES trade aggregation function. 
The condition for labour market equilibrium is that the flow of efficiency units 
of labour that is inelastically supplied by the household sector is demanded by the sector 
of firms: 
E, LjD -L S=0 
(51) 
where LD and Ls are the demand by the jth firm and supply of labour, respectively. 
The condition for an equilibrium in the loanable funds market is 
EA +B W -s =O 
(52) 
Finally, the government budget constraint and balance of payments condition are 
given: 
T-G-Tr =0 (53) 
Ep VA j rBB"'-pz-Bw =0 
(54) 
j A( 
At first glance it might be expected that, because of Walras' law, one of the five 
type of equilibrium conditions is redundant, that it is already implied by the other four. 
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It is important to realise that conditions (50)-(54) do not refer to five type markets in 
the usual sense but since they apply to all points in time to five continua of markets. In 
other words, it this way, one should expect that one of the five type of equilibrium 
conditions is redundant for just one single point in time but not the total continuum. 
Since such a general equilibrium defines only relative prices, one use a price- 
normalization rule that provides a benchmark against which all price changes are relative 
price changes. The normalization rule can be seen as no more than the choice of a 
numeriare. Either aggregate price index or setting a variable such as a wage rate, the 
exchange rate, or the price of any particular commodity equal to one can be used. The 
consumer price index in the first period is chosen as the normalisation rule in this paper. 
Prices are scaled in subsequent periods so as to produce the specified rate of inflation 
I. 
The model developed above is based on the assumption that there is a sufficient 
number of markets for a perfect coordination of economic plans or a perfect foresight 
of the development of all market data. While intertemporal contract with a certain, 
sometimes significant, depth are settled in the labour and especially in the capital 
markets, the commodity markets are typically organised as spot markets. Future markets 
for commodities are more an exception than a rule. In the light of this fact, forward 
markets are not necessary for an intertemporal general equilibrium. Perfect capital and 
labour markets are sufficient for coordinating private plans in all markets of the model. 
The reason for this result is what could be called the intertemporal linking function of 
the capital market. 
In the short run, policy shocks give rise to divergences in marginal products of 
capital across industries and in returns to domestic and foreign bonds. Over time, long- 
run equilibrium is re-established as firms' investment decisions equalize after-tax 
products of capital across industries and households' savings behaviour equalize returns 
to domestic and foreign bonds. 
4.6.2 Intertemporal Equilibrium 
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In intertemporal equilibrium the distinction between planned (expected) and 
actual magnitudes no longer applies. Intertemporal equilibrium is a state in which not 
only are current markets for current goods and assets cleared at every instant of time, 
but also the movement of the economy from one intratemporal equilibrium to the next 
is such that expectations are continuously fulfilled and previously made plans are always 
carried out. When the economy is in intertemporal equilibrium there are no incipient 
disequilibria. The rates at which households plan to add to their holdings of each asset 
equal the rates at which these assets are issued. The planned (expected) rate of change 
of consumption is equal to the rate of change of output of consumption goods at 
expected prices. Actual income is equal to expected income and actual asset 
accumulation is equal to planned asset accumulation. Since actual capital gains are equal 
to expected capital gains. 
When agents have perfect foresight, the economy will follow a path which 
satisfies the present requirements for an intertemporal equilibrium which is also a 
steady-state (a balanced growth path). The steady-state equilibrium has the following 
properties: (1) under the assumption that the economy grows at a constant rate36, g, real 
consumption and capital grow at constant rate g; (2) the real average rate of return rB 
equals the pure rate of time preference p plus the inverse of intertemporal substitution 
elasticity multiplied by the steady-state growth rate; (3) the economy's stock of capital 
is constant; and (d) all relative prices remain constant. 
These properties imply that since the planned rate of asset accumulation must 
equal the actual rate of asset accumulation in intertemporal equilibrium, it follows that 
the planned rate of asset accumulation in the intertemporal must be equal to the steady 
state growth rate. 
The analysis in this section has continually emphasized the crucial role which 
expectations play in determining the equilibrium position of the economy at any moment 
of time. Also, expectations play an important role in determining how the economy 
36This growth rate is the growth rate of effective units of labour which has two components: 
population growth rate and Harrod-neutral technical change. 
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moves over time37. In order to conduct such analysis described above, it is necessary 
to make an assumption about how expectations are formed and revised. All assumptions 
about expectations are ad hoc in the sense that they are something additional which is 
put into the model. Many ways of forming expectations suffer from defects. For 
example, static expectations that arbitrarily assume that current prices, wages, taxes, 
rates of return and exchange rates will persist into the indefinite future suffer from the 
defect that expectations are consistently wrong, unless the economy has reached its 
intertemporal equilibrium position. The only assumption about expectations which does 
not suffer from this defect is the assumption of perfect foresight. By definition, if 
expectations are characterised by perfect foresight, expectations are never wrong. 
Further, perfect foresight is the only assumption about expectations which takes full 
account of the structure of the underlying model and, in the sense flows naturally form 
the model itself. 
Loosely speaking, the concept of 'perfect foresight' can be defined by the 
requirement that 'the expected time paths of all prices are precisely those time paths 
which are fully consistent with maintaining equilibrium in the economy at every instant 
of time in the future'. Then, future actions are merely the implementation of current 
decisions for future periods. This implies that the prices of all periods must be solved 
for simultaneously. Although perfect foresight may, at first, be seen as an extreme 
assumption, it appears useful benchmark for analyzing behaviour, just as the assumption 
that consumers optimally choose among commodities appears useful in elementary 
demand analysis. The assumption of fully rational perfect foresight provides a useful 
benchmark because deviations from full rationality are not likely to be systematic. 
[Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) p. 10] They argued that less than perfect expectations 
imply that agents are irrational in some way. 
37Recent evidence of many of applied dynamic general equilibrium tax models suggests that the choice 
in modelling expectations is an important one. Ballard (1987) examines the effects of moving from current 
income tax system to a consumption tax in the United States in the FSW model with "variable 
expectations" and tested the sensitivity of the results to changes in the specifications of expectations. He 
concludes that static expectations and perfect foresight yield rather similar results, and the value of 
additional foresight leads to a lower level of welfare. 
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To see important aspects of perfect foresight a more precise definition is needed, 
which is the following: 
Given the initial conditions on real (capital) and financial assets (bonds and 
equities), a perfect foresight path for the economy is a combination of time paths for the 
endogenous 'price' variables and the endogenous quantity variables, which jointly satisfy 
the following conditions: 
(1) the implications of optimal behaviours of firms, namely that the time path of 
L from equation (20a), I/K from equation (18'), X from equation (20b), yj from equation 
(20c), y from equation (14d) and k from equation (5) are derived from the maximisation 
problem in section 2 of this chapter; using the time paths of the endogenous 'price' 
variables as the basis for firms' expectations; 
(2) the implications of optimal household behaviour, namely that the time paths 
of Cj, Bj, B, and Ej are derived from the maximisation problem of section 3, using the 
paths of the endogenous 'price' variables as the basis for household expectations; 
(3) the government budget constraint; 
(4) the balance of payments condition with the implications of treatment of 
foreign trade and financial capital flows; and 
(5) the requirement of intratemporal equilibrium at every moment of time. 
Since the fact that transversality conditions ensure that the model converges 
steady state values of variables, it is necessary to show that perfect foresight paths lead 
to the steady state point found in solving optimal growth maximisation problem satisfy 
the transversality conditions of the individual decision problems of the representative 
household and representative firm. This has been done in similar models by Sinn (1987) 
and Mussa (1977) to the model in this study. 
4.7 USING THE MODEL IN ANALYZING TAX POLICY CHANGES 
If the model is described by the movement of changes in the rate of investment, 
I/K, and the capital stock, K, we assume that K is a 'slow moving' variable while I/K is 
115 
a 'jump' variable. Thus, K(t) is given at the time of the unanticipated change in the tax 
rate, i. e., predetermined variable. The initial steady state values of I/K and K, together 
with new steady state values and the adjustment cost technology, determine the amount 
by which I/K must 'jump' in order that new steady state be reached. Since the policy 
change affects capital accumulation through changes both in marginal benefits from 
investment and in marginal cost of investment, the movements of I/K and K require 
particular adjustments in Q, the cost of capital (cost of finance), and the debt to equity 
ratio. 
In the light of this discussion, we can inspect the q-investment theory, in 
particular q-ratios, in reflecting the points made above. To do this let us reproduce the 
tax adjusted ratios, Q: 
Q=[ V -DE -1 +z+DN1 [ 
pK 
] (55) 
PKK PN(l-tC) 
Since, in equilibrium, firms choose investment level so as to equate the present value 
of the future products of a unit of capital with the effective cost of a unit capital (new 
investment) good. Since new and old capital goods must be of equal future profitability, 
the market value of firm equals the present value of the future products of a unit capital. 
(Hayashi, 1982). In the presence of taxation, on the other hand, one should subtract 
investment subsidies that reduce the firm's out-pocket cost. The investment tax credit 
directly reduces the real acquisition cost of new capital goods; the purchase of new 
capital good carries with it a stream of future tax-deductible depreciation allowances has 
a similar effect. These two factor reduce the effective price of capital goods from 1 to 
(1-z-DN), where z is the investment tax credit and DN is the write-off depreciation 
allowances and the present value of the tax savings from the depreciation deductions 
arising on a new investment of one pound. This cost must be compared with the 
increase in the market value that results from the purchase. Under the assumption stated 
above that capital is homogeneous, the increase in the stock market value of a firm 
brought about by an extra pound of investment is (V-DE)IPKK, where DE is the present 
value of the tax savings due to depreciation on existing capital. These must be 
subtracted because they are not related to new capital; DN already takes account of the 
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depreciation allowances expected on new capital. Finally, since adjustment costs are 
expensed, firms invest until the market value of the additional capital minus its 
acquisition cost equals the after-tax cost of installation. When the corporate tax rate 
rises, marginal installation costs decline on an after-tax basis so investment increases, 
other, ceteris paribus. The term, is used in calculation Q-ratios to reflect that 
adjustment costs are expensed. 
The effects of taxation on Q-ratios can be inspected from the market value of 
firm, V, the effective price of capital good, (1-z-DN). Since the market value of the firm 
equals the present value of future cash flows, NCF, discounted at the nominal, after-tax 
cost of capital, F, taxes affect the market value of the firm directly through changes in 
NCF and indirectly through changes in F. While only business taxes can affect directly 
NCF, both business and personal taxes generate changes in F. 
These effects can be clarified as follows. First, changes in the corporate tax rate, 
ti,, the investment tax credit, z, and the depreciation allowances on new capital, DN, 
drive a wedge between the movements of Q and I/K. However, there might be windfall 
effects to the extent that taxes are targeted to old capital. Second, changes in taxes on 
marginal revenue of capital at corporate level allowing higher earnings and dividends 
and thereby increases the market value of firms and thus investment. Third, changes in 
taxes that affect the relative cost of debt finance to retention finance drives a wedge 
between the movements of the debt-equity ratio, y, and the interest rate, rB. The changes 
in the taxes that induce movements in y affect the cost of capital, F by making 
adjustments in Ys optimal value. In turn the movements in F lead to changes in 
investment level. To see the last point clearly, let us reproduce the cost of capital 
expression: 
I'- 8 rD+ý ___ 
Y +[a+-] 
1 (56) 
y 1+y PE 1+y 
with the (arbitrage) condition that 
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e rD= 
ePll+® pE 
(56a) B P eb 8 PE 
where 9 is the various tax factor such that subscript p denotes the personal income tax, 
b is the dividend tax credit, g represents the capital gains tax. What it implies is that in 
the steady state the model determines the dividend pay-out ratio, d and in transition the 
growth rate of shares prices PF/PE is determined by the arbitrage condition. Changes in 
gyp, b and tig require adjustments in d in the steady state. In the steady state, the change 
in rDB can only be generated by a change in ti.,. This can be seen from the relation on 
the consumer side. 
1 
rB lr=P+-g (57) 
where rB=S2o(1-, tp)r°B+(1-Q0)eB with ele=0 in the steady state. Since it, p, g, 6,,, and r`"B 
are exogenously specified to be constant and SZo is constant in the steady state, the 
change in tiP must be absorbed by the change in rDB so as to satisfy the condition. This 
is also consistent with the interest parity condition: 
(1-zp)rB =rB +e/e (57a) 
Because the world interest rate remains constant as the requirement of small country 
assumption associated with the financial market and the steady state equilibrium 
condition requires that ele equals zero, the change in tip must be adjusted in rDB so as to 
satisfy the condition. 
To see dominant effects let us review the possible effects of the particular policy 
change. The corporate tax cut, on the one hand, stimulates investment by raising the 
after-tax marginal product of capital, on the other hand reduces investment via declines 
in the value of tax depreciation allowances and via increases in the cost of capital. The 
latter effect stems from the fact that the tax cut reduces the tax advantage of debt 
finance, deductibility of interest payment from corporate tax base, and in response to this 
firms lower the debt-to-equity ratios to balance the agency costs of debt which in turn 
mitigate increases in the cost of capital. Dismantling partially first year and initial capital 
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allowances directly reduces the marginal cost of investment, which makes capital factor 
relatively expensive to labour factor and leads to substitution between capital and labour 
factors. The marginal rate cut in personal income tax changes the relative cost of bond 
finance and retention finance by raising the net return to interest-bearing assets more 
than equity assets and makes ownership of bonds more attractive relative to ownership 
of real capital. If there is no change in capital gains taxes, the personal income tax cut, 
and accompanied by a similar cut in dividend tax credit surely will favour interest- 
bearing assets in terms of net returns. Increases in savings of the households derives 
interest rate down and stimulate investment. 
In closed economies, saving and investment represent, respectively, the supply 
and demand for new domestic capital. Saving incentives shift the supply curve for new 
domestic capital, while investment incentives shift the demand curve. Hence, in closed 
economies, from the basic public finance equivalence theorem -that the real effects of 
a tax (subsidy) are independent of who nominally pays the tax (receives the subsidy)- 
one can conclude that saving and investment incentives do not represent conceptually 
distinct policies and that the real effects of taxes or subsidies are the same whether 
applied to saving or the demand for new capital, investment. However, there are 
meaningful distinctions between policies that affect savings incentives and investment 
incentives. the latter treats newly produced capital more favourably than existing capital, 
whereas saving incentives do not distinguish them. This distinction provides a useful 
starting point for the discussion of the effects of tax policy changes on capital 
accumulation, growth and the asset values of capital because although both types of 
policies alter marginal incentives to accumulate new capital38. 
Note that costly adjustment of investment to desired changes in long-run capital 
intensity constrains the supply of new capital goods. Adjustment costs add dynamics on 
the one hand and provide another reason for a difference in the pre-tax value of new 
capital and the value of old capital on the other hand. We discussed adjustment 
38As for tax reform concerns, public economists point out that investment incentives represent a shift 
from income to consumption taxation, while savings incentives represent a shift from income to wage 
taxation. For a good discussion, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) ch. 9. 
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dynamics before, now let us discuss the latter. The difference in the pre-tax value of 
new capital and the value of old capital, caused by adjustment costs, leads that the 
impact of an investment incentive on the market value of the firm is no longer clear. If 
the firm is attempting to expand its stock of capital, old (installed) capital gets a 
premium relative to new (non-installed) capital because of the adjustment costs required 
to install new capital. If the firm is trying to reduce its stock of capital, it values a unit 
of noninstalled capital more highly than installed capital because of the installation costs 
it is paying to disinstall capital. Hence, investment incentives will directly lower the 
value of existing assets whereas adjustment costs will drive it up. Which affect 
dominates depends on the magnitude of adjustment costs. 
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CHAPTER 5 MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Applying the model described in chapter 4 requires data collection, 
parametrization, and solution method. Data collection and parametrization are simplified 
on the adoption of deterministic calibration rather than stochastic estimation. The use 
of this sort of calibration approach is necessary because the number of exogenous 
variables is small, and extensive use of excluded variables as identifying restrictions is 
not possible because of the general equilibrium interdependence which the model 
captures. If single equation estimation is used, parameter estimates will be obtained 
which do not necessarily generate an equilibrium consist with observed data. To achieve 
this consistency, parameter values for equations are calculated from observed data using 
the equilibrium conditions of the model. Hence, data are structured for a single and 
particular year, which we choose the year 1980, and parameter values are obtained from 
these data in a way that will be explained below. 
Given that there is an accounting system corresponding to every economic 
model, it is useful to make the accounts explicit in the form of a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) and more importantly such a matrix can be used as the framework for a 
consistent set of data39. The SAM provides a consistent picture of the flow-of-funds 
accounts of the separate institutions or "actors" in the economy that one may wish to 
distinguish. However, the widely-used standard SAM is not sufficient to capture main 
aspects of the model at hand in which a variety of different assets including domestic 
bonds, foreign bonds, equity and real capital are incorporated. To illustrate how the 
loanable funds market works in the model, we constitute a financial SAM, (or FSAM) 
which includes a subset of the assets, expressed in flow terms, indicating the changes 
in the assets and liabilities of the various actors during a period. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes data 
sources and consistency adjustments in constructing the benchmark equilibrium data set. 
"There is a considerable body of literature showing how SAMs can be used to provide a framework 
for collating, reconciling, and presenting a detailed quantitative picture of an economy. Special Issue 
(SAM-based models) of Journal of Policy Modelling, Fall 1988 presents a range of studies on this area. 
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Section 5.3 focuses on parameterization issues. Section 5.4 discusses 'equal yield 
equilibria'. Section 5.5 discusses welfare measurement. Finally, section 5.6 explains 
solution method. 
5.2 CONSTRUCTING THE SAM OF THE UK ECONOMY 
A SAM is a simple and efficient way of representing the fundamental law of 
economics that for every income there is a corresponding outlay or expenditure. It 
provides the workings of an economy. So, one can use it as an organising framework 
with its device presented in one unified set of accounts a picture of the "circular flow" 
of a market economy. Therefore, we will use the SAM as the framework for a consistent 
data set. 
Table 5.1 
Social accounting matrix. 
Expenditures 
Commo- House- Govern- Rest of 
dities Activities Factors holds ment Capital world Totals 
Receipts (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Commo- Aggregate 
dities y C G I Z Demand 
(1) 
Value of 
Activities Y output 
(2) 
PLL Aggregate 
Factors PKK factor 
(3) income 
House- PLL House- 
holds r]) BB Tr rWBB W 
hold 
(4) DIV income 
Govern- TL Tp Govern- 
ment T, TVY Tc Tg TM ment 
(5) TW revenues 
Invest- 
Capital RE S PSBR BOC ment 
(6) funds 
Rest of foreign 
world M r° BB exchange 
(7) payment 
Aggregate Total Aggrega- House- Govern- Aggregate Foreign 
Totals supply costs to factor hold ex- ment ex- invest- exchange 
(8) income penditure penditure ment receipts 
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Equilibrium conditions 
1) flow equilibrium in product and factor markets 
a) product market 
Y+M = y+C+G+I+Z (58) 
b) factor market 
LS = LD (59) 
2) flow equilibrium in loanable funds market 
S+RE+PSBR+BOC =1 (60) 
3) equilibrium in assets markets 
a) equity 
PEES =p 1) W D (61) 
b) bonds 
BS+BS+Bw = BD+Bg +B 
(62) 
4) intertemporal equilibrium 
Previous equilibrium conditions, i. e., intratemporal equilibrium conditions, must 
be satisfied for all time simultaneously. 
In constructing a SAM, the first thing to be noticed is that it is a square matrix 
and corresponding row and column sums are equal. The defining characteristic of a 
SAM is then that each row and column reflects a separate account for which 
expenditures and receipts must balance. First, table 5.1 includes a set of accounts 
(numbers 1 to 3) for production. Second, there are accounts (numbers 4 and 5) for 
institutions, that is for households and government. Third, table 5.1 incorporates a capital 
account (number 6)40. Finally, table 5.1 shows a distinction between the home economy 
(accounts 1 to 6) and the rest of the world (account 7). 
"Although the SAM includes government budget deficit or surplus, the model does not treat 
unbalanced government budget. For the sake of completeness, we also describe government budget 
balance. Also, the model assumes a balanced trade account in the base case. 
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The "commodity" account keeps track of products market equilibrium; the supply 
of the commodity, which equals the domestic gross output plus imports from the rest 
of the world, equals the demands for the commodity by households, government, firms - 
demands for intermediate inputs- and the rest of the world -exports. The account is the 
net of output tax and indirect taxes -value added tax and specific excise duties. The 
"activities" account represents producers. As a requirements of the basic 
conceptualization that activities buy raw materials and hire factor services in order to 
produce commodities, producers pay out total revenue from sales of their output to 
commodity market to intermediate inputs suppliers as material costs, factors of 
production as factor costs and government as indirect taxes (row 2 and column 2). The 
factors accounts reflect the property that the model possesses that capital is tied to firms 
and accordingly factor incomes are paid as labour income, interest payments to 
households and/or to the rest of the world and as dividend payments. Producers also pay 
taxes on labour and profits. Firms also retain some of their earnings in order to finance 
investment. 
Along with producers, the "institutions" (households and government) are 
represented by accounts 4 and 5, respectively. Households receive their income from 
firms as labour income, interest payments and transfer payments and from the rest of 
the world as interest payments. Households pay income taxes, capital gains taxes and 
then divide their disposable income between consumption and savings. Government 
receives income from direct and indirect taxes purchases commodities directly, pays 
transfers to households and also saves, in other words runs deficits. 
The "capital" account in the sixth row and column summarizes the "loanable 
funds" market, collecting savings along the row and purchasing capital goods in the 
column. This account is further elaborated below in a financial SAM. Finally, the last 
account shows the relationship between the home country and the rest of the world. 
Accordingly, foreign exchange receipts for the home country come from exports and 
interest payments on domestic households foreign bond holdings. The home country 
makes foreign exchange payments to imports and to interest payments on the rest of the 
world's domestic bond holdings. A difference between foreign exchange receipts and 
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payments is represented by a balancing item, either surplus or deficit, of current 
accounts. 
From the accounts portrayed in table 5.1 one can notice the three basic macro 
balances: balance of current account, saving-investment, and government deficit. 
Depending on the macro closure rules chosen, the model can become either static or 
dynamic with endogenous macroeconomic behaviour. Specifying endogenous 
equilibrating feature to the basic macro balances, the model expand the notion of 
equilibrium to incorporate the loanable funds market, asset, and expectations. Saving- 
investment, government budget deficits and international financial flows as a whole are 
not only elements of a flow equilibrium condition but also require stock market 
equilibrium conditions. Therefore there are four equilibrium concepts that form the raw 
material of a dynamic model with endogenous macro behaviour. 
To illustrate how the loanable funds market works in the model, table 5.2 shows 
a financial SAM (FSAM) which includes a subset of the assets. The FSAM is expressed 
in flow terms, indicating the changes in the assets and liabilities of the various actors 
Table 5.2 
Financial social accounting matrix. 
Capital accounts Change in assets 
House- Govern- Rest of Capital Firm Public Foreign 
Current accounts Firms holds ment World goods bonds bonds bonds 
Current SAM I 
accounts 
Capital 
accounts 
Firms RE AB 
House. S 
Govern. PSBR ABg 
World BOC ABW 
Change in liabilities 
Capital goods AK SK 
Firm bonds ABb AB"' 
Public bonds ABg 
Foreign bonds AB 
SAM + New New New New 
Savings Change in net worth capital firm Public foreign 
bonds bonds bonds 
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Equilibrium conditions 
I= AK-8RK (63) 
I= RE+AB (64) 
S= OB h+ABS+EBw (65) 
AB = OB h+OB "' 
(66) 
during a period. The FSAM can be seen as a simplified presentation of the major 
financial linkages in the model. 
Like all SAMs, the FSAM is square, with each column sum equal to the 
corresponding row sum. The standard SAM of the table 5.1 is collapsed into the first 
column and row of the FSAM, while the capital account is expressed to include the 
capital accounts of four agents: firms, households, the government and the rest of the 
wold. There are two types of assets; namely, physical capital goods and bonds, and the 
latter is further differentiated: firm specific bonds, government bonds and foreign bonds. 
The columns indicate the change in assets, while the rows indicate changes in liabilities. 
The last row and column sets out the change in the balance sheets of the actors with 
respect to the assets. 
The savings entries in the first column (which represent flows from current 
accounts to capital accounts) represent the injections of savings into the loanable funds 
market. This account, as an equilibrium condition, must equal investment account. Firms 
are assumed to finance their investment by the mix of retained earnings and bond 
issuance. So firms issue bonds by the amount of investment minus retained earnings. 
The government and the rest of the world also issue bonds to finance government budget 
deficit and to take advantage of interest rate differentials, respectively. However, if 
domestic interest rate is greater than foreign interest rate, the rest of the world is then 
assumed to have saving and use it to purchase domestic firm bonds. Thus, household 
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savings are used to purchase a mix of these bonds issued by domestic firms, the 
government and the rest of the world. A final point to note, capital stocks depreciate and 
net increase in capital stocks is equal to gross investment minus depreciation. 
The FSAM is constructed so as to satisfy four equilibrium concepts. The first is 
flow equilibrium in product and factor markets. Since firms buy raw materials, hire 
labour services and use capital factors owned by these firms in order to produce 
commodities, in this process they generate revenues out of sales of their products to 
commodity markets and make payments to production factors. This revenue is partially 
offset by purchases of raw materials. The remainder is, by definition, a tax on activity 
(value added tax). Since capital factors are tied up to firms, as a balancing item on 
liabilities side firms must have bond stocks and common stocks. Hence after payments 
to labour factor, PLL, i. e., profits, EARN, go to interest payments. Column 2 shows 
these payments. In column 1, YD represents the value of domestic products sold on the 
domestic market and M, imports. The column sum plus tariffs equals aggregate 
supply41. Row 1 details domestic demand items, household consumption, government 
expenditure and investment expenditure. Balance in the first two accounts yields the 
standard absorption identity: absorption=C+I+G=GDP+M-Z. In column 3, factor 
payments are broken down, as explained above. Similarly row 3 shows before tax factor 
payments, that is wages plus profits. Government collects taxes on the use of labour 
factor and company profits. 
A second equilibrium is that of flow equilibrium in the market for loanable 
funds. Households supply the fund to loanable market as savings and this fund is 
demanded by firms to finance investment, the government to finance deficit. Another 
source of fund comes from the rest of the world as foreign financial capital flows. 
Achieving Savings-investment equilibrium is equivalent to specifying how equilibrium 
is achieved between the supply and demand of loanable funds. Row 6 of table 5.1 
reveals sources of savings. As a condition that total savings is equal to investment 
shown in column 7. 
"Obviously, production activities and commodities can be disaggregated as has been done in the 
paper. 
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Third, there is equilibrium in asset markets. Equilibrium is defined in terms of 
firms achieving a desired debt-equity ratio and of household passively accommodating 
their demands for assets supplied by other agents. Two condition can be expressed as 
an equilibrium in I=RE+B'. 
Finally, there is a notion of intertemporal equilibrium. Intertemporal equilibrium 
consists of two sorts of equilibrium notions: instantaneous equilibrium and long-run 
equilibrium. Firstly these equilibrium conditions altogether gives a notion of 
instantaneous equilibrium. However, actors are assumed to change their current 
behaviour based on their expectations about the future course the economy will take. In 
the long-run, it is assumed that the economy is on the steady-state equilibrium. Given 
that the balanced growth theory holds, it is written that capital stocks of firms and 
consumption of the household grow at the steady-state rate. 
5.3 THE BENCHMARK EQUILIBRIUM DATA SET 
Data requirements for the model are extensive. These include capital stock and 
its financial structure by industry, labour usage by industry, an input/output table, 
consumer expenditures by commodity and incomes by source, government expenditures 
and tax collections, and foreign trade. In addition, allowing for depreciation of capital 
stocks requires data on rates of depreciation for economic purposes and tax purposes. 
The model integrates data from several sources to form a 1980 benchmark data set. 
5.3.1 Production Data 
The information available in the National Accounts is primarily macro and value- 
added, hence an input/output table is needed to obtain data on surplus of industries and 
their intermediate demands. We used the data on input-output given in the book "Input- 
output tables for the United Kingdom 1984" (HMSO 1988). Data in the book are 
disaggregated for eight industries. In the model since we consider five industries, that 
is J=5; namely, (i) agriculture; (ii) energy; (iii) manufacturing sector; (iv) services, trade 
and utilities; and (v) housing services, we make necessary adjustments to reduce them 
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to five industries. Data needed on the production side are required to be disaggregated 
for five industries (that is, J=5). The industries are classified as follows: 
Agriculture: agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
Energy: coal mining, other mining, quarrying and gas 
Manufacturing: food, drink, tobacco, mineral oils, other coal, petroleum products, 
chemicals, metals, textiles, clothing, leather and fur, timber, furniture, paper, 
printing, publishing, instrumental engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles. 
Services, trade and utilities: communication, retail trade, wholesale trade, 
transport, banking, insurance and construction. 
Housing services: housing services 
To calculate Leontief parameters aj, data on input use of industries and supply of them 
are taken from the book "Input-output tables for the United Kingdom 1984" (HMSO 
1988). The CSO Blue Book (United Kingdom National Accounts) provides data on 
labour use by industry for the year 1980. 
As for data on capital stocks of industries, a difficulty arises with the availability 
of data: Neither the Blue Book nor Input-Output Tables publish disaggregated figures 
of capital stock. One source of information is the Blue Book where gross capital stocks 
are broken down by industries. We use this information to convert aggregate data on net 
fixed capital stocks into disaggregated data. A further breakdown of capital stocks by 
asset is required for calculating depreciation rates for both economic and tax purposes. 
The breakdown of capital stocks by asset is made as follows: we calculate average 
values of the data on the capital formation made on assets (vehicles, machinery, 
buildings) over ten years. The data are taken from the Blue Book. For economic 
depreciation rates we use the data given in King and Fullerton (1984). However, King 
and Fullerton's work does not cover some of industries which are modelled in this paper: 
agriculture, energy, financial services, utilities and housing services. For these industries 
we calculate economic depreciation rates from the data on capital consumption by 
industry published in the Blue Book. As for tax depreciation rates, we compile the tax 
code and the sample data given in the Inland Revenue Book. We take investment values 
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from the data on capital formation across industries and capital allowances from the 
sample data given in the inland Revenue Book. Given these data we run a simple 
calculation to find actual rates of tax depreciation - the rate of first year depreciation 
allowances, the rate of the initial depreciation and the rate of annual depreciation 
allowances - accordingly calculate. In order to reflect actual figures we did not use the 
tax code. Table 5.3 reports benchmark values for certain variables and parameters 
calculated from the data defined above. 
In many applied general equilibrium models, marginal corporate tax rates are set 
equal to the observed average tax rate on capital income, calculated separately by 
industry. This approach conveniently abstracts from the many detailed provisions of the 
specific country tax law. However, it possesses many problems. Most immediately, the 
measured average tax rate depends critically on the measure for true earnings to capital. 
This latter number is difficult to calculate appropriately in any year and varies greatly 
from year to year. This variation implies that there is substantial measurement error in 
the calculated tax rates. In this paper, we instead model the tax law directly while this 
procedure requires many new data in order to characterize the tax law by industry, it 
does not require capital income and tax payment figures, which can fluctuate sharply 
from year to year. However, we further simplify and assume that industries except 
housing services industry are corporate firms. Housing services sector is represented by 
corporate housing, tenant-occupied noncorporate housing and owner-occupied housing. 
Their shares in housing sector are calculated from the data supplied in Black and 
Stanford (1988); they are 10 percent, 30 percent and 60 percent, respectively. 
Accordingly, the effective tax rate on earnings is calculated as the share of (tenant- 
occupied) corporate housing in all housing times the statutory tax rate. A more important 
reason for our remodelling, however, is that the explicit model of the effect of taxes on 
economic decisions implies that marginal tax distortions differ dramatically from average 
tax rates, even if all figures can be measured without error. 
The Data for labour use by industry are taken from the National Accounts. As 
it is noticed, Data taken from the Input-output Tables for the year 1984, therefore we 
adjust them for to year 1980. 
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Table 5.3 
Benchmark values for industry tax and behaviourial parameters and capital stocks 
Services, 
Parameter or stock Manufac- trade and Housing 
variable Agriculture Energy turing utilities services 
Capital stock 15.8 90.6 136.7 263.1 246.0 
% Machinery 0.400 0.495 0.692 0.307 0.000 
% Building 0.508 0.492 0.232 0.539 1.000 
% Vechiles 0.092 0.013 0.076 0.154 0.000 
Rate of economic 0.070 0.050 0.045 0.057 0.016 
depreciation (SR) 
First year depreciation 0.250 0.400 0.600 0.350 0.000 
rate (8Tf) 
Initial depreciation 0.010 0.015 0.060 0.010 0.000 
rate (ST) 
Annual depreciation 0.050 0.055 0.020 0.040 0.040 
rate (8TW) 
Import substitution 0.8 1.6 3.2 0.8 - 
elasticity 
Export demand 0.6 1.2 2.4 1.8 - 
elasticity 
Production efficiency 0.612 0.581 1.081 1.115 0.118 
factor 
Labour/Capital ratio 0.082 0.072 0.316 0.355 0.000 
Debt-equity ratio (y) 0.190 0.224 0.251 0.363 0.500 
Scalars: 
Corporate tax rate (i) 0.52 
Capital gains tax rate (rg) 0.075 
Marginal income tax 
rate (re) 0.35 
Dividend credit rate (b) 0.30 
To calculate agency cost parameters we need data on debt-equity ratios by 
industry. Debt-equity ratios are derived from The Extel Limited Data Set. However, the 
source does not provide information for all industries. The literature enables us to use 
sensible values for the debt-equity ratios cannot be calculated from the Extel Limited 
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Data Set. We take a value of 0.190 for the debt-equity ratio in the agriculture sector. 
Studies on housing market such as Black and Stanford (1988) indicate that debt-equity 
ratio in the housing sector is a value of around 0.5. 
The adjustment cost parameters have been estimated in several works; Jenkinson 
(1981), Poterba and Summers (1983) and Bond and Devereux (1988). Sensible values 
for parameters are chosen in a way that those that are chosen are not necessarily 
reported in these works. 
5.3.2 Data on Demand 
The categories for goods from consumer expenditure data differ from the 
categories for outputs from production data. The consumer expenditure data are 
classified for 28 categories in the input-output Tables. Accordingly, we transform five 
producer goods to 28 consumer goods through the fixed-coefficient matrix. Each 
coefficient gives the amount of a particular producer goods needed to produce one unit 
of a particular consumer good. The data for the demand for commodities by the 
household, and government and foreign trade are derived from the Input-output Tables. 
The difficulty lies in finding indirect tax rates on commodity purchases. We tackled the 
difficulty by applying the tax law tax to calculate indirect tax rates for five commodities. 
This can be done without any loss of relativity because the advantage of the detailed 
consumer expenditure categorization allows us correctly define indirect rates on each 
consumer goods. In order to calculate average personal income tax rate, the data on 
income taxes paid and household disposable income that are available in the National 
Accounts are used. However, calculation of marginal rate requires additional data and 
work. This has been done in Fullerton and King (1984). Finally, we employ a value of 
0.075 for the effective tax rate on capital gains. The tax rate differs for capital gains on 
residential capital. It is assumed that the half of residential capital gains are subjected 
to capital gains tax. 
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The model simplifies certain aspects of modelling issues. Firstly, unbalanced 
government budget is not allowed. Secondly, although capital flows are allowed, in the 
base case we assume a balanced trade account. Thirdly, the marginal income tax rate is 
taken as a rate of 35 per cent. A distinction between marginal tax rates on capital 
incomes and labour income would be beneficial. However, we simplify such tax 
treatment by taking one single marginal tax rate applied to all incomes. Studies done by 
Fullerton and King (1984) others suggest that personal income tax rate on dividend and 
interest income is above 40 per cent. We take into account of personal income tax rate 
on labour income and thus adopt a rate of 35 per cent. Similarly, we choose a rate of 
30 per cent for the dividend tax credit rate. The model captures that the personal income 
tax is not levied on imputed income from owner-occupied housing services. 
5.4 PARAMETERIZATION 
Calibrating the model involves deriving values for parameters. However, values 
for two sort of parameters cannot be found in any calibration procedure because the 
benchmark data only give price and quantity observations, associated with a single 
equilibrium. They are (i) elasticity parameters defining certain degree of substitution 
between opposing choices such as consumption today or tomorrow, investing today or 
tomorrow, domestic consumption or import, issuing bonds or retaining earnings and 
demanding domestic goods or not (ii) certain parameters which define the steady-state 
property of the model such as the balanced growth rate, nominal interest rate and the 
inflation rate. Hence we specify values for intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
between consumption at different periods, elasticity parameters of adjustment cost, 
elasticity parameters of agency cost, price elasticity of export demands, trade substitution 
elasticities, certain intertemporal defining parameters such as the balanced growth rate, 
nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, and a parameter which controls international 
financial capital flows, based outside estimates. These values serve to identify uniquely 
the other parameters of the model along with the equilibrium observation. Given 
exogenously determined substitution elasticity parameters, a technique of "backwards 
solution" has been used to determine the remaining parameters. 
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The adjustment cost parameters have been estimated in several works: Jenkinson 
(1981), Oulton (1981), Poterba and Summers (1983), and Bond and Devereux (1988). 
However, these works use data of manufacturing industry, industries such as housing 
which holds a considerable amount of capital stocks are not taken into account. One 
then could argue that without other industries such as housing with low depreciation 
rates one could argue that they tend to estimate parameter values biased upward. It 
implies that they do not reflect the adjustment cost behaviour of industries as a whole 
correctly. Instead, we take low values for adjustment cost parameters. In the paper the 
estimated values of adjustment cost parameter are lowered down taking into account 
other industries and chosen as a value of 0.035 for ado and 15 for adl. As for agency 
cost parameters, we guesstimate a value of 0.5 for agl and derive ago from the debt- 
equity ratios in the calibration. 
Econometric estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ((T. ) vary 
considerably. We employ a value of 0.8 for ßu. This value is consistent with the value 
for the saving elasticity parameter used in Piggott and Whalley (1985). We consider a 
range of plausible estimates in the sensitivity analysis. 
For the parameters of price elasticity of export demands, trade substitution 
elasticity Piggott and Whalley provide information. They take a value of 1.25 for all 
product categories. We disaggregate this common value across industries in way that we 
increase the value for the export-oriented industries such as manufacturing and decrease 
it for other industries. 
Finally, for the parameter that controls international capital mobility, we adopt 
a value of 10' for the parameter (B). We scale this value across time to bring them in 
line with the levels implied by balanced growth rate and inflation. 
Since the fundamental assumption made in calibrating the model is that the 
economy is in equilibrium in a particular year, the technique of backwards solution must 
satisfy certain equilibrium conditions. In a dynamic context, there are two sorts of 
requirements: 
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(a) Replication requirement. In the base case the model must generate an 
equilibrium solution with values matching those of the benchmark data set. In particular 
the levels of inputs in each sector, the levels of factor incomes, and the magnitudes of 
various tax payments must be identified to those of the benchmark data set. 
(b) Balanced growth requirement. The model must simulate a balanced (steady- 
state) growth path, when the base policy is maintained. 
The first requirement indicates intratemporal equilibrium condition as the second 
requirement is associated with the intertemporal equilibrium condition. 
Intertemporal aspects of the parametrization can be explained as follows: First 
of all it is assumed that initially economy is on a balanced growth path. Hence, first we 
need to specify exogenously, the steady-state growth path, g. It takes the value . 
0275 
that is the average value of the growth rate of the last two decade GDP, in our 
simulations. Accordingly, in the steady state, in discrete time, AK/K=g and AC/C=g. 
Also, in the steady-state, financial variables grow at a combined rate of the rate of 
balanced growth and the rate of inflation such that (1 +it)(1 +g)-1. 
The first condition, form the equation of motion for capital, implies that the rate 
of gross investment, I/K, in each sector must satisfy 
I 
_g+Sg K 
(67) 
Since we have the benchmark data on K and 6R, we can obtain the initial level of 
investment in each industry. Having the value of the rate of gross investment, I/K, and 
given the parameters of the adjustment cost function, we invert equation (19) to solve 
for the steady-state value of Q. 
The nominal depreciable capital stock, KT, can be derived from the relationship 
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KT(t+1) = (1-8w)K T+(1-z)(1-8 f)PK(t)I(t) (68) 
In the steady-state, the relation between capital stock basis for tax purposes and capital 
stocks is then given by 
K C1 +t)(1 +8) -C1-bw) 
KT 
(69) 
Given the values of the variables appearing in (69), we solve equation (69) for KT in 
each sector. 
In order to calculate V we use the relationship (7). It is rewritten in discrete time 
as: 
NCF+ AV_r 
vv 
(70) 
It requires a long process to calculate the net cash flow, NCF. Data on the gross 
production levels and the use of intermediate goods and labour are used to obtain gross 
earnings of firms. But we must use net production levels, that is values after deducting 
agency and adjustment costs. With the extraneous values of adjustment cost parameters 
and the derived value from the calibration procedure, as explained above, a correct value 
for gross earnings can be calculated. When deductions of debt interest payments and 
taxes paid by firms, such as corporation tax, are made from gross earnings, it yields net 
earnings. 
Since the link between households and firms is the cost of capital, driven by the 
rates of return required by households, now it is time to show how to obtain the cost of 
capital depending on the rates of return required by households. The first condition 
implies that investment is financed with retained earnings and bond issues, and that the 
debt-equity ratio must be constant. In turn, this implies that borrowing at steady-state 
is defined as 
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AB=[(1+5)(1+n)-1]B 
We can derive the dividend payout ratio, d, from the arbitrage condition (4'). 
(71) 
Once we have a value for the dividend payout ratio and given the benchmark 
data on debt-equity ratios and tax parameters, it is straightforward to obtain a value for 
agency cost parameter, ago, by solving the equation (14d) and ruling out one of the 
roots. Finally, with the values of agency cost parameter, debt-equity ratios and tax 
parameters the equation (11) calculates the cost of capital. 
When the values for NCF and F are obtained, we substitute the steady-state 
condition of the growth rate of the market value of the firm for AV/V, into (70) which 
can now be solved for V. 
The last job regarding intertemporal aspect is to obtain the tax-adjusted q-ratios, 
appeared in equation (19). First, we calculate the present values of writing down 
depreciation allowances on existing capital, DE and new capital, DN. DE and DN in 
discrete time can be expressed as: 
DNW(t) =1 [(1-SW)DNw(t+l) +t 8] (72) 1+I' 
T 
DE(t)=(1-87KT(t)[DNý, (t)+ Tcaw ] (73) 
1-8T 
Accordingly, the present value of first, initial and writing down depreciation allowances 
on new capital can be written as: 
DN(t) = Tc(SaT +8 f)+DN (t) (74) 
Then, these values with together V, K and tax parameters are substituted to provide Q- 
ratios. However, these Q-ratios might not match the steady-state ones. We adjust the 
data so as to produce the Q ratio implied by the balanced growth requirement and the 
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values of adjustment cost parameters (see eq. 18' of the model). From the equation of 
motion for capital, eq. 5, given the economic depreciation rates and the values of capital 
stocks, one can calculate the level of investment. The relationship between the rate of 
investment and Q, with exogenously chosen the values for adjustment cost parameters, 
then corresponds to a particular value for the Q ratio. The data supplied in official 
statistics do not generate this q ratio. For this reason, we adjust production level. 
The subroutine PCALIB takes care of this adjustment procedure in production 
level. The algorithm used in PCALIB is a NAG subroutine called CO5NCF. The 
algorithm is an improved hybrid POWELL method that is written to solve non-linear 
equations system. PCALIB works with the subroutine BPROD, in which the producer's 
demand functions are located. 
Once the program adjusted production levels, we are able to calculate the 
consumer's income level and wealth (human and non-human wealth). To determine 
savings and consumption a pure rate of time preference rate is required. Once a value 
for time preference has been specified, we can identify initial consumption. Since the 
value of aggregate household savings must equal total external borrowing by firms, the 
subroutine DISRAT is written to calculate the rate of time preference42. From the 
intertemporal equilibrium condition for the consumer, it is required that the pure rate of 
time preference must be consistent with the nominal market rate of interest (see eq. 75). 
Since the calculation on the producer side is based on a specified rate of interest, on the 
consumer side we calculate a value for the pure rate of time preference. This is done in 
the subroutine BDMND. BDMND also calculates consumer spending on specific goods. 
The subroutine GVREV, accordingly, calculates various tax revenues, transfer payments 
and government spending on goods. 
The second and third conditions together with the condition (31c"), the rate of 
return on consumption, can be used to find a value for the pure rate of time preference, 
p. In discrete time, a formula to obtain the pure rate of time preference is written as: 
"Actually, there is no need such a subroutine. This is because from the intertemporal equilibrium 
condition for the consumer, eq. 75, one can calculate the pure rate of time preference. 
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ýl +r 
-1 
[(1 +t)(1 +8)l° 
(75) 
Given the values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 6,,, the gross of tax 
nominal interest rate, rB, and the rate of inflation, it, we can find a numerical value for 
p. Note that from the arbitrage condition the portfolio rate of return is equal to the after- 
tax interest rate. We specify exogenously the rate of inflation and the gross of tax 
nominal interest rate, whose values take 0.075 and 0.175 in our standard simulations. 
We determine total nonhuman wealth (WK) by adding up debt and equity 
ownership across sectors. We take a zero value for the foreign bonds in the base case. 
From initial labour income and transfer, the household discount rate rp, and the steady 
state growth rate, we calculate the present value of labour, transfer and income tax 
intercept. The solution of the household utility maximisation problem requires that 
PC= { 1-[(1 +7t)(1 +P)]°(1 +r-)Q-1] } TW (76) 
where TW=WK+WH. Since in the benchmark P=1, equation (76) yields initial 
consumption. Consumption is subtracted from initial income to obtain the initial value 
of household savings. 
So far we have dealt with intertemporal aspect of calibration. Static aspect of 
calibration is much more straightforward to perform: it simply involves finding share 
values of production factors and expenditure on commodities. 
5.5 EQUAL YIELD EQUILIBRIA 
In applied general equilibrium tax models it is commonly used tradition to use 
an equal-tax-yield equilibrium concept in order to undertake "differential" analysis. Such 
analysis allows an existing tax to be replaced by an alternative tax system that raises 
equivalent revenue. This change in procedure allows us to maintain the size of 
government when the effects of changes in the structure rather than the level of taxes, 
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we would not be able to interpret our results without worrying about changes in the 
pattern of total demands that are caused by changes in the amount of government 
spending. 
In defining equal-tax-yield a question arises: what price index is suitable to 
correct the price changes occurred as a result of the adoptation of a new tax regime so 
as to preserve equal "real" revenue? Shoven and Whalley (1977) discuss a variety of 
price indexes. However, the concept of equal tax revenues is confined to cases when 
government activities is confined to taxation and transfers. On the other hand, when 
government activities include purchases of private goods in addition to taxation and 
discretionary transfers, equal yield is interpreted to mean "constant public utility". In this 
case, government base utility is maintained in the counterfactual experiments. 
In this paper equal yield is also assumed to mean equal government public utility 
in both the base case and revised case equilibria. We give the government a utility 
function, and then use the corresponding expenditure function to calculate the revenue 
required for the government to achieve constant utility at any set of prices. The 
expenditure function expresses the amount of money necessary to attain a given level 
of utility at any given set of prices. When calculating a base-case equilibrium, we also 
calculate the government's utility. In equilibrium calculations for changes regime, we 
give the government enough revenue so that it reaches the same level of utility. 
5.6 WELFARE COMPARISONS 
There are several ways of associating a scalar welfare measure to the array of 
which defines an economic equilibrium43. Perfect foresight equilibrium models, in 
general, tend to use dynamic analogues of the standard money matric measures - 
Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. In this study, a dynamic analogue of 
the Hicksian equivalent variations is used to measure changes in welfare. 
43Pereira (1988a, 1988b) discusses the commonly used welfare evaluations approaches. 
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Since consumer groups are regarded as infinitely-lived, to make welfare 
assessments it is necessary to calculate the utility derived from an infinite stream of 
consumption of goods. However, because of the steady-state properties of the model, it 
is possible to approximate the contribution to discounted utility of these infinite streams 
using results from simulations over a finite time interval. Under a revised case 
simulation, the economy departs from its initial steady-state path immediately following 
the policy change; however, the growth path of the economy converges to a new steady- 
state within about 50 years. Since simulations which calculate equilibria are generally 
run a period of 75 years, which is along enough interval to allow one to observe the 
feature of the new steady state, we can calculate to a very close approximation the 
welfare value of the infinite stream of consumption in the new steady state. 
5.7 SOLUTION METHOD 
We will explain solution method in two subsections: solution strategy and 
solution algorithm. 
5.7.1 Solution Strategy 
The approach to solving intertemporal models that is generally adopted consists 
of, first, solving for the initial steady state (the benchmark case: calibration); second, 
coputing the new steady state after policy changes; and, last, solving the transition path 
between the two steady states. Since our model assumes perfect foresight and rational 
expectations on the part of agents, current behaviour will depend on variables in future 
periods. Therefore, it will not in general be possible to solve the model recursively over 
the transition path. To obtain perfect foresight expectations, we repeatly solve the model 
forward, each time generating a path of equilibria under a given set of expectations. 
After each path of equilibria is abtained, we revise the expectaions and we solve for a 
new path. Hence, the solution of the model satisfies two sorts of equilibrium conditions. 
"Within period" equilibrium conditions require that, in any period, given any set of 
expectations for future variables current supplies and demands are in balance. 
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Intertemporal equilibrium conditions require that expectations conform to the values 
eventually realised in later periods. 
In solving intertemporal allocation problems for finding the path of state and 
control variables over infinite time span, it is necessary to specify initial conditions for 
the state variables (stock variables such as capital stock) and terminal conditions 
(transversality conditions) for costate variables (asset price variables such as firm values) 
ensuring the model's convergence. In mathematical terms, the intertemporal equilibrium 
system is a two-point boundary-value problem. 
In order to solve this kind of problem we make two alterations: approximation 
with difference equations for numerical solution of differential equations and 
replacement of the infinite time transversality condition with a finite condition`. The 
second alteration implies that a natural condition is that by time T, when T is large, the 
terminal values will converge to the steady state value. We take 75 year of T. 
Once approximations have done, the strategy proceeds on expectations about the 
future. At any given point in time, t, these expectations are embedded within the current 
period values of the variables Vt, Qt, DEL, DNS, WH, and N, where Nt Pa/A and A is 
the discrete analogue of A in equation (36')45. Using certain relationships we can 
reduce dimensions of these expectaions: from expression (19), we can express Vt in 
terms of Q, DEL, DNWt and prices and parameters from period t. In addition DEt can be 
written in terms of DNwt and current values. Thus, expectations hold in period t are fully 
summarised by the period t values of Vt, DEL, DNS, WI-It and Nt. The time paths of such 
of these variables have certain characteristics that can be exploited: it is possible to 
derive explicit relationships of the form: 
"This corresponds to a transformation from continuous time analysis to discrete time analysis. As 
implicitly assumed in the previous chapters in which the model presented in continuous time, it is assumed 
that all transactions occur at the end of each period. 
45When the endogenous financial capital mobility is considered, we add the exchange rate to these 
variables. 
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V*+NCF 
Vt t+1 ` (77) 
` 1+rt 
where V*t», denotes the period t expectation for the value of the firm in period t+l. 
Evaluating DNS,, WH, and Nt over successive periods yields: 
DN,,, = 
11 
+I' 
[(1-8ýDN, 
vt+1+T8Tl 
(78) 
WHt=YHt+ t+1 (79) 
1+F 
Nt=Pt -a +(1 +p)-o(l +r)" -1Nt+1 (80) 
where DN*W l, WH*t+l, and N*t+l also denote the period t expectations for values in 
period t+l, YHt is current labour and transfer income, and r incorporates the risk 
premium associated with future labour and transfer income. We refer to the variables 
with asterisks as 'lead' variables. 
Solution of the model proceeds on two steps. first solution step is to assign 
values to the lead variables for t=2,3....... T+1. Conditional on these guesses, we calculate 
a general equilibrium solution for every period; this is the whithin-period equilibrum 
problem. On the next step, we solve for the correct values for the lead variables; this is 
the intertemporal equilibrum solution problem. 
5.7.1.1 Within Period Equilibrium 
We assign an initial guess to current (product and labour) prices, interest rate and 
the exchange rate. We also specify tax policy. The strategy then works on the labour 
market. Given sectoral production technology and current capital stock one solves for 
the demand for labour in each sector. 
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An initial guess I* is necessary to move on defining the demand for products and 
assets. The guess of investment allows us to calculate net cash flows in the current 
period based on current bond stocks. Solving equation (14d) for industrial debt-equity 
ratios and in turn using them in obtaining cost of capital, given the lead values for V, 
we can calculate current values for V. The next stage now is to calculate current values 
for Q. Since it can be defined in terms of V, DN, and DE, we then need to obtain 
values for DNw and DE. Given the lead value for DNW, we calculate current values for 
DNS,,. Given the nominal depreciable capital stock, KT, for the current period, since the 
values of DE and DNW for a given period can be related, it is possible to determine DE 
from this relation. Finally, using the derived values for V, DN, and DEL, we calculate 
the current value of Q using (19). This value of Q implies a certain level of investment. 
If this value does not match the initial guess of investment which helped to generate it, 
the initial guess is updated and the entire sequence of derivations is performed again. 
This procedure is repeated until the initial investment guess matches the derived 
investment level. 
From the optimal debt-equity ratio and the current Q we then derive investment, 
adjustment costs, and agency costs. Once adjustment costs and agency costs are known, 
we can calculate each sector's output from the desired input level and the current capital 
stock. 
Given the lead value for WH, we calculate the current value for expected human 
and transfer wealth, WH according to equation (79). We sum the values of firms' bonds 
and firms' equities. We calculate non-human wealth, WK summing the values firms' 
bonds and firms' equities plus foreign bond stocks. The variables WH and WK allow 
the calculation of total wealth, consumption, and saving. 
The demands for commodities by the government can be calculated from current 
prices and tax rates, given that the level of overall government spending (transfers plus 
purchases) is exogenous in every period. 
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Once the demands for commodities by households and the government and the 
demand for composite intermediate inputs derived from sectoral production levels and 
the input-output coefficients are known, using the domestic use ratio, we calculate total 
demand for domestic use. Exports are derived from the export demand functions. Total 
demand for domestically produced goods is therefore given as the sum of total demand 
for domestic use and exports. 
The import demand functions derived from the trade aggregation function subject 
to that the value of composite good is equal to the value of import plus the value of 
commodity produced domestically yields imports. 
Debt-equity ratios yield us desired bond and equity stocks. The difference 
between desired bond stocks and current bond stocks gives borrowing for each sector. 
As stated in Chapter 4, within-period equilibrium requires that at each period: 
(1) the total (domestic and foreign) demand for the output of each industry equal its 
(domestic) supply; (2) the demand for labour equal its supply; (3) total borrowing by 
firms equal total saving by households plus foreign savings; (4) government revenue 
(taxes) equal government spending; and (5) the demand for foreign exchange equal its 
supply. Accordingly, a solution to the general equilibrium model is given by a price 
vector (PD1,..., PDj, PL, rDB, ER, f) such that excess demands equal zero in all markets46: 
XD _Xi 
s4 (81) 
E- jP+Lg -L 
s=0 (82) 
zjEj+BW-s=o (83) 
E jP i+BW-EiP i-rB Bw =0 
(84) 
46Equal yield equilibrium requires another dimension and a parameter to be adjusted. We adjust the 
income tax lump-sum factor to preserve the equal yield equilibria. 
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B 1(1 +z, 4)G1+Tr-T=O 
(85) 
The excess demand function have a number of important properties. First, they 
are homogenous of degree zero in all prices. It means that neither supplies nor demands 
are affected by proportional price changes. This implies that if a vector 
(PD1,..., PDj, PL, rDB, ER, f) constitutes a solution to the system of J+4 excess demand 
equations, any vector /X(PD 1,..., PDj, PL, rDB, ER, f) proportional to it (X>O) will also 
constitute a solution. There seems to be an infinite number of solutions. In fact, the 
second important property of the excess demand equations is that they are not 
independent. This property is deduced from Walras's law: because each agent's demands 
are subject to a budget constraint, it is clear that such a budget constraint also holds in 
the aggregate not only at equilibrium but for all allowable price vectors. There are thus 
only (J+3) independent excess demand equations to determine (J+3) relative price ratios. 
Accordingly, we normalise prices to sum to a constant, which using such models 
as tools of policy analysis and formulation, it is best to use a price-normalisation rule 
that provides a "no-inflation" benchmark against which all prices changes are relative 
price changes. The equation used will be of the form 
EiPiµi =P (86) 
where the pj are weights defining the index P. The numeraire chose is the consumer 
price index in the first period. The index will updated over time to reflect the specified 
rate of inflation it. 
However, normalising prices is not sufficient to solve the set of excess demand 
equations. It is crucial to attain that the set of excess demand equations is functionally 
independent and that the Jacobian is non-zero. The obvious solution if one wishes to 
work with an algorithm requiring a nonzero Jacobian is to drop one of the excess 
demand equations and replace it with price-normalisation rule. 
5.7.1.2 Intertemporal Equilibrium 
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Perfect foresight requires that the values of the lead variables conform to realized 
values. Fair and Taylor (1983) and S. G. Hall in several papers (for instance, see Hall 
1985) developed a method achieving this conformity47. Although there does not yet 
exist a general proof of convergence, the method has been used successfully in many 
application, such as Goulder and Summers (1989). The method is very simple: First, we 
calculate the new-steady values for V, DN, WH, and N which ultimately preveil after 
a policy change. The steady-state values are obtained by simulating the policy change 
under consideration in a general equilibrium system under steady-state constraints. 
Second, we assign an initial path for the lead variables. For the lead variable, V, for 
example, the path is represented V*2, V*3,........, V*T+1. 
Conditional on the values of lead variables, we solve successively for the 
market-clearing prices of each period from 1 to T. The general equilibrium solution 
provides a path of 'derived' values for V, DN, WH and N stemming from the 
relationships indicated by eqs. (77)-(80). Thus, the lead variables generate the time paths 
from 1 to T of V, DN, WH and Z. 
We then compare the values for lead variables with contemporaneous derived 
values; if the lead and derived values are not sufficiently close to one another, we revise 
the lead values in a Gauss-Seidel fashion. For example, we adjust the V* path 
accordingly to 
V*(k+l)=,. V(k)+(1-,. )V*(k) t=2>T (87) ttt> 
where k represents the iteration number and k is a parameter between 0 and 1. When 
lead and derived values agree, a perfect foresight equilibrium sequence has been 
attained. This is the case because (1) the equilibrium paths for V, DN, WH and N are 
have the appropriate slope across any two consecutive periods, as assured by when lead 
values correspond to derived values for period t+l, and (2) the equilibrium paths have 
the appropriate level, since they lead to the desired steady-state values. 
47A clear description of the method can be found in Blanchard (1985), Dixon et al. (1992) and for an 
implementation see Goulder and Summers (1989). 
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5.7.2 SOLUTION ALGORITHM 
There are a variety of solution algorithms that work directly with the various 
excess demand equations, using the kind of solution strategies described above. These 
algorithms can be divided into three types: (1) those based on fixed-point theorems (2) 
those based on a tatonnement process and (3) those exploiting information about the 
derivatives of the excess demand functions. 
Algorithms (Scarf's simplicial search method and Merrill's grid search algorithm) 
based on fixed-point theorems are truly elegant mathematically and a major advantage 
of this approach is that convergence is guaranteed within a finite number of dimensions 
on the simplex. However, Scarfs original fixed point algorithm has been extended to 
allow for continued refinement of approximations until an answer of desired accuracy 
is achieved, allow initiation of solution procedures on the face simplex rather than in a 
corner and make simplicial subdivision methods more competitive with Newton methods 
in terms of computational time. 
Algorithms based on a tatonnement process simply adjust the price in each sector 
in response to that sector's excess demand. The Gauss-Seidel iteration procedure is a 
special version of tatonnoment process. In particular, in the case of Gauss-Seidel 
iteration, successful convergence to an equilibrium depends in principle upon judicial 
selection of starting values and step size. The costs of the Gauss-Seidel method depend 
on efficient ordering of equations into simultaneous and recursive blocks. 
We use an algorithm which exploits information about the derivatives of the 
excess demand functions. This type of algorithms is called 'Jacobian algorithms' because 
their performance is sensitive to the determination of the matrix of numerical derivatives 
-the Jacobian. The algorithm solves a set of nonlinear functions, fi(P 1....... Pn) which is 
in matrix terms: 
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fP=o (88) 
where P is the vector of variables and f is the vector of functions. In general, any 
iteration procedure for solving this set of equations can be written as 
P(k+1)=P(k)+a(k)d(k) (89) 
where the superscript k refers to iteration, d(k) is a direction vector, and a is a scalar 
giving the size of the step to be taken in direction d(). The iteration vector depends on 
the matrix of derivatives of the functions f(P). Define this matrix as D: 
D= af, (90) 
Different approaches to solving eq. (88) lead to different methods which differ in the 
direction vector and the step size. A classic approach is to use the linear Taylor series 
expansion for f(P). It yields the following iteration procedure: 
P(k+1)=P(k) -D -flP 
(91) 
This is the Newton or Newton-Raphson method with the direction vector d given by D-'f 
and the step size a equal to 1. Clearly, search involves a movement across the simplex 
in directions indicated by the local behaviour of excess demand functions at any point 
under consideration. Steps can be large or small and there is no guarantee that the search 
procedure will terminate with an equilibrium solution. 
Another approach is to set up the solution problem as minimization problem of 
a special kind. Let 
4b(P) =E 1f (P)]2 = P)] P) 
(92) 
where the prime () indicates the transpose. (D(P) is a scalar function that has a minimum 
when f(P)=O. Thus, minimising the function b will yield a solution to f(P)=O. In seeking 
aP will minimise (D(P), it makes sense to search in the direction in which the function 
decreases the fastest, that is, the steepest. Applying Taylor series expansion to b(P) and 
using the method of steepest descent yields the iteration formula 
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P(k+l)-P(k)-2a(k)D/p(k)) (93) 
In general, the Newton-Raphson method has quadratic convergence properties provided 
that the initial guess is sufficiently close to the solution. The method of steepest descent 
is preferred when the initial guess of P is far from the solution, but it is slower to 
converge. A number of algorithms have been developed directions. These algorithms 
differ in how they do the interpolation, how they choose the step size a0 , and 
how they 
compute the derivatives of f(P). We choose the Powell algorithm48 that does not require 
the analytic specification of the derivatives of f(P). The Powell algorithm has mainly 
been chosen due to that it does not require the analytic specification of the derivatives 
of the excess demand functions. In the program written in fortran, we call one of the 
routines that are designed to solve a set of nonlinear equations in Nag Fortran Library. 
The routine called CO5NCF is selected, in which the correction is made at each step as 
a convex combination of Newton and scaled gradient directions. Under reasonable 
conditions this guarantees global convergence for starting points far from the solution 
and a fast rate convergence. The jacobian approximated by forward differences, but 
these are not used again until the rank-1 method fails to produce satisfactory progress. 
48The method and the associated computer algorithm are described in Powell (1970a, 1970b). For 
general information about the algorithm see Dervi§, et al. (1982), in particular Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER 6 SIMULATION RESULTS 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will attempt to evaluate the impact of the major tax policy 
changes to have taken place during the 1980s on U. K. growth using the model 
developed in chapter 4. The focus will be on their effects on the rate of capital 
accumulation and the allocation of capital among sectors and types of assets over time. 
We will examine the announcement effects of the tax reform. Since the model includes 
international financial capital flows and endogenous export demand feature, we analyze 
the tax reform effects on capital flows, exports and the terms of trade. In evaluating the 
results, we also pay attention to the efficiency effects in terms of changes in welfare 
level and functional distributional effects - capital owners versus labour suppliers, 
existing capital owners versus new capital owners, bond holders versus equity holders. 
Major tax changes to be analyzed are the reductions in the corporate and personal 
income tax rates, the elimination of the write-off (first year and initial) depreciation 
allowances and the rise in the value-added tax rate. Changes in the tax code are directly 
applied to corporate, capital allowances and value-added tax, while those in personal 
income tax is assumed. During the 1980s the corporate tax rate was reduced from 52 to 
33 per cent. The 100-percent first year and 75-percent initial depreciation allowances 
were replaced by a 25 per cent and 4 percent writing down allowances, respectively. We 
employ the tax code directly to the manufacturing sector while for other sector we apply 
the half rates of writing down allowances in order to reflect differences across industry. 
The VAT standard rate was raised from 8 to 17.5 per cent. The change in personal 
income tax rate, as suggested by empirical work49 and changes in the tax code, is 
assumed to amount to a cut in average marginal rate from 35 to 25 per cent50. 
Similarly the reduction in dividend tax credit is taken as a reduction from 30 to 22.5 
per cent. 
49For example, Robson (1988) estimates that average marginal tax rates on dividend and interest 
income would be reduced from 54 and 49 respectively to 40 per cent. 
s"A 10 percentage point rate cut might seem to be too high as compared to Robson's findings. 
However, taking into account changes in the marginal income tax rate on labour income might justify it. 
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Simulation results are analyzed as follows. The 'base case' sequence of equilibria 
is the standard against which each of the alternative tax policies is measured. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the economy achieves steady-state growth in the base case at an 
annual rate of 2.75 per cent. Simulations are performed over an interval of 75 years, 
with the equilibria spaced one year apart. In most simulations, the economy almost 
completes convergence to the new steady state within 50 years. It is found that 
simulating over a longer time interval does not significantly affect the simulation results. 
In all simulations, a balanced government budget is assumed. The path of real 
government spending is kept the same as in the base case. This means that all tax 
policies considered involve no changes in the timing and the level of the government's 
direct absorption of resources. It leaves unchanged, in the aggregate, the private sector's 
intertemporal consumption possibility frontier. To maintain government budget balance 
in each period we adjust the personal income tax intercept, f. Personal income revenue 
is calculated from the linear progressive income tax structure, Tp='tp(YT)-f, where YT 
is the taxable income. Adjusting f, the tax intercept, thus, means that we use a non- 
distortionary replacement tax scheme to obtain equal yield equilibria. In this replacement 
scheme, increases (reductions) in government revenues caused by a tax change are 
absorbed (recovered) by lump-sum transfers (taxes) received (paid) by households. This 
amounts to changes in the personal income tax intercept. Although such changes in the 
personal income tax intercept does not create distortionary (substitution) effects since 
marginal personal income tax rate is not affected by the replacement scheme. However, 
the replacement scheme generates income effects. 
Although this replacement scheme can be seen unrealistic because it abstracts 
from the efficiency effects of the replacement tax, One can justify this replacement 
scheme on several grounds. First, since it does not change effective tax rates, we can 
see a clear picture of the effects of tax policy changes on the economy. Second, since 
our tax policy issues do not include trade-off between the effects of alternative tax 
policies, there would be no need to adjust distortionary replacement tax scheme. For 
example, switching to consumption tax from income taxation would creates trade-off 
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between no intertemporal distortionary effects of the consumption taxation and 
distortionary effects on labour supply of higher tax rates. 
One can see the personal income tax intercept as personal allowances. So 
increases in government revenues caused by a tax change are absorbed by increases in 
personal allowances. Similarly, reductions in government revenues caused by a tax 
change are recovered by reductions in personal allowances. 
In order to reach a cohesive conclusion we first simulate major tax policy 
changes individually. This might help one to identify the effects of individual taxes. We 
evaluate in sequence the reduction in the personal income tax and dividend tax credit 
rate, the reduction in the corporate tax rate, the elimination of the write off depreciation 
allowances, and the rise in VAT rate. 
6.2 THE CUT IN THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATE AND DIVIDEND 
TAX CREDIT RATE. 
In this experiment we evaluate the effects of the reductions in the personal 
income tax rate and dividend tax credit rate, as assumed, from 35 and 30 per cent to 25 
and 20 per cent, respectively. As stated above, they are cut in marginal tax rates. The 
policy change is treated as unanticipated and takes effect in the first period. It 
encourages saving by raising the after-tax rate of return. We examine the effects of this 
policy change in the absence of internationally mobile financial capital. 
Simulation results from the cuts in the personal tax rate and dividend credit tax 
rate are reported in tables 6.1,6.2 and 6.3. Table 6.1 reports the effective tax rates in 
both the new steady state and the base case steady state. Table 6.2 reports the effects 
of the policy change on nominal interest rate, exchange rate, investment, nominal 
savings, exports volume, the terms of trade, revenue effect of the policy, total 
production, efficiency and distributional effects of the policy for period 1 and 5 and the 
new steady state. Figures are in percentage change as compared to the base case levels. 
Interest rate and exchange rate are in level terms. These rates as well as saving figures 
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denote nominal level. The efficiency effect of the policy is measured in equivalent 
variation change in total wealth. Distributional effects indicates the ratio of discounted 
present value of labour earnings to that of capital earnings. Table 6.3 reports variables 
across industries. 
The immediate impact of this policy change is to raise the after-tax return for 
households. The rise in the after-tax return at which households' incomes are discounted 
will reduce consumption and increase savings. Also, substitution effect will lower the 
propensity to consume wealth. As a consequence, savings will rise further. In the initial 
period, households's savings in nominal terms increase by approximately 8.5 per cent 
relative to the base case in the same period, as indicated in table 6.2. The table shows 
that this rise in households' savings will lower the equilibrium gross interest rate to a 
rate of 15.4 per cent from 17.5 in the base case. The lower interest rate and also lower 
taxes implies a drop in the cost of finance. The drop in the cost of finance across 
industries is between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent. The lower the cost of capital is the higher the 
market value of the firm and thus the higher the Q ratio. As indicated in table 6.2 this 
results in an increase in fixed investment of approximately 4.0 per cent relative to the 
base case in the first period. Over time, the rise in the capital intensity of the economy 
implies a lower marginal product of capital and a lower value of Q for any given 
interest rate; thus, the rate of investment falls, although the level of investment remains 
higher than in the base case because of the higher capital stock. In the new steady state, 
the rate of investment in each industry returns to its long-run value, while aggregate 
investment exceeds that of the base case for corresponding years by about 5.7 per 
cent" 
The effects of this policy on imports and exports are also reported in table 6.2. 
The effects on exports and imports are minor in both the short and long run. Table 6.2 
reveals that total export volume does not show any significant change; in the initial 
"Our results are comparable to those of Goulder and Eichengreen (1989); In a two country model they 
find an increase in the US investment of 1.00 and 1.43 per cent in the initial and in the new steady state 
under no capital mobility, respectively, corresponding to a4 percentage point in increase in taxes 
consumption with a compensating reduction in US households' marginal income tax rates from 0.285 to 
0.256. 
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period, total export volume declines only by about 0.1 per cent relative to the base case. 
Over the longer term, the higher capital intensity and productiveness leads to an increase 
in demands for both foreign intermediate and final goods. To balance trade account in 
the new steady state total export volume increases by approximately 1.2 per cent over 
the base case steady state. However, in the new steady state the United Kingdom faces 
a worsening of approximately 4.2 per cent in the terms of trade. Since the demand for 
British exports is imperfectly elastic; to sell additional product in international markets 
necessitates a reduction in the exported good prices in foreign currency term. 
As far as the incidence and welfare effects of the policy are concerned, as shown 
by Bovenberg (1989), amongst others, the welfare effects of the policy depends upon 
two competing effects: (i) capital accumulation is welfare improving and (ii) any 
deterioration in the terms of trade induces a negative welfare effect. In our experiment, 
the positive welfare effect associated with capital accumulation outweighs the welfare 
loss caused by worsening the terms of trade. British consumers enjoy with an 
improvement in welfare; the gain is in the region of 0.264 per cent of the base case total 
wealth level, as indicated table 6.2. 
Turning to the distributional effects, it can be seen that wage earners gain from 
the policy change. The relative functional distribution of income shifts approximately 
11 per cent in favour of human wealth (wage earners). Over the longer term, as the 
marginal product of capital falls the wage rate increases. Table 6.2 indicates that in the 
new steady state wage level is 1.01 as compared with the level of slightly over 1.00 in 
the first year. As indicated in table 6.3, the increases in the debt-equity ratios shift the 
relative distribution approximately 4 per cent in favour of bondholders from 
shareholders. Finally, the reductions in the personal tax and dividend credit rates amount 
to a loss of 27-25 per cent of the total government tax revenues, which is balanced by 
increases in lump-sum factor of the personal income tax. 
Table 6.3 displays the policy effects across industries. The table shows the effects 
of the policy change on after-tax earnings, deb-equity ratios, cost of finance, firm values, 
investment-capital ratios, investment, and capital stocks in each industry. Since 
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differences in investment in each industry underlie differences across industries, we 
concentrate on investment. In the new steady state, investment in the manufacturing 
sector rises by 9.6 per cent above the base case as the agriculture sector manages only 
an increase of 2.2 per cent. Differences across industries can be attributed to their 
differences in financial behaviour, and general equilibrium and trade effects. 
Table 6.3 reveals that changes in the cost of finance are not the same across 
industries. This reflects the role of the endogenous adjustment of financial structure 
specified in the model. the policy reduces the relative cost of debt finance as compared 
with retention. Firms minimize the cost of finance by moving to debt finance. But 
agency costs of debt constrain firms in doing so. The table shows that industries, such 
as agriculture and energy, with lower initial debt stocks raise optimal debt-equity ratio 
more than other industries. However, industries namely manufacturing and services, with 
higher initial debt stocks, reduce the cost of finance, more than the agriculture and 
energy sectors despite a relatively lower rise in the optimal debt-equity ratio. As a result 
differences in investment can be partly attributed to differences in the industry's ability 
to reduce the cost of finance. For instance, as the agriculture industry reduces the cost 
of finance in the new steady state by 2.1 per cent and in turn investment in agriculture 
increases by 2.2 per cent, the services sector reduces the cost of finance by 3.2 per cent 
and in turn investment in services rises by almost 6.0 per cent. The situation differs for 
the housing sector. Since most interest payments in the housing sector are deducted at 
the personal income tax rate, the reduction in the personal income tax rate reduces the 
relative advantages of debt finance in this industry. The size of decline in the cost of 
finance in this industry despite its higher initial debt stock is lower than that of the 
services sector. 
In table 6.1, we also presents the effective tax rates across industries as well as 
overall rate52. The overall effective tax rate in the new steady state declines to a rate 
of 11.1 per cent from 13.35 per cent, as indicated in the table. This decline in the overall 
52They are on the r-based calculations. See Appendix C for the methodology of 
calculation. 
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rate is reflected in industries' effective tax rate or tax wedge but in varying degrees due 
to the endogenous adjustment of financial structure. Variations in changes in industries' 
effective tax rate measure tax distortions on capital allocation. Standard deviation 
measures this distortion after the policy change. Standard deviation declines a value to 
0.559 from 0.648, representing a less distortionary tax system on capital allocation. 
As for general equilibrium and trade effects, in general, the policy boosts capital 
goods industries (manufacturing and services because services include construction 
sector). Over the longer term, the relative advantage of capital goods industries declines 
as the capital intensity of the UK economy rises and after-tax rates of return and rates 
of accumulation fall. Trade effects play a role such that a deterioration in the terms of 
trade results in a demand shift towards home goods (housing services) by reducing home 
goods prices. The new steady state value of housing sector's investment rises by 3.2 per 
cent over the level of the base case steady state, as indicated in table 6.3. 
6.3 PERSONAL TAX CUT AND VAT RATE RISE 
As did the UK government in early 1980s, in addition to the previous policy, - 
the personal income and dividend credit rate reductions - we also double the standard 
rate of the value-added tax. The standard rate, in general, covers all commodities except 
housing services. Hence an important difference arises between this policy and the 
previous policy, in which the tax cuts are financed by lump-sum tax (i. e., lump-sum 
factor of the personal income tax): The VAT rate rise distorts the wedge between 
housing services and other goods, to the extent that housing services are exempted from 
the VAT. In the United Kingdom, as in other countries, housing services is favoured 
with no taxes on its services. 
The increased relative attractiveness of housing sector combined with lower 
interest rate generated by the personal tax cut, results in a substantial increases in 
investment in this sector. In the initial period, investment in the housing sector increases 
by approximately 9.1 per cent over the base case. As for other industries, they also raise 
investment as a response to the decline in the cost of finance that encourage firms to 
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invest, as explained above. Overall investment in the new steady state thus increases by 
6.8 per cent over the base case steady-state. In contrast, this increase in aggregate 
investment is greater than the increase of 5.7 per cent scored in the previous policy 
experiment. This seems to reflect that since housing services are home goods and do not 
require imported intermediate goods in production process, the expansion of the housing 
industry incurs less deteriorations in the terms of trade associated with increases in 
economy's production power. Table 6.4 indicates that deterioration in the terms of trade 
caused by the VAT rate rise policy is relatively lower than in the previous policy. In the 
new steady state, the terms of trade deteriorates by 4.422 per cent, despite greater 
growth, as compared with 4.190 per cent in the previous policy case. Relatively, lower 
deterioration in the terms of trade implies a higher purchasing power of the UK 
consumers. 
As is expected, the welfare gain is greater under the VAT rate rise policy than 
in the lump-sum tax finance. The welfare gain is in the region of 0.363 as compared to 
the gain of 0.264 in the previous case. Table 6.5 reveals that the policy leads to different 
incidence effects across sectors. The policy causes investors to reallocate assets: 
residential sector offers highest returns compared to other sectors. The value of the 
residential capital stocks rises by 5.6 per cent in the short run (in year 5). Over longer 
term, the changes in the sectoral allocation of capital brings about changes in output 
prices and cause asset values toward the same line with the other sectors. The table 
reveals that over the longer term capital owners of the manufacturing sector gain. In the 
new steady state the market value of manufacturing rises by 10.5 per cent relative to that 
of the base case steady-date. This seems to reflect the fact that the manufacturing 
industry is a capital-goods producing industry. 
The table shows that the VAT rate rise fell short in offsetting the revenue loss 
faced by the personal tax rate reduction. The policy still gives rise to a deficit in the 
government budget which is balanced by nondistortionary component of the personal 
income tax namely lump-sum tax factor. In the first year of the policy implementation, 
the policy causes a 15 per cent deficit in the government budget. Over the longer term, 
it declines to approximately 12.7 per cent as the economy grows. 
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6.4 THE REDUCTION IN THE CORPORATE TAX RATE 
In this experiment we evaluate the effects of the reduction in the UK corporate 
tax rate from 0.52 to 0.33 in all industries. Given that the housing sector in less 
incorporated, the tax cut effect on this sector is relatively smaller than the other sectors. 
We present results from this experiment in tables 6.6 and 6.7. The former table reports 
aggregate results and the latter reports industry effects. 
Table 6.6 reveals that this policy encourage investments and thus generates 
increases in production. The table indicates that in the new steady state aggregate 
investment rises by approximately 7.1 per cent above the base case steady-state level. 
the higher the capital accumulation is the higher the production level, as indicated in 
table 6.6. In the new steady state aggregate production level increases by 2.1 per cent. 
The increased production level implies a gain in welfare level. The welfare gain in 
equivalent variations is in the region of 0.275 per cent. The previous discussion indicates 
that the increased production, causes a deterioration in the terms of trade. In the new 
steady state the deterioration in the terms of trade is almost 10 per cent. Such a level 
of deterioration in the terms of trade, results in the rest of the world having to share the 
benefits of the reduced corporate taxes with the domestic consumers. The corporate tax 
cut, on the other hand, creates significant distributional effects. The relative wealth 
distribution shifts by 16 per cent in favour of non-human wealth. Also, the relative 
distribution of assets shifts by around 13 per cent in favour of shares. This reflects the 
reduced attractiveness of debt finance caused by the corporate tax cut. 
The tax cut policy effects across sectors and time can be summarized as follows. 
A corporate tax cut, on the one hand, stimulates investment by raising the after-tax 
marginal product of capital, and on the other hand, reduces investment via declines in 
the value of tax depreciation allowances and increases in the cost of capital. Table 6.7 
reveals that the former effect predominates, and the corporate tax cut policy results in 
substantial increases in investment in all sectors. Table 6.7 sheds light on how to analyze 
the effects of the tax cut. The table reveals that the cut in the corporate tax raises the 
after-tax marginal product of capital, allowing higher earnings and dividends in every 
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period. The market values of the firms rise immediately to reflect the increases in the 
stream of earnings. In the initial period, for instance, earnings in the services sector 
increases by almost 20 per cent over the base case. The market value of the services 
sector rises by 25 per cent reflecting the increases in the stream of earnings in this 
sector. The increase in the market values is sustained over time, and in the new steady 
state the market value of this sector exceeds the base case steady-state value by almost 
32 per cent. 
The higher asset values imply larger values for Q, and stimulate investment. In 
the first period investment in this sector rises by almost 7.0 per cent over the level of 
the base case. Sustained higher rate investment leads to steady increases in the capital 
stock. The increases in the capital stock in this sector over time, generate an increase 
of 9.0 per cent in this investment sector in the new steady state. 
The results are similar for the other sectors except for housing, as indicated by 
table 6.7. The table demonstrates that investment in all sectors is higher than in the base 
case. For example, investment in the manufacturing sector is 9.7 per cent above the base 
case steady-state level. 
The corporate tax cut policy implies differences across residential and non- 
residential sectors as well, to the extent that residential sectors are lightly incorporated. 
The housing sector is less directly affected by the corporate tax rate reduction policy 
since only a small fraction (approximately 10 per cent) of housing capital is employed 
by private corporations. The corporate tax cut implies a much smaller reduction in the 
overall rate of capital taxation in the housing sector than in other sector. In the first year 
earnings after taxes decrease by 2.4 per cent relative to the base case. The reduced 
attractiveness of the housing sector combined with higher interest rates generated by the 
higher investment of the non-residential sectors, causes the market value of this sector 
to decline initially by 3.2 per cent. The lower market values discourage investment, 
which initially declines by 6.0 per cent relative to the base case. However, as the 
capacity intensity of the economy improves productiveness, and raises incomes and 
demands, the housing sector ultimately benefits, and it offsets reductions in housing 
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demands. In the long run the housing sector actually manages a slight increase in 
investment. 
It can be seen that since the corporate tax rate reduction reduces the tax 
advantages of debt finance, deductibility of interest payments from corporate tax base, 
industries face a loss in their earnings after-tax. In our model, firms are able to choose 
an optimal debt-equity ratio, and thus they can mitigate the loss in tax advantage of debt 
finance by lowering their debt-equity ratios. As indicated in table 6.7, the debt-equity 
ratios in each industry decline in a considerable rate. For example, in the first year the 
manufacturing industry lowers the debt-equity ratio by 19.1 per cent relative to the base 
case in the first year. Table 6.7 shows differences across industries in changes in debt- 
equity ratios. This reflects that industries with a low debt-equity ratio in the base case 
incurs less agency costs, and hence can afford large changes in debt-equity ratios. In the 
base case, the debt-equity ratio of the agriculture sector is 0.190 and that of the services 
sector is 0.363. While in the first year the debt-equity ratio in agriculture declines by 
25.6 per cent relative to the base case, that of the services, trade and utilities sector 
declines by only 12.1 per cent in the same period relative to the base case. Therefore, 
to the extent that industries can lower optimal debt-equity ratios, industries face less 
increases in their cost of finance. Otherwise they would incur much larger costs in 
financing investments. Table 6.7 reveals that the increase in the cost of finance is in the 
region of between 5 and 8 per cent (apart from housing), in the initial period, relative 
to the base case. As explained above, agriculture faces the lowest increase in the cost 
of capital, which is 5.4 per cent, while the services sector faces the highest increases in 
the cost of finance, which is 8.4 per cent. With an exogenous financial behaviour, such 
increases in the cost of finance would be much more larger than in our model. 
Our results are consistent with Goulder and Summers's (1989) results from a 
similar model. They found that a reduction in corporate income tax rate from 0.46 to 
0.34 in all American industries would stimulate capital accumulation in U. S. 
nonresidential industries, a striking rate between 3.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent in the new 
steady state. 
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In the short run the revenue effect of the tax reform is approximately 7 per cent 
deficit in the government budget. But in the long run as the economy grows the deficit 
becomes smaller. In the new steady state, the budget deficit is only 3.0 per cent. 
6.5 THE REDUCTION IN THE WRITE-OFF CAPITAL DEPRECIATION 
ALLOWANCES 
In this experiment, we replace the 100-percent first year depreciation allowances 
given to plant and machinery, and the 75-percent initial depreciation allowance given 
to industrial buildings, with 25 per cent and 4 per cent of writing-down depreciation 
rate, respectively. The writing down rates differ across industries. We apply the tax law 
directly to capital in the manufacturing industry. These rates are halved for other 
industries. The policy implies that this policy will curb the tax saving from the capital 
allowances. Industries will face a higher cost of investment project, and thus investment 
will be discouraged. 
We report the results from this simulation in table 6.8 and 6.9. The tables report 
figures on aggregate variables and industrial variables, respectively. Both tables reveal 
marked effects on capital accumulation. Table 6.8 shows significant differences across 
industries and time. Our effective tax rates, reported in table 6.1, reiterate this point. The 
effective tax rate in manufacturing because of the policy change rises sharply to a rate 
of 62 per cent from a previous rate of 21 per cent because of the policy change. 
Effective tax rates in other sectors (apart from the housing sector whose effective rate 
remains unchanged) increases but at a lesser extent. As a whole, the overall effective tax 
rate jumps to a rate of 24 per cent from about 13 per cent. The effect of this rise in the 
overall effective tax rate can be seen from table 6.8: in the new steady state, total 
investment declines substantially by 9.3 per cent below the base case steady-state value. 
As revealed in our Q ratio, the policy, - lowering tax depreciation allowances - 
lowers Q directly and causes an immediate reduction in the rate of investment. In the 
short run, investment in the manufacturing sector for instance, falls substantially by 
approximately 11 per cent. Over the longer term, the capital stock declines relative to 
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the base case, as does the productiveness of capital. Thus, over the long term, both the 
earnings, and the market value of the firm fall. In the long run, the rate of investment 
(I/K) returns to the steady-state value, but both the capital stock and the level of 
investment are markedly lower than in the base case (about 15 per cent lower). 
Table 6.9 reveals the effect of this policy change across the five industries. 
Repealing the write-off depreciation allowances, discourages investment in all industries. 
Once again the situation differs for the housing sector, since the initial writing-off 
depreciation allowances were zero, and thus repealing them has no direct impact. 
Investment in housing actually increases somewhat relative to the base case in the short 
term, after the write-off capital allowances are eliminated. This reflects the increased 
relative attractiveness of investment in the housing and the decline in interest rates 
associated with the reduction in aggregate investment demand. In the first year, nominal 
interest rates fall to a value of 16.85 per cent, as compared with 17.50 per cent in the 
base case. Similarly, in the short term the market value of the housing sector rises; in 
the first year it increases by about 5.2 per cent. This reflects the general equilibrium 
price effects associated with the relative attractiveness of industries. In the long run, 
investment in housing sector slows down and is below the base case steady-state value 
by some 0.4 per cent. This seems to be as a result of the fact that the overall capital 
intensity of the economy is lower, implying lower capital productiveness, lower real 
incomes, and a diminished demand for the output from the housing services sector. 
It is worth noting that changes in the cost of capital over time suggest that the 
short term effects of this policy would be somewhat sharper than otherwise. In our 
model, firms exploit declines in the nominal interest rate by increasing optimal debt- 
equity ratios. 
As a result of the reduced capital intensity in the new steady state, total 
production, declines by approximately 3 per cent. Reduced production level implies 
lower imports. The lower the imports and production level are, the lower the export 
volume will be. In the new steady state, the export volume drops by 2.8 per cent relative 
to the base case. Lower export volume induces improvements in the terms of trade. The 
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new steady-state terms of trade is almost 10 per cent higher than the base case. Table 
6.8 reveals that as the wage rate varies from the base case level, the ratio of the human 
wealth to non-human wealth change as well. The wealth distribution shifts in favour of 
non-human wealth. Since the policy does not change the relative attractiveness of debt 
finance and retention, the relative distribution of wealth between bondholders and 
stockholders remains the same as in the base. The revenue effect of the policy is in the 
region of 8.5 per cent in the short run. Over the longer term, as the economy contracts, 
the tax revenue declines, reflecting the reduced incomes, profits and expenditures. 
Our results confirm the view that investment incentives are more efficient than 
any other policies such as savings incentives that aim at boosting investment. Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Goulder and Summers (1989) find substantial reductions in 
U. S capital accumulation after repealing investment tax credits. Goulder and Summers 
calculates the decline in capital accumulation in US manufacturing to be in the region 
of 11 per cent. 
6.6 THE CORPORATE TAX CUT AND WRITE-OFF CAPITAL 
DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES ELIMINATION 
Two key features of the tax reform of 1984 are the elimination of the writing-off 
depreciation allowances and reduction in corporate income taxes. Here we consider the 
effects of a combined policy of this kind, the elimination of the writing-off capital 
allowances accompanied by a reduction of the corporate tax rate to 33 per cent. 
The previous discussion indicates that eliminating the write-off capital allowances 
and cutting the corporate tax have the opposing effects on Q and investment; both in 
aggregate capital intensity. Our simulation results indicate that this combined policy does 
not result in any clear effect on capital accumulation. In the new steady state, the 
combined policy results in a minor effect on aggregate investment, which increases 
investment by only 0.7 per cent above the base case steady-state value. In the model, 
this combined policy is almost 'revenue neutral' over time. This suggests that this 
combined policy is not favourable in terms of growth and capital accumulation. 
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As indicated in table 6.11, this policy combination generates windfalls to capital 
owners (higher asset values) in both the short run and long run. It is especially worth 
noting that the windfall to capital owners is not accompanied by any increase in capital 
accumulation. The market values of industries except the residential sector increase in 
the region of 30 per cent - 40 per cent in both the short run and long run. The relative 
distribution of wealth shifts accordingly in favour of non-human wealth. Table 6.10 
reveals that the shift in the welfare distribution is the region of 18 per cent. This policy 
combination, as discussed above, shifts the relative distribution of wealth in favour of 
equity assets because of the corporate tax cut. 
The UK corporate tax reform of 1984 have been studied by several researchers 
(Kay and King (1989), Devereux (1987a, 1987b and 1988)). Kay and King's work finds 
that the effective average marginal tax rates on corporate investment has risen from a 
negative value to a zero from a level of over 40 per cent. However, Devereux's works 
imply a lower increase in overall effective tax rate. They mark that the government 
achieved the gains in terms of greater fiscal neutrality at the expense of an increase in 
the overall marginal tax rate on new investment in the corporate sector. They stress the 
substantial reduction in the write-off depreciation allowances in explaining the rise in 
the overall effective tax rate. Our effective tax rates reported in table 6.1 remains almost 
unchanged. The results from our simulation show that the standard deviation declined 
from 0.648 to 0.639. It can be argued that our results are consistent with the mentioned 
works above. We observe a slight increase in total investment in the long run. In the 
manufacturing sector, which they mainly study, we also found a decline of almost 0.8 
per cent in investment in this sector in the long run. One should stress that our 
preliminary results take into account several issues: we take into account general 
equilibrium effects of taxes, endogenous adjustment of financial structure and adjustment 
dynamics. The works mentioned above are mainly concentrated on corporate industries 
and they are not taking into account any behaviourial issues. 
6.7 THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF THE RECENT UK MAJOR TAX 
REFORM 
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In this experiment we allow all the UK major tax policy changes to have taken 
place during the 1980s to be in effect. Table 6.12 and 6.13 report aggregate and industry 
effects, respectively. Also, figure 6.1 displays the effects of the policy change on after- 
tax earnings, the cost of the capital, the market value of the firm and investment in each 
industry. 
The previous discussion indicates that cutting the personal and corporate income 
taxes stimulates investment. Eliminating the write-off depreciation allowances causes the 
capital stock to decline. The previous section shows that the corporate tax cut outweighs 
the negative effects of the depreciation allowances elimination. As a consequence it will 
be expected that the overall tax policy will greatly stimulate investment and production. 
Table 6.12 indeed exhibits that the overall policy effect is growth accelerating. As can 
be seen from the table, in the new steady state, aggregate investment increases by 
approximately 7.6 per cent below the base case steady-state value. In the new steady 
state total production rises by around 2.1 per cent. The increased productiveness result 
in a rise in the performance of exporting industries and export volume increases by 
around 1.8 per cent. 
Table 6.13 demonstrates that the rise in the cost of finance associated with the 
corporate tax cut outweighs the reduction in the cost of finance associated with the 
personal income tax cut. All industries apart from the housing sector face higher 
financial cost. As explained above, this reflects the fact that the corporate tax cut implies 
a much smaller reduction in the overall rate of capital taxation in the housing sector than 
in other sectors. 
Our results show that differences across industries appear to be not important. 
All industries gain from this overall policy almost at the same extent. As residential 
sector, the housing sector, largely benefit from the VAT rate rise, non-residential sectors 
largely benefit from the personal and corporate tax cuts. 
Both table 6.12 and table 6.13 indicate that there are differences across time, 
reflecting the adjustment costs of investment. In the initial period, total investment 
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increases by 5.5 per cent relative to the base case, over time the increase in total 
investment reaches to a 7.6 per cent. 
Table 6.13 reveals that the recent major UK policy changes generate windfalls 
to capital owners. Asset values increase significantly in both the short and long run. This 
reflects that the policy change raises the relative rate of return to existing capital to the 
rate of return to new capital. The previous discussion indicates that previously 
considered policies treated new and old capital differently. Since cutting the personal 
income tax does not affect the relative attractiveness of old capital and new capital, the 
tax cut resulted in higher asset prices accompanied by increases in capital accumulation. 
Cutting the corporate tax has changed the relative attractiveness of old and new capital 
since adjustment costs are deducted from the tax base - when the corporate tax rate is 
lowered, marginal installation costs increases on an after-tax basis. Hence, the corporate 
tax cut changes the relative attractiveness of capital in favour of old capital. In this 
instance, the increased attractiveness of old capital is reflected in increases in asset 
prices (the market values of the firms). The elimination of the write-off capital 
allowances produces two opposing effects on the market value of a firm. On the one 
hand, cutting tax savings given to new investment make existing capital attractive 
relative to new capital thereby resulting in a positive influence on the value of the firm 
in the short run. On the other hand, infra-marginal losses associated with existing capital 
tends to cause reductions in the value of the firm. 
Our simulation results indicate that the tax policy changes favour old capital 
when all the changes are combined. Figure 6.1 and table 6.12 reveal that the overall 
policy generates windfalls to capital owners in both the short run and long run. The 
market values of industries increase by 30-55 per cent. However these increases in asset 
values are not accompanied by substantial increases in capital accumulation. The tables 
also indicates that relatively, residential capital owners realize much lower windfall 
gains. 
As would be expected, this policy implies an efficiency gain in terms of welfare 
effect. The welfare gain in equivalent variations is in the region of 0.428 per cent of the 
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base case total wealth. Although the terms of trade deteriorated, implying an 
deterioration in British citizens' living standards, capital accumulation resulted in welfare 
gain. Functional distribution changes in favour of capital income receivers. Table 6.12 
indicates the relative distribution between wage earners and capital income receivers. 
The relative distribution between wage earners and capital income receivers changes by 
around 11 per cent in favour of capital income receivers. As for the relative distribution 
of wealth between bondholders and stockholders, the reduced attractiveness of debt 
finance because of cuts in corporate rate leads to capitalization effects; share prices 
increase while bond prices declines. This implies gains for the stockholders but loss for 
the bondholders. Table 6.12 indicates that the relative wealth distribution between the 
two assets changed by around 7.5 per cent in favour of the stockholders. 
The revenue effect of the tax reform is negative. Our results discussed above 
have already indicated that both the personal tax cut combined with VAT rate rise and 
the corporate tax cut combined with capital allowances elimination cause budget deficit. 
Hence the revenue effect of this policy is multiplied, when these policies are combined. 
The budget deficit amounts to be 14 per cent in the short run and almost 12 per cent in 
the long run, as indicated in table 6.12. 
6.8 ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF THE U. K. TAX REFORM 
The 1980s tax reform is, to great extent, a preannounced reform; in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the U. K. government lowered personal and corporate income tax 
rates, reduced capital allowances and raised consumption tax rates. The government 
announced in advance further tax cuts in personal and corporate income taxes and 
capital allowances. This section analyses the announcement effects of the tax policies 
on capital accumulation. We consider the implications of the policy when the policy 
change is announced five years prior to its implementation (the tax policy takes effect 
in year 6). 
While it is expected that the announcement of the tax policy change in advance 
of their implementation significantly affects the short-run results, the steady-state 
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consequences of this pre-announced policy change are the same as those in the 
unannounced case previously considered. In the long run, the capital intensity of each 
sector changes by that amount necessary to bring the after-tax marginal product of 
capital into its appropriate relationship with the cost of new capital. 
However, the short-run effects of this pre-announced policy change differ 
significantly from those in the unannounced policy change. This indicates the following 
points: Firstly, the cut in corporate taxes will reduce DN, the present value of 
depreciation allowances on a pound of investment, once the policy change takes effect. 
This induces firms to invest more prior to the policy change than the pre-announced 
corporate tax rate effect on DN. Secondly, although the reductions in capital allowances 
lowers the overall attractiveness of investment and leads to a downward shift in the 
investment profile, the reduction in investment is slight in the years prior to full 
implementation of the new policy, as firms continue to take advantage of the original 
investment subsidies right up to the time of the change. Thus, the rate of investment is 
expected to be higher prior to anticipated policy change than the rate after the change. 
As Judd (1985) points out, in anticipation of lowered future investment subsidies, 
households may step up current savings, particularly in 'fast-adjusting' economies with 
high intertemporal elasticities of substitution in consumption, which further induces 
investment prior to the policy change. Thirdly, the cut in personal income taxes raises 
the after-tax capital income, reducing the effective rate of tax on savings, and increases 
savings. Thus, up to the time of the policy change households speed up the rate of 
growth of savings, in order to meet the income required to consume more at cheaper 
prices in future. This leads to a decline in interest rate and in turn stimulates investment. 
The simulation results of the unannounced effects of the 1980s tax reform are 
reported in table 6 and displayed in figure 2. As predicted by the theory, in the short run 
the announcement effects of the tax reform differ from those in the long run as well as 
those in the unannounced policy change. The combined effects of the announced 
changes in these taxes induce firms to invest as much as adjustment technology allows 
and encourage households to save after the tax reform is fully put into effect. For 
example, for manufacturing, investment in this sector prior to the policy change 
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increases the base case level by around 15 percent while in the new steady state case 
investment in this sector increase by 8.2 per cent. The value of firm equity rises 
immediately following the announcement, but much lesser in the case where the tax cut 
is immediately enacted. This manifests that windfall effects do not occur prior to the 
policy implementation. But after the policy change is put into effect existing capital 
owners benefit windfall gains. 
The pattern is similar for the other industries except for housing as indicated by 
table 6. The situation differs for the housing sector. Since the housing sector is 
considerably less subjective to taxation in the United Kingdom, the tax policy changes 
produce a negligible direct impact on the behaviour of the housing sector. While asset 
values rise in the other sectors, the reduced relative attractiveness of housing capital, 
combined with higher interest rates generated by the higher investment of the 
nonresidential sectors, cause equity values to decline initially. The lower stock values 
discourage investment. However, after the tax policy implementation, the situation is 
reversed for the housing sector and the other sectors, while investments in residential 
sectors begin to slow down. Investment in the residential sector initiates a marked rise. 
These simulations indicates that the announcement of tax policy changes in 
advance would generate reverse effects in the short run and in the long run. Thus, for 
this policy change, the prior announcement of the policy seem preferable to maintaining 
uncertainty as to whether the policy will be implemented. This result is consistent with 
the analysis of Goulder and Summers (1989). Their analysis shows that the 
announcement of a prospective cut in corporate taxes hastens the gains to be achieved 
in terms of capital formation, productivity, and real incomes. We also observe their 
prediction; in the short run investment can be significantly increased by an announced 
policy. On the other hand, the result obtained here contradicts with the conventional 
belief that only surprise policies generate real outcomes. 
Our results are consistent with other works. Devereux (1988) stresses these 
transitional effects caused by policy announcement in advance. Devereux quantifies the 
transitional effects and finds that they were extremely important in stimulating 
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investment right after the 1984 corporate tax reform. Devereux reports an increase of 
about 25 per cent in investment in 1984 and 1985 which is induced by a decline of 
around 10 percentage points in the pre-tax cost of capital. 
6.9 FINANCIAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE RECENT TAX REFORM 
In this experiment we allow for international financial capital mobility. We 
assume that the 1980s UK tax reform encourage foreign investors to supply their savings 
funds into Britain by cutting marginal rates of the personal income tax. The cut in the 
personal income tax rates causes the after-tax returns to interest payments to rise and 
therefore induces foreign savers to supply funds for the United Kingdom. However, the 
rise in the after-tax return depends on the market rate of interest as well. As in the no- 
mobility scenario, the initial effect of the recent UK tax policy changes is to increase 
investment demands and raises the domestic interest rate. The rise in the domestic 
interest rate further increases the domestic after-tax interest rate relative to the foreign 
after-tax interest rate. The higher is the domestic after-tax rates of return relative to the 
foreign one induces capital inflows. Table 6.18 reveals that in the initial year, domestic 
aggregate investment increases by 7.3 per cent as compared with the increase of 5.5 per 
cent with no-mobility case. This reflects that foreign savers supply their funds into the 
United Kingdom because of the tax advantage and increased interest rate after the 
growth accelerating tax policy change in the United Kingdom. 
These capital inflows imply a surplus on the UK capital account, which puts 
upward pressure on the pound, making U. K. exports more expensive and decreasing 
demand for U. K exports by approximately 1.5 per cent in the initial period relative to 
the base case. This represents a significant difference between the no-mobility case and 
the mobility case. The decline in UK exports in the mobility case is 1.5 per cent as 
compared with the rise of 0.12 per cent in the no-mobility case. Higher funds supplies 
into the United Kingdom imply interest rate, implying a higher domestic investment 
level. 
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Over time the situation differs, as the foreign residents accumulate domestic 
assets and receive interest income from the United Kingdom. This implies an 
deterioration in the UK balance of payments, which puts downward pressure on the 
pound, making U. K exports cheaper and increasing demand for U. K exports. On the 
other hand, as the domestic economy grows because of increased capital intensity, U. K. 
households' incomes and savings rise, implying a decline in the domestic interest rate. 
This decline in the domestic interest rate implies a lower capital inflows and eventually 
zero capital flows in the new steady state. As a consequence, the long run result remain 
unchanged even though we allowed for international capital flows. 
We also compare the above results with different cases, such as low capital 
mobility and high capital mobility. We take a value of 108 for the mobility parameter 
in the high mobility case and 106 in the low mobility case. We report results from this 
experiment in table 6.17. Figure 6.3 displays the effects of the policy change on exports, 
capital flows, the terms of trade and domestic investment. With low capital mobility, the 
effects of imports and exports are minor in the short. Since capital is internationally less 
mobile, there are less changes in capital account -a potentially important channel for 
transmitting effects on merchandise trade through its effect on the exchange rate. In the 
short run, real exports are not significantly affected by the policy change. In the initial 
year, exports volume declines by 1.5 per cent. Over the long term, the higher capital 
intensity and productiveness of the U. K. economy imply higher real output and incomes; 
this yields somewhat higher demands for foreign intermediate and final goods and a 
increased volume of international trade. In the new steady state, real exports are 
approximately 1.8 percent higher than in the base case. 
Similarly, if capital mobility is high, the effects on imports and exports are 
higher than in the low mobility case in the short run. In the short run real exports are 
significantly affected by the policy change. With high mobility of financial capital 
internationally, capital outflow reaches to 5.395 billion pound (almost 20 per cent of 
domestic household savings) as compared to 1.563 billion of the central mobility case. 
This capital inflow is coupled with a 9.5 per cent in the terms of trade, reflecting an 
appreciation in the pound value. The appreciated pound in turn causes real exports to 
.` 
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decline by 5.3 percent in the initial period than in the base case. Capital inflows lower 
the domestic interest rate. Lower domestic interest rate induces investment in the United 
Kingdom, in the first year total investment rises by 11 per cent as compared with a rise 
of 7.3 per cent with low mobility case. 
6.10 SENSITIVITY 
In this section we first describe sensitivity analysis and then test the robustness 
of results from the 1980s major tax policy changes with respect to parameters that 
govern major intertemporal aspects of decision-makings. The model's parameters that 
govern intertemporal aspects of decision-makings are the parameters of the adjustment 
cost function, the agency cost function, and the intertemporal elasticity substitution in 
consumption. They govern investment, cost of finance and savings, respectively. We 
vary the base case values of these parameters. 
One of the feature of our model is to include endogenous financial behaviour; 
namely, optimal choice of debt-equity ratios. We explore the sensitivity of the model's 
results to parameters that govern debt-equity choice: namely ago and all of the agency 
cost function, (g(B/PEE). In a low agency cost case, we reduce the value of agl to 0.1 
from 0.5 in the base case. Accordingly the value of ago is adjusted so as to leave the 
value of the 0g function unchanged. Similarly, in a high agency cost case, we raise the 
value of agl to 1.5 and adjust the value of ago to leave the value of 0g unchanged. In the 
low agency cost case we obtain a lower slope of the agency cost function and the high 
agency cost case the slope is raised. 
Table 6.18 presents results from the sensitivity of the model with respect to 
agency cost parameters. The results suggest that endogenous financial behaviour 
generate real effects as well as financial effects. The high agency cost case resembles 
the model of Goulder and Summers (1989) and indeed others such as Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987), Bovenberg (1986,1989). Our results show that the exogenous financial 
structure (high agency cost) exacerbates the negative impact of the 1980s UK tax reform 
on the cost of finance, to the extent that industries are unable to exploit declines in cost 
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of the alternative sources. The table reveals that in the new steady state total investment 
in the high agency cost case (i. e., exogenous financial structure assumption) increases 
by approximately 7.5 per cent above the base case steady-state value. In the low agency 
cost case, the rise in total investment in the same period is approximately 8.2 per cent. 
Clearly, these alternative cases produce a systematic difference endogenous financial 
structure and exogenous financial structure. However, we can state that simulation 
results are rather robust to the parameters of agency cost function. 
As seen from table 6.18, in the low agency cost case, firms can afford large 
changes in debt-equity ratio and hence curb increases in the cost of finance in the high 
agency cost case. The manufacturing industry, for instance, in the new steady state, 
lowers its optimal debt-equity ratio by about 50 per cent below the base case steady- 
state value. This enables the industry to reduce its cost of capital and thus lower the 
declines in capital intensity. Table 6.18 indicates that in the high agency cost case the 
manufacturing lowers increases in the cost of finance. As a result of this ability, the new 
steady state investment in this sector in the low agency cost case increases by 8.5 per 
cent when compared with 7.8 per cent in the high agency cost case. 
However, changes in debt-equity ratios in the high agency cost case are 
substantial thus, require attention with regards to incidence effects of tax policy. Policies 
like cut in corporate tax rate create important incidence effects. It would then be argued 
that the 1980s tax reform that reduced the attractiveness of bond finance through cut in 
corporate tax rate would cause substantial incidence effects if British firms were 
incurring less agency cost; bondholders would loose while stockholders would gain. 
As pointed out by Chamley (1987), the elasticity of demand for capital is greatly 
determined by the adjustment cost of investment. The adjustment cost reduce the 
possibilities for intra- and intertemporal distortions, and the potential welfare gains of 
tax reform. Therefore, the parametrization of the adjustment cost functions gains crucial 
relevance. To understand the robustness of our results under the parameters chosen for 
adjustment cost function, we run a sensitivity analysis on the model's results to these 
parameters. 
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We take two alternative cases to the central case modelled in this paper. The two 
cases are represented by a low adjustment cost and a high adjustment cost. In low 
adjustment cost case, we halve the value of adl of the adjustment cost function, Od(I/K). 
Accordingly, the value of ado is adjusted so as to leave the value of the 0d function 
unchanged. In the high adjustment cost case, we double the value of adl and adjust the 
value of ado to leave the value of Od unchanged. Hence, in the low adjustment cost case 
we halved the slope of the agency cost function and in the high adjustment cost case the 
slope is doubled. 
As indicated by Summers (1981b) and Bovenberg (1985), the specification of 
adjustment cost function would create significant transitional, efficiency and 
distributional effect. Our results, reported in table 6.18, confirm this view. The table 
reveal that although the long-term effects of the tax reform are not substantially different 
across alternative adjustment cost specifications, the short-term effects can differ 
significantly - especially with respect to investment. In the case of low adjustment cost, 
total investment in the initial year substantially increases by approximately 7.5 per cent, 
while in the high adjustment cost case it rises by about 3.6 per cent. 
An important difference introduced by changing the adjustment cost parameters 
is in differences across industries. The table shows that in the short run capital is 
reallocated through investment under the low adjustment cost case. Investment in the 
housing sector increases sharply in the first year under the low cost as compared with 
the slow increase in the high cost case. 
In sensitivity analysis with respect to the intertemporal elasticity substitution in 
consumption we take a lower value of 0.4 and a higher value of 1.2. Results from this 
simulation are reported in table 6.18. As indicated in the table, the model's result is quite 
robust to the intertemporal elasticity substitution. Since the requirement that the model 
replicate the observed benchmark equilibrium that implies a relationship between the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the subjective rate of time preference, a 
higher value of intertemporal elasticity of substitution corresponds to higher values of 
subjective rate of time preference. Similarly, a lower value of intertemporal elasticity of 
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substitution corresponds to lower values of the subjective rate of time preference. 
Therefore the steady-state values under alternative cases would not be expected to 
differ53. (See Ballard and Goulder 1985). 
As for short-run results, it would be expected that a higher value of intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution yield a greater saving response, faster transition, and larger 
welfare gain, our results shows that the offsetting effect of the rise in the subjective rate 
of time preference is not substantial. In the first year, total investment under the high 
value, for instance, increases by approximately 6.2 per cent as compared with 4.3 per 
cent under the low value. 
53Goulder and Summers (1989) and overlapping generation models, such as Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) and Perraudin and Pujol (1991), find differences in steady-state results across alternative values 
of the parameter. As overlapping generation models' findings reflects differences between old and young 
generations, Goulder and Summers' result can attributed to the inclusion of risk premium 
in discounting 
households' incomes. 
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Table 6.2 
Results from the Personal income tax and dividend tax credit rates reduction 
Periods 
15 INF 
Nominal interest rate 15.421 15.374 15.167 
Nominal exchange rate 1.001 1.002 1.010 
Investment 4.003 4.439 5.704 
Nominal savings' 8.482 7.591 8.106 
Total production -0.262 0.087 1.345 
Exports volume -0.086 0.215 1.166 
Terms of trade effect -0.282 -1.749 -4.190 
Wage rate 1.001 1.004 1.014 
WH/WK 11.254 11.104 11.099 
WB/WE 3.949 3.866 3.623 
Revenue effectb -26.617 -26.459 -24.528 
Efficiency effects 0.264 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation 
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Table 6.4 
Results from the Personal income tax and dividend tax credit rates reduction and the 
value-added tax rates rise. 
Periods 
1 5 INF 
Nominal interest rate 15.439 15.383 15.167 
Nominal exchange rate 1.002 1.003 1.010 
Investment 5.516 5.836 6.817 
Nominal savings' 10.377 9.620 11.070 
Total production -0.203 0.173 1.581 
Exports volume 0.167 0.423 1.308 
Terms of trade effect -0.815 -1.525 -4.422 
Wage rate 1.001 1.004 1.014 
WH/WK 9.165 9.056 9.046 
WB/WE 4.570 4.492 4.346 
Revenue effectb -15.269 -15.002 -12.662 
Efficiency effect' 0.363 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation 
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Table 6.6 
Results from the corporate tax rate cut 
Periods 
1 5 INF 
Nominal interest rate 18.155 17.943 17.500 
Nominal exchange rate 0.998 1.007 1.022 
Investment 3.642 4.466 7.074 
Nominal savings' 8.162 8.311 10.316 
Total production -0.336 0.176 2.145 
Exports volume -0.192 0.369 2.130 
Terms of trade effect 0.589 -2.942 -9.919 
Wage rate 0.999 1.008 1.030 
WH/WK -16.455 -16.344 -16.091 
WB/WE -13.279 -13.318 -13.426 
Revenue effectb -6.888 -5.977 -2.820 
Efficiency effects 0.275 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
cEfficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
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Table 6.8 
Results from the write-off capital allowances elimination 
Periods 
1 5 INF 
Nominal interest rate 16.852 16.971 17.500 
Nominal exchange rate 0.999 0.995 0.979 
Investment -5.643 -6.481 -9.342 
Nominal savingsa 7.993 6.004 1.386 
Total production 0.385 -0.303 -2.979 
Exports volume 0.172 -0.512 -2.723 
Terms of trade effect" 0.106 2.234 9.756 
Wage rate 0.999 0.992 0.964 
WH/WK -4.610 -4.701 4.966 
WB/WE -1.081 -1.022 0.000 
Revenue effects 8.469 6.752 1.280 
Efficiency effects -0.367 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
ainvestment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
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Table 6.10 
Results from the corporate tax cut and write-off capital allowances elimination 
Periods 
1 5 INF 
Nominal interest rate 17.782 17.671 17.500 
Nominal exchange rate 0.998 1.003 1.008 
Investment 0.379 0.484 0.721 
Nominal savings' 15.597 13.315 11.049 
Total production -0.059 0.036 0.027 
Exports volume -0.062 0.085 0.367 
Terms of trade effectb 0.590 -1.666 -3.801 
Wage rate 0.999 1.003 1.007 
WM/WK -18.266 -18.705 -18.950 
WB/WE -13.698 -13.594 -13.757 
Revenue effects -0.888 -1.217 -1.454 
Efficiency effect' 0.025 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
ainvestment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
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Table 6.12 
Results from the overall tax policy change 
Periods 
15 INF 
Nominal interest rate 15.681 15.503 15.167 
Nominal exchange rate 1.000 1.001 1.018 
Investment 5.534 6.022 7.621 
Nominal savingsa 27.451 25.224 25.104 
Total production -0.233 0.246 2.141 
Exports volume 0.120 0.514 1.833 
Terms of trade effectb -0.259 -3.122 -8.377 
Wage rate 1.000 1.006 1.023 
WH/WK -10.820 -11.001 -11.039 
WB/WE -7.407 -7.550 -7.766 
Revenue effects -13.920 -13.867 -11.675 
Efficiency effects 0.428 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
O 
. --+ 
bA 
cd 
U 
U 
O 
N 
0 
a) iS 
E 
0 
r 
N 
0 
E-H 
O 
O Ný N O \D I O V O ! N O ýc v') M O O M O d' if) C) t- O It N O M V> > O 'O N O O N C C -+ O N O 'ý 00 ,., O - r Ö - - O O o0 © N Ö - O\ - 
M N N r-+ --+ N V N Oý N IC tf) if) Oý N M 'dt N tr) O*N ýO ýO ýlO N N N v') 
Fý 
M M N r O N r-+ r-+ V') N N 00 M 00 
ýt ýt M ýh M 'd' oö V'; i r- oö Oý 0ý U 
O 
4-4 
O 
U 
M M O N It 0 N kn 0 N N © X0 00 0 Oý N O It C O Oý O ýO ýO O N N O 
M N O N C O - C O in O O 00 N O E N O M N O M cý C> vý 4 O 0.6 N O 
CT' 
4) 
0 
r--I N 't M at O O - tr) M (14 00 kn m ýlc +-) d' r-+ N M 00 00 00 ýO , -4 "--q N O C - Ö 
O N 'It N O O 1%O M O M 00 O\ O O\ U 
0ý Oý "; N Ö 4 4 d' 'mot C - Li N O N N M M Wt ýt ýt M, M i 
CW 
U M vý N N - C - N N v') O N - O N 
i m o0 O, ý 4 tf) W") C O ' Ir) 110 v> ý4 N U Loý o \O M O ý-O M r-+ (aN M -q 00 lý \D k 
ct M r-+ 
M 
-; ui 't r-+ \D Y) N , -+ 
p 
r; 
4 U O `ý a) II 
( cd 
n N Oý O' ' i) \O VI) ON Oý V') N Q'N V') \D Ü c O -t r-+ 00 Oý O' N O VI) O N ýt N Oý N 0 A N N \1O 00 N M n 00 011\ O N M M d' U U 
N N cc; O O O' cý Oý vi \, 6 ýO r-; r-i -4 -0 N tQ 
4 a) 
ý II 
Cd co: ) r, rA rA 
O*ý VI) N --ý N 00 N N "Ic ýO ýO O, \ N p N Y) Oý N N N ýO O O d' O 00 N 
\O N \IO ýt M fit' N '--+ N O ON 00 
'-. C M 00 06 1-4 06 \C tf) 
f -. 4 , 41 O 
C-0 
4-1 
191 
Table 6.14 
Results from the announced overall tax policy change 
Periods 
15 INF 
Nominal interest rate 15.370 155.370 15.176 
Nominal exchange rate 0.994 1.011 1.018 
Investment 9.174 6.778 7.621 
Nominal savings' 66.265 24.645 25.104 
Total production -0.486 0.708 2.141 
Exports volume 0.061 0.910 1.833 
Terms of trade effectb -0.419 -5.153 -8.377 
Wage rate 0.994 1.013 1.023 
WH/WK -9.794 -11.0244 -11.039 
WB/WE 2.575 -7.650 -7.766 
Revenue effects 9.097 -13.326 -11.675 
Efficiency effects 0.445 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bPercentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
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Table 6.16 
Results from the overall tax policy change with financial capital mobility 
Periods 
1 5 INF 
Nominal interest rate 15.770 15.553 15.176 
Nominal exchange rate 0.992 1.005 1.018 
Investment 10.509 11.001 7.621 
Nominal savingsa 37.030 30.202 25.104 
Total production -0.864 0.160 2.141 
Capital flowsb -4.658 -3.839 0.000 
Exports volume -4.619 -3.051 1.833 
Terms of trade effects 8.128 2.953 -8.377 
Wage rate 1.017 1.028 1.023 
WH/WK -12.165 -11.296 -11.066 
WB/WE -7.643 -12.650 -7.766 
Revenue effects -11.595 -11.397 -11.675 
Efficiency effect' 0.069 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bMinus sign denotes capital inflows and plus sign represents capital outflow 
'Percentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
'Efficiency effect is measured as the equivalent variation. 
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Table 6.17: Overall tax policy change with different financial capital mobility 
High mobility 
15 
Interest rate 15.778 15.544 
Exchange rate 0.990 1.005 
Investment 11.252 11.640 
Nominal savingsa 38.266 30.569 
Total production -0.963 0.152 
Exports volume -5.346 -3.509 
Capital account" -5.395 -4.353 
Terms of trades 9.471 3.732 
Revenue effects -11.225 -11.056 
Low mobility 
1 5 
15.730 15.555 
0.997 1.006 
7.277 7.841 
31.034 27.202 
-0.446 0.215 
-1.499 -0.761 
-1.563 -1.301 
2.537 -0.954 
-13.595 -13.097 
Key: WH = total human wealth, WK = total non-human wealth, WB = Value of total 
bonds, and WE = value of total equities. 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case, except in the row 
corresponding to the interest rate, and wage rate. 
'investment percentage may differ from personal saving percentage because of retained 
earnings and investment grants used to finance investment. 
bMinus sign denotes capital inflow and plus sign represents outflow. 
'Percentage change in personal income tax intercept to total tax revenues. 
i. e. 100 *( change in tax intercept) / total tax revenues. 
dSpecified periods are replaced with 10,20 and 50, respectively. 
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Table 6.18: Sensitivity Analysis 
Low values High values 
15 INF 
Elasticity substitution in consumption 
Total Investment 4.360 4.914 7.621 
Housing investment 7.814 8.304 9.855 
Manufacturing sector value 42.646 44.949 54.315 
Housing sector value 5.421 6.484 10.916 
Adiustment cost of investment 
Total Investment 7.519 
Housing investment 9.526 
Manufacturing sector values 45.197 
Housing sector value 3.462 
Aizencv costs of debt 
7.954 8.493 
10.496 9.618 
48.712 57.780 
5.276 10.872 
Total Investment 5.754 6.307 8.182 
Housing investment 8.601 9.212 10.149 
Manufacturing sector val ues 44.402 47.402 55.578 
Housing sector value 5.749 7.045 11.303 
Debt-equity ratios' -48.281 -49.375 -51.465 
Cost of financea 5.068 3.799 1.384 
15 INF 
6.201 6.614 7.621 
9.428 9.893 9.855 
44.864 47.558 54.315 
6.192 7.433 10.916 
3.557 3.967 6.149 
7.538 8.001 10.251 
41.588 43.264 49.122 
9.357 9.879 10.924 
5.496 5.974 7.532 
8.867 9.349 9.819 
44.018 46.562 54.100 
5.934 7.106 10.866 
-3.091 -3.151 -3.265 
1.740 5.393 4.222 
Note: All values express percentage changes from base case. 
'Manufacturing industry. 
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Figure 6.1 : Effects on industries of the major UK tax policy changes 
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Figure 6.1 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.2 : Announcement effects of the major UK tax policy changes 
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Figure 6.2 : (Continued) 
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Figure 6.3 Capital mobility and the UK tax reform 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
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In this study, we developed a dynamic computable general equilibrium tax model 
to gauge the incidence and growth effects of tax policy changes. The model attempts to 
provide a comprehensive account of both the short-run impacts of the tax policy changes 
on asset values and their long-run effects on capital accumulation, by focusing on 
forward-looking investment decisions, on endogenous financial decisions, and on the 
influence of international financial capital flows. The model also allows for disaggregate 
industry effects by considering business sectors as well as housing services sector. 
We have applied the model to the major tax policy changes to have taken place 
during the 1980s in the United Kingdom. Our preliminary results cast light on the 
importance of incorporating forward-looking investment behaviour, adjustment dynamics, 
endogenous financial behaviour and international financial mobility in general 
equilibrium policy evaluation models. The incidence and growth effects of the tax policy 
changes obtained in this study are consistent with economic theory and other works by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Dixon et al (1992) and Goulder and Summers (1989). 
We observe that saving-promoting policies (the personal and corporate income tax 
cuts) outweigh the negative effects of the write-off (first year and initial) depreciation 
allowances elimination. Our experiments with the UK major tax policy changes in the 
1980s suggest that the increase in investment in the long run could be approximately 7.6 
per cent above the base case steady-state value. 
The results of the simulation experiments indicate the UK corporate tax reform of 
1984 (the corporation tax cut and capital elimination) would not produce any significant 
impact on capital accumulation. When these policies are considered separately, the 
corporate tax cut policy increases investment by 7.1 per cent in the long run, whereas 
the capital allowances elimination lowers the new steady-sate investment by 9.3 per cent 
above the base case steady-state value. When they are combined the corporate tax cut 
policy slightly predominates the other policy. However, it is worth noting that this 
combined policy generates significant windfall effects to capital owners. Our results 
indicates that the windfall effects of the policy could be in the region of 30 per cent to 
40 per cent. 
203 
We observe that differences across industries appear to be negligible. All industries 
gain from the overall tax policy almost at the same extent. As residential sector, the 
housing sector, largely benefit from the VAT rate rise, non-residential sectors largely 
benefit from the personal and corporate tax cuts. When policies are considered 
separately, simulation results indicate significant differences across sectors in the effects 
of various tax policy changes. Industry effects are significant especially between 
residential and non-residential sectors. Policy changes, in general, cause adverse 
consequences for the housing sector, particularly in the short run. These different effects 
are largely attributable to the existence of costs of adjustment. Adjustment costs to 
investment greatly reduce the immediate sharing of policy benefits and losses. For 
example, while the elimination of write-off capital allowances decreases in investment 
in most sectors, investment in the housing sector rises by 8.2 per cent. But over the 
longer term investment in the housing sector declines by 0.4 per cent below the base 
case steady-state value. 
Simulation results from the announced policy experiment cast light on the 
importance of incorporating forward-looking investment behaviour. Prior to the 
investment incentives elimination and the cuts in the personal and corporate tax rates, 
firms invest substantially to take advantage of the original investment incentives and 
lower tax rates to be applied to on their future profits right up to the time of the change. 
In the short-run total investment incentives increases by approximately 9.2 per cent as 
compared with 5.5 per cent in the announced policy scenario 
Simulation results also suggest that models which ignore the endogenous 
adjustment of the financial structure will systematically err in predicting the response 
of investment to changes in the taxes that affect the relative attractiveness of debt 
finance and retention. In sensitivity analysis, we observe that alternative specification 
of agency costs of debt generates different investment levels, implying that opportunities 
in adjusting financial structure yield real effect. Simulation results indicate that 
companies respond to the reduced attractiveness of debt finance by shifting from debt 
finance to retention. 
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The results of the simulation experiments with international financial capital 
mobility suggest that the short run effects of tax policies from differ the long-run 
outcomes. We observe that increases in the UK domestic rate of return generated by 
both tax provisions and higher investment induces capital inflows. Such capital inflows 
greatly affect domestic investment in the short run. the increase in aggregate investment 
with financial capital mobility is double the increase in investment with no-mobility 
case. 
There are undoubtedly weakness in this model. There are two groups of factor that 
should be taken into consideration when evaluating policies are under consideration. 
These are technical problems and fundamental conceptual problems. Technical problems 
are restrictive functional forms and inconsistent data set. Fundamental problems arise 
from those commonly used assumption; certainty, market-clearing and no technological 
progress. 
Despite these limitations, our dynamic general equilibrium model represent a step 
forward to include more actual features of a complicated economic world in tax models. 
The model provides more realistic description of the dynamics of an economic system, 
and therefore, a more useful tool for fiscal policy evaluation. 
The current model can be extended in several directions. Firstly, it would be useful 
to include different types of capital goods. Distinguishing structures from equipment 
would be particularly worthwhile, allowing for analysis of the effects of tax policy on 
the asset composition, as well as the industry composition, of investment. 
Secondly, it would be useful to categorize households. Categorizing households 
makes it possible to address redistributional issues in a more realistic way. 
Thirdly, incorporating liquidity constraints in the treatment of household behaviour 
also seems a worthwhile enterprise. Without these constraints, the current model may 
overstate the importance of wealth effects on consumption and understate the potential 
effects of policy changes on interest rate. 
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Finally, the current model adopts primitively 'source principle' in taxing capital 
income. The United Kingdom applies the residence principle for several capital income 
categories. Thus one profitable investment in a model development might be to expand 
the current model to capture the residence principle. 
Apart from these modelling efforts, there are many other important issues 
associated with dynamic tax reform which the model presented here is capable of in 
addressing. These include the effects of policies which involve changing tax rates over 
time. An important area which few numerical general equilibrium models have entered 
so far is the analysis of government debt. Since it is widely believed that the structure 
of expectations about future tax liabilities can have a large effect when government 
bonds are issued, a model of this nature can be very useful in evaluating alternative tax 
and deficit plans. 
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APPENDIX A: A GLOSSARY OF NOTATION 
1. Scalars 
p subjective rate of discount 
6 intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
g steady-state growth rate 
7 inflation rate 
rB : nominal interest rate 
f: income tax rate intercept 
tip marginal income tax rate 
6P marginal income tax factor 
iP average income tax rate 
b: dividend tax credit rate 
9b dividend tax credit factor 
tig : capital gains tax rate 
6g capital gains tax factor 
TL labour tax rate 
and adjustment cost parameter considered to represent capital depreciation 
rate 
ald adjustment cost parameter 
e nominal exchange rate 
eR real exchange rate 
Tr transfer payments 
2. Behavioral and Tax Parameters 
2.1 Firms 
ao coefficient of requirement of value added 
as : coefficient of requirement of intermediate input j 
( production technology 
OP Leontief production function 
VA(L, K) value added production function 
E1 Cobb-Douglas normalisation parameter 
E0 Cobb-Douglas weighting parameter 
Od adjustment cost function 
09 agency cost function 
ao agency cost parameter 
ad agency cost parameter 
d dividend payout parameter 
bR capital economic depreciation rate 
bT tax depreciation rate 
tiC corporate tax rate 
6c corporate tax factor 
z: investment tax credit rate 
E number of equity 
2.2 Household and Rest of the World 
P Cobb-Douglas utility weighting parameter 
TV value-added tax rate 
GM elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
(30 trade aggregation function weighting parameter 
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ßl trade aggregation function normalisation parameter 
PWM : world price of import in foreign currency 
'Cm tariff rate 
ßZ price elasticity of export demand 
Z° : export demand in base case 
Pwz : world price of export in foreign currency 
tiZ rate of export subsidy 
3. Variables 
3.1 Commodities and prices 
C composite consumer good 
P price of composite consumer good 
C; : consumer good i 
Yj composite producer good j 
Pi price of composite producer good j 
YD : domestic supply of good j 
PD : price of domestic good j 
Mj : imported good j 
PMT : price of imported good j 
Zi : exported good j 
PZj domestic export price of good j 
PNj net price of supply of good j 
yj ; demand for intermediate good j by industry i 
yj intermediate good j 
y vector of intermediate inputs 
Py : vector of intermediate input prices 
PES price of equity j 
PK price of composite capital good 
PL price of labour 
L: labour 
3.2 Assets 
Kj capital stock of firm j 
Vi market value of firm j 
Bj jth industry bond 
Ej : value of equity 
Bg : government bond 
BW : foreign bond 
TW total wealth 
WH human wealth 
WK non-human wealth 
WE : total value of equities 
WB : total bond stocks 
DA : value of currently allowable depreciation allowances 
DE : value of depreciation allowances on existing capital 
DN value of depreciation allowances on future acquisition (unit investment) 
3.3 Rate of Returns and Flow Variables 
EARN before tax earnings 
NCF net cash flow 
DIV dividends 
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RE : retained earnings 
B. debt issue by firm j 
PE increase in equity price (capital gains) 
I: investment 
K net investment (net increase in capital stock) 
F: cost of capital 
'y debt-equity ratio 
discounting factor used by firms 
shadow price of additional capital goods 
q market valuation of existing capital (Tobin's q-ratio) 
Q tax adjusted q-ratio 
U: lifetime utility level 
u: instantaneous utility level 
YD : disposable income 
YH : labour income and transfers 
YK : capital income 
Tr transfers 
S savings 
WK capital asset accumulation 
r: average after-tax return on the portfolio held by household 
OP discounting factor used by household 
A: propensity to consume out of wealth 
TL labour tax revenue 
Tc : corporate tax revenue 
TZ : total investment tax credits paid by government 
Tv : value-added tax revenue 
Tp : personal income tax revenue 
Tg : capital gains tax revenue 
TW : wealth tax revenue 
T total tax revenue 
Gj government expenditure on good j 
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APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL 
1. Producer Behaviour 
1.1 Production 
-Production Technology 
0 [L, K, Y, II =(Op(L, K, y) -Od(I/K)I (B. 1) 
-Leontief structure 
(o p(L, 
K, Y) = Min{ 
1 VA(LK), y 9.......... 
y 
j=1,..... J=5 (B. 2) 
ao al aj 
-Value added production function 
VA(L, K) = E1LE°K1 ý° (B. 3) 
1.2 Financial constraints, definitions and behaviour 
-Gross profits (earnings before tax and interest payments) identity 
EBIT = rB+4g(y)B+RE+DIV+TAXF (B. 4) 
-Gross profits definition 
EBIT = PY-PLL-P), y (B. 5) 
-Investment expenditure-finance identity 
(1 _z)pKI=RE+B 
(B. 6) 
-Dividend payout rule 
DIV = dE (B. 7) 
-Arbitrage condition 
ý1-T r 
(1- 
d+(l_T SPE (B. 8) B (1-b) 9 PE 
-Market value of firm 
cc 
V(t) =f exp 
S 
[ -fT(u)du]NCF(s)ds, 
(B. 9) 
tt 
-Net cash flow 
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NCF=[PNY-(1-z. PLL] +T DA-(1-z)PKI (B. 10) 
-Cost of finance 
I' = 1-T r+P +[d+ 
pE] 1 (B. 11) [( 
ý) B 
ýgCY)l 
1+y P1+ EY 
1.3 Taxes on the producer 
-Taxes paid by firms 
TAXF = -c yPY+TLPLL+-c jP)y+T,, [e, PY-OLPL-evip)'-rBB] -zDA (B. 12) 
-Depreciation allowances 
DA(t) = 8wK T(t) +(a T +8 f)PK(t)I(t) 
(B. 13) 
-Value of depreciation allowances on existing capital 
Co 
TsT (B. 14) DE(t) = f8exp[_fr(u)du}KT(s)[exp(_ý)(s_t)ds 
tt 
-Value of depreciation allowances on new investment 
m 
Tu() 
DN(s) = uc(b +8f)+ f'r awexp[-fr(v)dv]KT(u)[exp(-aw)(u-S)du `B. 15) S 
S 
1.4 Capital stock accumulation condition 
k=I_bRK (B. 16) 
1.5 Other conditions and functions 
-Initial conditions for assets 
K(0) =Ko, B(O) =Bo, and E(O) =E (B. 17) 
-Adjustment cost function 
(c4/2)[I/K_ao]2 (B. 18) ýýIlý = I/K 
-Agency cost function 
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4)g(Y) = 
1.6 Demand for investment 
(ag/2) [Y _ aö]2 
Y 
Id1 
K-a°+ dQal 
1.7 Tax-adjusted g ratio 
Q=[ V -DE -1 +z +DNI [ 
PK 
PKK ec pN 
2. Consumer Behaviour 
2.1 Utility functions 
-Intertemporal utility function 
Co Q-1 
U(t) =f 
a C(s) ° exp(- p (s -t))ds, 
t °-1 
-Sub-utility function 
IIic 
2.2 Budget constraint, income and conditions 
-Intertemporal budget constraint 
Co 
s 
f15(s) (s)exp[ -1(1- )rB(u)du]ds = TW(t) 
rr 
-Total wealth 
TW = WK + WH 
-Non-human wealth 
WK = eBw+EiBi+ýiPE, 
-Human wealth 
Ca 
s 
WH(t) = 
fYH(s)exp[-f(1 
-)rB(u)du]ds 
tt 
(B. 19) 
(B. 20) 
(B. 21) 
(B. 22) 
(B. 23) 
(B. 24) 
(B. 25) 
(B. 26) 
(B. 27) 
-Dynamic budget constraint 
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BW+Z i= YD-PC 
(B. 28) 
-Disposable fincome 
YD = f+YH+YK (B. 29) 
-Non-capital income 
YH = (1-t)PLL+Tr+Ej4g(yj)Bj (B. 30) 
-Capital income 
YK =E 
1-gyp 
+ +(rB + e)eBW+(1-T rB Sigam -T E 
(B. 31) 
1_b e 'gj g JP i 
-Saving flow identity 
S= eh +Eibi (B. 32) 
-Average rate of return 
rB = Si(1-zýrB +(1-0)[rB +e/e] 
(B. 33) 
2.3 Aggregate consumption and demand for commodities 
-Demand for aggregate consumption 
P(t)c(t) = A(t)Tv(t) 
°° s (B. 34) 
A(t) =[f [P(s)/P(t)]1-QK[exP(P(s-t)]au[exp[-frB(u)du]]l-Q4 j1-l 
tt 
-Demand for commodities 
Cf = µý 
[YD-S] (B. 35) 
Pi 
3. Government Sector Behaviour 
3.1 Expenditures on commodities 
G1(t) = (1 +g)r-'G1 (B. 36) 
3.2 Goverment Sector Revenue 
T= TL+Tc-TZ+TV+Tp+Tg+T (B. 37) 
-Labour tax on labour services 
op, 
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TL = TLEJPLLJD (B. 38) 
-Corporate income tax 
TC = EizCi[PNJYj(1-zL)PLL-rBBj -DA] (B. 39) 
-Investment grants 
TZ =E jzJPxl, 
(B. 40) 
-Value-added tax 
Tv = Eit, iCi+EjEi-c ryji+EiT, iGi 
(B. 41) 
-Personal income tax 
T,, = 'r L+rB EjBf+Y j6-'DIVj] -b EjDIv 
f (B. 42) 
P[PL 1-b 
-Capital gains tax 
TgMAE (B. 43) 
-Property tax 
Tw=Ej tWPKKj (B. 44) 
3.3 Government Budget Constraint 
EI(1 +TVI)PiGi+TR =T (B. 45) 
4. Rest of World Behaviour 
4.1 Trade 
-Production differentiation 
0M-1 am-1 am 
(B. 46) 
Y= a1[POM aM +(1_ndYD 
Om I Om-1 
-Foreign consumer utility (function of export) 
aZ-1 
UU(t) =f 
az 
1 
Z(S) az exp[-p(s-t)]d 
(B. 47) 
v tz 
4.2 International capital flows 
i 
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BW(t) = B[(1--r") (1-zp) -%] 
(B. 48) 
4.3 Balance of payment condition 
Bw(t) _ [1 +(1-zp)]r8 Bw(t) +E W -PZ(t)Z(t) 
(B. 49) 
i 
5. Prices 
-Composite consumer good price 
p= II [ 
(1 +T'ý)Pi]µ' (B. 50) 
µi 
-Import price 
PM = PM(1+Tm)e (B. 51) 
-Export price 
D 
p= 
Pf (B. 52) 
z (1+Tz)e 
6. Equilibrium Conditions 
6.1 Product market 
yD_Y., =0 (B. 53) 
-Total demands 
yyD = Dj+Zj (B. 54) 
-Total demands for the goods produced in the domestic country 
D1 = d, [CC+Gj+aVB/ý+E1y1j] (B. 55) 
6.2 Labour market 
E 
jLj° -L =0 
(B. 56) 
6.3 Funds market 
B +E .p (B. 57) w jBj 
r 
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E.,. (1 +zw)P1Gj+TR =T (B. 58) 
Bw(t) _ [1 +(1-ýp)]rB Bw(t) +Ej`ýi "' -Pz (t)Z(t) (B. 59) 
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APPENDIX C: BASE CASE PARAMETER VALUES 
Benchmark values for industry tax and behaviourial parameters 
Parameter 
Agriculture Energy 
Manufac- 
turing 
Services, 
trade and 
utilities 
Housing 
services 
General Parameters 
Production efficiency factor 0.612 0.581 1.081 1.115 0.118 
(source: calibration) 
Cobb-Douglas labour share 0.082 0.072 0.316 0.355 0.001 
(source: calibration) 
Dividend payout rate 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.023 
(source: calibration) 
Debt-equity ratio 0.190 0.224 0.251 0.363 0.500 
(source: own calculation 
from Extel Limited data set) 
Rate of economic 0.070 0.050 0.045 0.057 0.016 
depreciation (8R) 
(Source: King and Fullerton 
1984 and own calculation) 
Import substitution 0.8 1.6 3.2 0.8 - 
elasticity 
(source: Piggott and Whalley 
1984 adjusted) 
Export demand 0.6 1.2 2.4 1.8 - 
elasticity 
(source: Piggoot and Whalley 
1984 adjusted) 
Tax Parameters 
(source: own calculation) 
First year depreciation 0.250 0.400 0.600 0.350 0.000 
rate (STf) 
Initial depreciation 0.010 0.015 0.060 0.010 0.000 
rate (8Ta) 
Annual depreciation 0.050 0.055 0.020 0.040 0.040 
rate (8TW) 
Investment grant rate 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.003 0.000 
(source: King and Fullerton) 
Labour tax rate 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
(source: tax code) 
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Scalars: 
Corporate tax rate (tie) 0.52 
(source: tax code) 
Capital gains tax rate (tig) 0.075 
(King and Fullerton 1984) 
Marginal income tax 0.35 
rate (tip) 
(source: Kay and King 
1978) 
Dividend credit rate (b) I 0.30 
(source: tax code) 
steady-state growth rate 1 0.0275 
inflation rate 1 0.175 
intertemporal elasticity 
subtitution 0.5 
(source: Piggott and 
Whalley 1985 and 
Lawrance (1991) 
adjustment cost parameters 
ado 0.035 
ad, 15 
(source: plausible values 
from works by Jenkinson 
1981, Oulton 1981, 
Summers and Poterba 
1983 and Bond and 
Devereux 1988) 
agency cost parameter 
ce, 0.5 
1ý 
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APPENDIX D: PROGRAMME AND COMPUTATION 
A programme in FORTRAN was written to stimulate the model described in 
chapter 4 and is called 'DAGETM', which stands for dynamic applied general 
equilibrium tax model. DAGETM structures overall computational procedure in three 
stages, namely DATDES, SOLVE and RESULT. DATDES modifies and transforms the 
basic data into a model admissible data set; SOLVE calculates alternative equilibria for 
the variables tax replacements considered; and RESULT analyses the final equilibrium 
data procedure for each run. 
DATDES is short section in terms of code. SOLVE is a lengthy in terms of 
code and complex in terms of programme structure and interlinking subroutine calls. 
In DAGETM the most execution time is spent in SOLVE. 
DATDES sets up the NAG subroutine codes and reads the basic data. It does 
a few calculation, such as shares of consumption goods in the consumer spending. 
SOLVE involves two stages. The first is to solve a "benchmark equilibrium". 
In the second stage SOLVE finds a "counterfactual" or "policy replacement" equilibrium 
as the alternative equilibrium associated with any changed policy regime. Both stages 
greatly differ from those seen in the static models. Models like ours that include multi- 
periods, i. e., dynamic models, must satisfy two sets of equilibrium conditions. 
Intratemporal (within-period) equilibrium requires that, given expectations, current 
supplies and demand balance in each period. Intertemporal equilibrium requires that 
expectations conform to the values realized in later periods. 
In the benchmark equilibrium, the commonly adopted assumption that the 
economy is in equilibrium in a particular year and grows at a constant rate, the balanced 
growth rate (i. e., the economy is on the balanced growth path) simplifies the benchmark 
equilibrium solution. It is simply to calculate the steady state values as concerning the 
intertemporal equilibrium condition. A commonly used units convention that is to choose 
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units for both goods and factors so that they have a price of unity in the benchmark 
equilibrium further simplifies the solution. 
In calibrating the model a difficulty arises. The relationship between stock 
variables and their flow variables are governed by the balanced growth requirement. 
This requirement condition are often not found in national account data or in others. One 
must then take one them from the national account data and solve the other from the 
condition. Usually stock variables are taken as given in the national account data and 
the program solves the level of flow variable implied by the condition. 
DAGETM initiates calibration when IFIN=O. Calibration is divided into two 
parts. The first part involves the producer side of the model. The second part deal with 
the consumer side problem. The crucial task in the first part is to adjust the data so as 
to produce the Q ratio implied by the balanced growth requirement and the values of 
adjustment cost parameters (see eq. 18' of the model). From the equation of motion for 
capital, eq. 5, given the economic depreciation rates and the values of capital stocks, one 
can calculate the level of investment. The relationship between the rate of investment 
and Q, with exogenously chosen the values for adjustment cost parameters, then 
corresponds to a particular value for the Q ratio. The data supplied in official statistics 
do not generate this q ratio. For this reason, we adjust production level. 
The subroutine PCALIB takes care of this adjustment procedure in production 
level. The algorithm used in PCALIB is a NAG subroutine called CO5NCF. The 
algorithm is an improved hybrid POWELL method that is written to solve non-linear 
equations system. PCALIB works with the subroutine BPROD, in which the producer's 
demand functions are located. 
Once the program adjusted production levels, we are able to calculate the 
consumer's income level and wealth (human and non-human wealth). To determine 
savings and consumption a pure rate of time preference rate is required. Once a value 
for time preference has been specified, we can identify initial consumption. Since the 
value of aggregate household savings must equal total external borrowing by firms, the 
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subroutine DISRAT is written to calculate the rate of time preference54. From the 
intertemporal equilibrium condition for the consumer, it is required that the pure rate of 
time preference must be consistent with the nominal market rate of interest (see eq. 75). 
Since the calculation on the producer side is based on a specified rate of interest, on the 
consumer side we calculate a value for the pure rate of time preference. This is done in 
the subroutine BDMND. BDMND also calculates consumer spending on specific goods. 
The subroutine GVREV, accordingly, calculates various tax revenues, transfer payments 
and government spending on goods. 
A consistency problem arises with balance in output supplies and demands. 
It is because we adjusted production levels whereas we used the data for demands from 
the Blue Book (National Income Account). The subroutine ADJUST then adjusts input 
demand levels to balance output supply and demands. 
Once the model is calibrated, the parameter values thus generated can be used 
to solve for the alternative equilibrium associated with any changed policy regime. That 
is, we advanced to the second stage of SOLVE, that is 'counterfactual equilibrium 
solution. The calculation of the counterfactual equilibrium path of the economy proceeds 
in two stages: (1) solving for the long-run steady state to which the economy eventually 
converges after the policy takes effect, and (2) solving for the transition path that the 
economy takes between the old (initial) steady-state and the new steady state. 
DAGETM places IFIN=2 to start the new steady state solution. In solving the 
new steady state equilibrium a complex simulation procedure is required. The simulation 
procedure involves the solution of the general equilibrium model under steady-state 
constraints. One of the constraints is to find the industry Q's equal to the steady state 
values. This requires adjustment in capital stocks. So in the constrained system we 
iterate over capital stocks as well as prices including interest rate and exchange rate to 
obtain a general equilibrium in which the derived industry Q's are equal to the steady- 
state values. 
54Actually, there is no need such a subroutine. This is because from the intertemporal equilibrium 
condition for the consumer, eq. 75, one can calculate the pure rate of time preference. 
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Having the initial values for stock variables and the terminal values for the 
'wealth' variables we can solve the transition path. Since households and firms are 
forward-looking with perfect foresight, solution of the model at this stage requires that 
expectations conform to actual future values. To derive perfect foresight expectations, 
one repeatedly solves the model forward, each time generating a path of equilibria under 
given set of expectations. At any period of time, t, expectations are assigned to SVE in 
period t+l, called 'lead' variables, corresponding to the certain wealth variables of the 
model; V, DN, WH, and N. In the case of endogenous international financial mobility 
we also assign expected values to the exchange rate. The reason why the expectations 
are not assigned to all wealth variables is that the other wealth variables can be 
expressed in terms of those used wealth variables. Q can be expressed in V, DN and DE 
and current price. DE can be written in terms of DN and current variables. Next we 
generate an initial path for the lead variables by expanding expectations assignment 
procedure to t=2........ T=75. This is done in EXPFOR. We generally use the new steady 
state values to assign expectations. Once again IFIN is set to indicate a new state 
starting. This time it is assigned to 1. 
We then solve the model for each within-period equilibrium given initial path 
of the lead variables. In solving each within-period equilibrium an initial guess 1* is 
necessary to move on defining the demand for products and assets. the guess of 
investment allows us to calculate net cash flows in the current period based on current 
bond stocks. Solving for industrial debt-equity ratios and in turn using them in obtaining 
cost of finance, given the lead values for V, we can calculate current values for V. The 
next stage now is to calculate current values for Q. Since it can be defined in terms of 
V, DN, and DE, we then need to obtain values for DN and DE. Given the lead value 
for DNW, we calculate current values for DN. Given the nominal depreciable capital 
stock, KT, for the current period, since the values of DE and DN for a given period can 
be related, it is possible to determine DE from this relation. Finally, using the derived 
values for Vt, DNt and DES, we calculate the current value of Q. This value of Q implies 
a certain level of investment. If this values does not match the initial guess of 
investment which helped to generate it, the initial guess is updated and the entire 
001, 
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sequence of derivations is performed again. This procedure is repeated until the initial 
investment guess matches the derived investment level. 
From the optimal debt to equity ratio and the current Q we then derive 
investment adjustment costs, and agency costs. Once adjustment costs and agency costs 
are known, we can calculate each industry's output from the desired input level and the 
current capital stock. Given the lead value for WH, we calculate the current value for 
expected human and transfer wealth. We sum the values of firms' bonds and firms' 
equites and foreign bonds. The human and nonhuman wealth variables allow the 
calculation of total wealth, consumption and savings. 
The within-period equilibrium solution provides a sequence of derived values: SV1, 
SV2............... SVT. We compare our lead variables with contemporaneous derived values 
updating the guesses in a Gauss-Seidel fashion. 
SVEtk-1) = XSV(k)+(l -1)SVEtk) 
where k represents the iteration and X is a parameter between zero and one. The 
procedure generally brings lead and realized values within 0.01 per cent on one another 
within fifty iterations. 
223 
PROGRAM DAGETM 
c Set double precision 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
c Include common block 'dimensions' 
include 'com. lib' 
c Include DATDES. LIB 
include 'datdes. lib' 
c Program 
call expfor 
ifail=O 
c If no print out required, then set iprint=O. 
iprint=O 
c Call NAG subroutine CO5NCF to solve BCALIB, in which we adjust production level 
c in consistent with q-ratios 
call c05ncf(calib, n5, x5, f5, xtol, maxfev, ml5, mu5, epsfcn, diag5 
+ , mode, 
factor, nprint, nfev, fjac5, ldfjac5, r5,1r5, gtf5, w5, ifail) 
if(ifail eq. 0) then 
fnorm=f06ejf(n5, f5,1) 
write(nout, *) 'Endogenous Financial Structure Results' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99999) 'final 2-norm of the residuals=', fnorm 
write(nout, 99998) 'Number of function evaluations=', nfev 
write(nout, *) 'final approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x5(J), j=1, n5) 
else 
write(nout, 99996) 'ifail=', ifail 
if(ifail ge. 2) then 
write(nout, *) 'approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x5(j), j=1, n5) 
end if 
end if 
c Call DISRAT to calculate the pure rate of time preference 
CALL DISRAT 
c Call ADJUST to perform required adjustments to balance output supplies and demands 
CALL ADJUST 
c Assign IPRINT to 1 to print the calibrated values 
iprint=l 
c Call SCALE to scale variables to be printed. First define a scale, which is set 3 digits. 
qmov=l. 0/ld3 
call scale 
call prnt 
C The following commands bring variables' values back to original levels 
gmov= l d3 
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call scale 
C DIGRESSION: We also calculate effective tax rates as suggested by King and 
Fullerton (1984). 
C Effective Tax Rate Analysis (ETRA). To this end call ETRA. 
CALL ETRA 
C Iprint=5 is assigned to print effective tax rates 
iprint=5 
CALL PRNT 
C 
. 
NEW STEADY STATE SOLUTION 
ifin=2 
C 
C Before we advance on the counterfactual equilibrium solution, we check the program 
C To check the program the following statements are used to operate it. 
C 
C We call subroutines EXPFOR to read expectations; PROD, DMND, GVREV and 
OPTN are 
C called to calculate producer, consumer, government and the rest of the world supplies 
and 
C demands 
call expfor 
call prod 
call dmnd 
call gvrev 
call optn 
qmov=l. 0/1 d3 
call scale 
C When print is required, write IPRINT=1. 
iprint=0 
call prnt 
qmov=ld3 
call scale 
C Checking finishes 
C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: iflow=1 means that capital is internationally 
mobile. 
iflow=l 
C Assign terminal year. T+1=nyear=76 
ik=nyear 
C 
C Define replacement policy: 
C IPOLI = The cut in corporate income tax rate 
C IPOL2 = The reduction in capital allowances 
C IPOL3 = The cut in personal income tax rate 
C IPOL4 = The rise in VAT rates 
C IPOL5 = Reform proposals; IPOL5=1 : consumption tax. 
C IPOLs = 1, the policy is unannounced. IPOLs =2 indicates a surprise policy 
ipol l=l 
ipol2=1 
ipol3=1 
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ipol4=1 
ipol5=0 
if(ipoll eq. 1) then 
C Corporate income tax cut 
rctl=0.35 
do 300 i=l, nfirm 
rct(i)=rct 1 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rct(i)=sr(1) *rct l 
end if 
fct(i)=1. -rct(i) 
300 continue 
end if 
ipol1=1 
if(ipol2 eq. 1) then 
C TAX DEPRECIATION RATES 
C First Year Tax Depreciation Rate 
do 310 i=l, nfirm 
rtf 1(i)=0.0 
rtf(i)=rtf 1(i) 
310 continue 
C Initial Tax Depreciation Rate 
do 330 i=l, nfirm 
rti 1(i)=0.0 
rti(i)=rti 1(i) 
330 continue 
C Writind down allowances 
do 340 i=l, nfirm 
if(i eq. 3) then 
rtal (i)=0.25 
else 
rtal(i)=0.5*0.25 
end if 
rta(i)=rta 1(i)*fcap(i, 2)+fcap (i, 3) *0.04 
340 continue 
end if 
ipol2=1 
if(ipol3 eq. 1) then 
C Personal income tax cut 
rmytl=0.25 
rlab=rmytl 
rmyt=rmyt 1 
fmyt= 1.0-rmyt 
C Dividend tax credit 
rdtc 1=0.20 
rdtc=rdtc 1 
fdtc=l. 0-rdtc 
end if 
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ipol3=1 
if(ipol4 eq. 1) then 
do 305 m=l, ncom 
rvtl(m)=2.0*rvt0(m) 
rvt(m)=rvt l (m) 
fvt(m)=1. +rvt(m) 
305 continue 
end if 
ipol4=1 
if(ipol5 eq. 1) then 
rmyt l =0.0 
rlab=rmyt l 
rmyt=rmyt 1 
fmyt=l. 0-rmyt 
rdtc 1=0.0 
rdtc=rdtc 1 
fdtc=1.0-rdtc 
fmyt=1.0-rmyt 
fdtc=l. 0-rdtc 
rcon=0.30 
end if 
C Write asterics for print out 
write(1,13) 
13 format(lx, 63('*')) 
if(iflow eq. 1) then 
write(1, *) ' International capital flows 
end if 
if(ipol4 eq. 1) then 
write(1, *) 'Value Added Tax Rise 
end if 
if(ipol3 eq. 1) then 
write(1, *) ' Personal Income Tax Cut 
end if 
if(ipol2 eq. 1) then 
write(l, *) ' Reducing Capital Allovances 
end if 
if(ipoll eq. 1 and. ipo12 eq. 1) then 
write(1, *) ' Corporate Income Tax Cut and Reducing Depr. ' 
else 
if(ipoll eq. 1) then 
write(1, *) ' Corporate Income Tax Cut 
end if 
end if 
if(ipoll eq. 2) then 
write(1, *) ' Corporate Income Tax Cut-Announced Policy' 
end if 
if(ipol2 eq. 2) then 
write(1, *) ' Reducing Capital Subsidy-Announced Policy' 
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end if 
if(ipol3 eq. 2) then 
write(1, *) ' Personal Income Tax Cut-Announced Policy' 
end if 
write(1, *) 'AFTER REPLACEMENT(SOLUTION GUESS): 
write(1,14) 
14 format(lx, 63('*')) 
C 
C New steady-state solutions 
C 
C Set up prices to be iterated. We iterate 14 variables; 5 output prices, interest rate, 
wage level, 
C exchange rate, income tax parameter (for equal-yield equilibrium) and industry capital 
stocks (for 
C q-ratios) 
do 70 i=l, ngood 
p(i)= 1.0 
p(5+i)=1.0 
p(10+i)=1.0 
x13(i)=p(i) 
pjd(ik, i)=p(i)*(l. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
x13(5+i)=p(5+i) 
scap(ik, i)=p(5+i)*scap0(l, i)*(l. +sgr)**(ik-1) 
70 continue 
x13(11)=p(11) 
plab(ik)=p(11)**(l . +rinf)**(ik- l) 
xl3(12)=p(12) 
rb(ik)=p(12)*rb(1) 
x13(13)=p(13) 
er(ik)=p(13)*er(1) 
if(igovd ne. 2) then 
x13(14)=p(14) 
if(ipol5 ne. 1) then 
ft(ik)=p(14)*ft0*((1.0+rinf)* (1.0+sgr))* *(ik-1) 
else 
ft(ik)=0.0 
rcon=p(14)*0.3 
end if 
end if 
iprint=0 
call c05ncf(lrun, n 13, x 13, f l 3, xtol, maxfev, ml13, mu l3, epsfcn, 
1 diag 13, mode, factor, nprint, nfev, fjac 13, ldfjac 13, rl3, lr13, 
2 qtf 13, w 13, ifail) 
if(ifail eq. 0) then 
fnorm=f06ejf(n5, f5,1) 
write(nout, 99999) 'final 2-norm of the residuals=', fnorm 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99998) 'Number of function evaluations=', nfev 
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write(nout, *) 
write(nout, *) 'final approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x 13(J), j=1, n l3) 
else 
write(nout, 99996) 'ifail=', ifail 
if(ifail ge. 2) then 
write(nout, *) 'approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x13(j), j=1, n13) 
end if 
end if 
C 
C Set the value for the parameter that determines the effect of tax 
C policy on government budget 
pf(ik)=p(14) 
C Call the subroutine 'RESULT' to see the new steady state results 
call result 
qmov=l. 0/ l d3 
call scale 
C Assign IPRINT=2 to print the new steady state results 
iprint=2 
call prnt 
qmov=ld3 
call scale 
ifin=l 
call expfor 
ifin=2 
C Once mobility case is considered, we solve the steady state after each transition (75 
years) 
C This is because one must find the steady-state bondholdings. 
179 iprint=O 
epsfcn=O. OdO 
call c05ncf(lrun, n 13, x 13, f 13, xtol, maxfev, ml 1 3, mu 13, epsfcn, 
1 diag 13, mode, factor, nprint, nfev, fjac 13, ldfjac 13, rl3,1r13, 
2 qtf 13, w 13, ifail) 
if(ifail eq. 0) then 
fnorm=f06ejf(n5, f5,1) 
write(nout, 99999) 'final 2-norm of the residuals=', fnorm 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99998) 'Number of function evaluations=', nfev 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, *) 'final approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x13(J), j=l, n13) 
else 
write(nout, 99996) 'ifail=', ifail 
if(ifail ge. 2) then 
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write(nout, *) 'approximate solution' 
write(nout, *) 
write(nout, 99997) (x13(j), j=1, n13) 
end if 
end if 
call result 
qmov=1.0/ld3 
call scale 
qmov=l d3 
call scale 
C Effective Tax Rate Anaysis (ETRA). To this end call ETRA 
CALL ETRA 
iprint=5 
CALL PRNT 
C 
C TRANSITION CASE SOLUTION 
C 
C Set transition solution 
ifin=1 
C Set accuracy 
epsfcn=ld-3 
C Now We can solve the model 
C Now iteration 
ntrys=75 
do 95 iter=l, ntrys 
niter=iter 
npass=0 
do 100 ik=l, nyear-1 
call polex 
do 110 i=1,9 
if(ik eq. 1) then 
p(1)=1.0 
p(2)=1.0 
p(3)=1.0 
p(4)=1.0 
p(5)=1.0 
p(6)=1.0 
p(7)=1.0 
p(8)=1.0 
p(9)=1.0 
else 
p(i)=P(i) 
end if 
x8(i)=p(i) 
110 continue 
do 120 i=l, ngood 
pjd(ik, i)=p(i)*(1. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
120 continue 
op, 
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plab(ik)=p(6)*(1. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
rb(ik)=p(7)*rb0 
er(ik)=p(9) 
if(igovd ne. 2) then 
if(ipol5 ne. 1) then 
ft(ik)=p(8)*ft0*((1. O+rinf)*(1. O+sgr))**(ik-1) 
else 
ft(ik)=O. O 
rcon=p(9)*0.3 
end if 
end if 
iprint=O 
call c05ncf(srun, n8, x8, f8, ld-6, maxfev, ml8, mu8, epsfcn, diag8, 
1 mode, factor, nprint, nfev, fjac8, ldfjac 8, r8,1r8, gtf8, w8, ifail) 
C 
c Apply Gauss-Seidel method for intertemporal solution 
c 
if(ik gt. 1) then 
do 115 i=l, nsvar 
rms(ik, i)=(sv(ik, i)-sve(ik, i))/sve(ik, i) 
print '(" rms: ", i3, l x, i2, l x, 14f 10.5)', (ik, i, rms(ik, i)) 
if(dabs(rms(ik, i)) It. O. ld-3) then 
npass=l+npass 
end if 
sve(ik, i)=. 75*sv(ik, i)+(1. -. 75)*sve(ik, i) 
sv(ik, i)=sve(ik, i) 
115 continue 
end if 
call result 
print '(" interest: ", lx, i3,12x, f 12.8)', (ik, rb(ik)) 
if(dabs(p(15)) gt. 1.0) then 
c print '(" saving: ", 3x, f 15.6)', (p(15)) 
end if 
C 
C Set the value for the parameter that determines the effect of tax 
C policy on government budget 
pf(ik)=p(9) 
100 continue 
print '(" iteration-Pass: ", lx, 2i6)', (niter, npass) 
if(npass eq. (nsvar)*(nyear-2)) then 
go to 180 
else 
if(iflow eq. 1) then 
ifin=2 
ik=nyear 
go to 179 
end if 
end if 
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95 continue 
180 iprint=3 
qmov=l. 0/ l d3 
call scale 
call prnt 
qmov=l d3 
call scale 
iprint=4 
call util 
call prnt 
write(1,16) niter 
16 format ( number of iteration: ', lx, i6) 
99999 format (l x, a, d 12.4) 
99998 format (1 x, a, i 10) 
99997 format (lx, 5f 12.4) 
99996 format (lx, a, i2) 
stop 
end 
SUBROUTINE PROD 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C CALCULATION OF THE SUPPLY OF GOODS AND THE DEMANDS FOR 
INTERMEDIATE C 
C GOODS AND LABOUR 
C 
C Simplification: 
c 1) Asset Tax Parameter 
fmyt=1.0-rmyt 
rh(ik)=fmyt*rb(ik) 
c 2) Steady-state Growth Rate 
sgrO= 1. +sgr 
sgrc=sgrO**(ik-1) 
C Labour Endowment 
slab(ik) =sgrc *slab( 1) 
C 
C PRICES 
C 
pcap(ik)=O. O 
do 10 i=l, ngood-1 
C Export Prices 
pjz(ik, i)=pjd(ik, i)/er(ik) 
if(itot eq. 1) then 
pjz(ik, i)=(1. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
end if 
I.. 
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C Capital prices 
pcap(ik)=pcap(ik)+ai(i)*pj (ik, i) 
10 continue 
pcap(ik)=pcap(ik)+ai(5)*pj (ik, 5) 
do 15 i=l, nfirm-1 
C Leontief Prices 
pn(i)=O. O 
do 20 j=l, ngood-1 
pn(i)=pn(i)+aj(i, j)*pj(ik, j) 
20 continue 
15 continue 
pn(5)=O. O 
C Capital Stock 
do 30 i=l, nfirm 
if(ik gt. 1 and. ifin eq. 1) then 
scap(ik, i)=scap(ik- l, i)+dinv(ik- l, i)-redep(i)*scap(ik- l, i) 
end if 
C 
C Capital Stock Motions 
C Steady-state Solution 
C 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
dcap(ik, i)=sgr* scap(ik, i) 
dpcap=rinf 
else 
C Intertemporal solution 
dc ap (ik, i)=dinv (ik, i) -redep (i) * sc ap (ik, i) 
end if 
C Steady-state depreciable capital stock 
if(ik gt. 1) then 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
C Depreciable capital stock 
sdep(ik, i)=(sgr+redep(i))*(1. -rtf(i))*(1. -ritc(i)) 
+ *pcap(ik)*scap(ik, i)/((1. +rinf)*(1. +sgr)-(1. -rta(i))) 
C Its intertemporal value 
else 
sdep(ik, i)=(1. -rta(i))*sdep(ik- l, i)+(1. -rtf(i)) 
+ *(1. -ritc(i))*pcap(ik-1)*dinv(ik- l, i) 
end if 
end if 
30 continue 
C Demand for Labour Factor 
tlab(ik)=O. O 
do 40 i=1, nfirm 
dlab(ik, i)=scap(ik, i)*((flt*plab(ik)/(aO(i, 1)*a1(i) 
+ *pjd(ik, i)))**(1.0/(aO(i, 1)-1.0))) 
tlab(ik)=tlab(ik)+dlab(ik, i) 
40 continue 
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C Total retained earnings 
tret(ik)=O. O 
C SUPPLY 
do 50 i=l, nfirm 
vad(i)=al (i)*(dlab(ik, i)**aO(i, 1))*(scap(ik, i)**aO(i, 2)) 
supj (i)=vad(i)/ajv (i) 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
dinv(ik, i)=(aca+(1. /acb)*sq(i))*scap(ik, i) 
end if 
C Calculation of Adjustment Cost Function of Investment 
acf(i)=((acb/2.0)*((dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i)) 
+ -aca)**2.0)/(dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i)) 
C Net Supply 
sup(ik, i)=supj (i)-acf(i) *dinv(ik, i) 
C Earnings of Firms 
earn (ik, i)=((1. -rit(i))*pjd(ik, i)*sup (ik, i)-pn(i)*supj (i) 
1 -flt*plab(ik)*dlab(ik, i))*fct(i)+rct(i)*(rtf(i)+rti(i)) 
2 *pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i)+rct(i)*rta(i)*sdep(ik, i)-rwt(i)* 
3 fcap(i, 3)*(pcap(ik)*scap(ik, i)) 
C 
C DEBT-EQUITY RATIOS 
C 
c l=-agb*(1.0+aga(i)/2.0)*aga(i) 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
rpe(i)=sgrO*(l. +rinf)-1. 
if(i eq. 5) then 
dpr(i)=fdtc*(((1. -0.35)*rbO+erp(i)-(1. -0.5*rgt)* 
+ rpe(i)))/(fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc)) 
else 
dpr(i) =fdtc * ((1. -0.3 5) *rb0+erp (i) -f gt*rpe (i))/fmyt 
end if 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1) then 
rpe(i)=(fmyt*rb(ik)+erp(i)-fmyt*dpr(i)/fdtc)/fgt 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rpe(i)=(fmyt*rb(ik)+erp(i)-(fdtc-sr(1) 
+ *(rmyt-rdtc))*dpr(i)/fdtc)/(1. -0.5*rgt) 
end if 
end if 
c2=dpr(i)+rpe(i) 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
c3=fct(i)*(dpr(i)/fdtc+fgt*rpe(i)/fmyt-erp(i)/fmyt)-c2 
if(i eq. 5) then 
c3=(fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)* ((fdtc-sr(1)* (rmyt-rdtc))*dpr(i) 
+ /fdtc+(1. -0.5 *rgt) *rpe(i)-erp(i))/fmyt-c2 
end if 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1) then 
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c3=fct(i)*rb(ik)-c2 
if(i eq. 5) then 
c3=(fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)*rb(ik)-c2 
end if 
end if 
der(ik, i)=(-agb+sgrt(agb*agb-4.0*agb*(c 1 +c3)/2.0))/agb 
C Agency cost function 
agf(i)=(agb/2. )*((der(ik, i)-aga(i))**2. )/der(ik, i) 
C Cost of Capital 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
rc(ik, i)=((fct(i) * (dpr(i)/fdtc+fgt*rpe(i)/fmyt-erp(i)/fmyt) 
+ +agf(i))*der(ik, i)+c2)/(l. +der(ik, i)) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rc(ik, i)=(((fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)* ((fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc)) 
1 *dpr(i)/fdtc+(1. -0.5*rgt)*rpe(i)-erp(i))/fmyt+agf(i)) 
2 *der(ik, i)+c2)/(1. +der(ik, i)) 
end if 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1) then 
rc(ik, i)=((fct(i) *rb(ik)+agf(i)) *der(ik, i)+c2)/(1. +der(ik, i)) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rc(ik, i)=(((fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)*rb(ik)+agf(i)) 
+ *der(ik, i)+c2)/(l. +der(ik, i)) 
end if 
end if 
C 
C Total Investment Expenditures 
vexp(i)=fitc(i)*pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i) 
C 
C CALCULATION OF MARKET VALUES OF THE FIRMS 
C 
C FIRST: Depreciation allowances on new capital 
C Steady-state value 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
sv(ik, i)=rct(i)*rta(i)/(rta(i)+rc(ik, i)) 
C Intertemporal value 
else 
sv(ik, i)=((1. -rta(i))*sv(ik+l, i)+rct(i)*rta(i))/ 
+ (1. +rc(ik, i)) 
end if 
C SECOND: Depreciation allowances on existing capital 
de(i)=(1. -rta(i))*sdep(ik, i)* 
+ (sv(ik, i)+rct(i)*rta(i)/(1. -rta(i))) 
C Investment incentives 
dn(i)=(ritc (i)+rct(i)* (rtf(i)+rti(i)) +sv (ik, i)) 
C THIRD: Market value of firms 
C Steady-state value 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
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sv(ik, 5+i)=(earn(ik, i)-vexp(i))/ 
+ ((l. +rc(ik, i))-(l. +rinf)*(1. +sgr)) 
C Intertemporal value 
else 
sv(ik, 5+i)=(sv(ik+1,5+i)+earn(ik, i)-vexp(i))/(l. +rc(ik, i)) 
end if 
C Bond Stock of Firms 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
bond (ik, i)=der(ik, i)*sv(ik, 5+i)/(1. +der(ik, i)) 
else 
if(ik gt. 1) then 
bond(ik, i)=bond(ik- l, i)+dbond(ik-1, i) 
end if 
end if 
C Equity Stocks 
segy(ik, i)=sv (ik, 5+i)-bond(ik, i) 
C Dividend Payments 
div (ik, i)=dpr(i) * seqy(ik, i) 
fv(ik, i)=sv(ik, 5+i) 
C Retained Earnnings 
if(i eq. 5) then 
ret(ik, i)=earn(ik, i)-div(ik, i)-(agf(i) 
+ +(fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)*rb(ik))*bond(ik, i) 
else 
ret(ik, i)=earn(ik, i)-div(ik, i)-(agf(i)+fct(i)*rb(ik)) 
+ *bond(ik, i) 
end if 
C Total retained earnings 
tret(ik) =tret(ik)+ret(ik, i) 
C New Bond Issues of Firms 
dbond(ik, i)=vexp(i)-ret(ik, i) 
CQ Ratios 
q(ik, i)=((sv(ik, 5+i)-de(i))/(pcap(ik)*scap(ik, i)) 
1 -1.0+dn(i))*(pcap(ik)/(pjd(ik, i)*(1. O-rct(i)))) 
C 
C Now We can Calculate Investment Demand 
dinv(ik, i)=(aca+(1. /acb)*q(ik, i)) * scap(ik, i) 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
dinv(ik, i)=(aca+(1. /acb)*sq(i))*scap(ik, i) 
end if 
acf(i)=((acb/2.0)*(dabs(dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i)) 
1 -aca)**2.0)/(dabs(dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i))) 
sup (ik, i)=supj (i)- acf(i) *dinv(ik, i) 
50 continue 
C Demand for intermediate goods 
do 60 i=l, nfirm-1 
do 70 j=l, ngood-1 
demji(i, j)=aj(i, j)*supj(i) 
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70 continue 
60 continue 
return 
end 
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SUBROUTINE DMND 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C CALCULATION OF TOTAL WEALTH 
C 
C Nonhuman Wealth And Current Capital Income 
we(ik) =O. O 
wb(ik) =O. O 
tdb(ik )=O. O 
wv(ik) =O. O 
tv(ik)= O. O 
yk(ik) =O. O 
p(l9)= 0.0 
dcpi(ik)=O. O 
do 10 i=l, nfirm 
we(ik)=we(ik)+seqy(ik, i) 
wb(ik)=wb(ik)+bond(ik, i) 
p(19)=p(19)+agf(i)*bond(ik, i) 
tdb(ik)=tdb(ik)+dbond(ik, i) 
dv (ik, i) =rpe(i) * seqy (ik, i) 
tv(ik)=tv(ik)+fv(ik, i) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
wv (ik)=wv (ik)+0.5 *dv (ik, i) 
yk(ik)=yk(ik)+(fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc))*div(ik, i)/fdtc 
+ +(1. -0.5*rgt)*dv(ik, i) 
else 
wv (ik) =wv (ik) +dv (ik, i) 
yk(ik)=yk(ik)+fmyt*div(ik, i)/fdtc+fgt*dv(ik, i) 
end if 
dcpi(ik)=dcpi(ik)+ac 1(i)*pjd(ik, i)/((1. +rin f)**(ik-1)) 
10 continue 
C 
C Closure Rule 
C International Capital Flows 
if(iflow eq. 1. and. ik . gt. 
1) then 
bondw(ik)=bondw(ik- 1)+dbondw(ik- 1) 
wbond(ik)=wbond(ik- 1)+dwbond(ik- 1) 
end if 
wb(ik)=wb(ik)+bondg(ik)+er(ik)*bondw(ik)-wbond(ik) 
tdb(ik)=tdb(ik)+dbondg(ik) 
C Rate of Return on Equities 
re(ik)=yk(ik)/we(ik) 
C Portfolio Share: Bond Share 
bps=we(ik)/(we(ik)+wb(ik)) 
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C Average After-tax Return on the Household Portfolio 
rp(ik)=rh(ik)*(1. -bps)+bps*re(ik) 
if(ifin eq. 1 and. iflow eq. 1) then 
rp(ik)=(1. -bps)*(rh(ik)*(wb(ik)-er(ik)*bondw(ik))/wb(ik) 
1 +((1. -0.35)*rw+(sv(ik+1,12)-er(ik))/er(ik))*er(ik) 
2 *bondw(ik)/wb(ik))+bps*re(ik) 
end if 
C 
C CALCULATION OF COMPOSITE CONSUMPTION 
C 
C First: Composite Good Price 
C Conversion of producer prices into consumer prices 
pjj(ik, 1)=pj(ik, 1) 
do 12 i=2,5 
pjj(ik, i)=pj(ik, 2) 
12 continue 
do 13 i=6,21 
pjj(ik, i)=pj(ik, 3) 
13 continue 
do 14 i=22, ncom-1 
pjj (ik, i)=pj (ik, 4) 
14 continue 
pjj (ik, 28)=pj (ik, 5) 
pc(ik)=1.0 
pg(ik)=O. O 
do 15 m=l, ncom 
pc(ik)=pc(ik)*((pjj(ik, m)*fvt(m)*fst(m)) 
+ /ac(m))**ac(m) 
pg(ik)=pg(ik)+ag(m)*pjj (ik, m) 
15 continue 
yk(ik)=0.0 
tdiv(ik)=0.0 
do 20 i=l, ngood-1 
yk(ik)=yk(ik)+fmyt*(div(ik, i)/fdtc+rb(ik)*bond(ik, i)) 
+ +fgt*dv(ik, i) 
tdiv (ik)=tdiv (ik)+div (ik, i) 
20 continue 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
sv(ik+1,12)=er(ik) 
end if 
tdiv(ik)=tdiv(ik)+sr(1)*div(ik, 5) 
yk(ik)=yk(ik)+(fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc))*div(ik, 5)/fdtc 
1 +fmyt*rb(ik)*(bond(ik, 5)-wbond(ik))+((1. -0.35) 
2 *er(ik)*rw+(sv(ik+1,12)-er(ik)))*bondw(ik) 
3 +(1. -0.5*rgt)*dv(ik, 5)+fmyt*rb(ik)*bondg(ik) 
C Secon: Human Wealth: The present value of after tax labour 
C income and transfers 
tran(ik)=(tran(1) *(sgrO*(l . +rinf)) 
* *(ik-1)) 
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if(ifin eq. 2) then 
sv(ik, 11 )=(l . +rp(ik))*(tran(ik)-(l . +rcon)*pc(ik)*adem(ik)+p(19) 
+ +(1. -rlab)*plab(ik)*slab(ik))/((l. +rp(ik))-(l . +rinf)*sgrO) 
wh(ik)=sv(ik, 11 )-(l . +rp(ik))*(tran(ik)+p(19)-(l . +rcon) 
+ *pc(ik)*adem(ik))/((l . +rp(ik))-(l. +rinf)*sgrO) 
else 
sv(ik, 11)=(1. -rlab)*plab(ik)*slab(ik)+tran(ik)-(l. +rcon) 
+ *pc(ik)*adem(ik)+p(19)+sv(ik+1,11)/(l . +rp(ik)) 
awh=(1. -rlab)*plab(ik)*slab(ik)/(tran(ik)+p(19)+(1. -rlab) 
+ *plab(ik)*slab(ik)-(l. +rcon)*pc(ik)*adem(ik)) 
wh(ik)=(1. -rlab)*plab(ik)*slab(ik)+awh*sv(ik+1,11)/(l . +rp(ik)) 
end if 
wk(ik)=we(ik)+wb(ik) 
C 
C Third: The ratio of consumption to wealth 
C 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
sv(ik, 13)=(((1. +rcon)*pc(ik))**(1. -esh))/(1. -(((1. +rinf) 
+ **(1. -esh))*((1. +stp)**(-esh))*((1. +rp(ik))**(esh-1. )))) 
else 
sv(ik, 13)=(((l. +rcon)*pc(ik))**(1. -esh))+((l. +stp)**(-esh))* 
+ ((1. +rp(ik))**(esh-1. ))*sv(ik+1,13) 
end if 
rcw=(((l. +rcon)*pc(ik))**(esh-1. ))*sv(ik, 13) 
C Forth: Present discounted value of income tax intercept 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
sv(ik, 14)=(l . +rp(ik))*ft(ik)/((l. +rp(ik))-(l . +rinf)*sgrO) 
else 
sv(ik, 14)=ft(ik)+sv(ik+1,14)/(1 . +rp(ik)) 
end if 
C Fifth: Total Wealth 
tw(ik)=we(ik)+wb(ik)+sv(ik, 1 1)+sv(ik, 14)+yk(ik) 
C 
C Now we can calculate composite consumption 
C 
cdem(ik)=tw(ik)/((l. +rcon) *pc (ik) *rcw) 
+ +((l . +rcon)*adem(ik)) 
if(esh eq. 1.0) then 
cdem(ik)=stp*tw(ik)/((1. +rcon) *pc(ik)* (1. +stp)) 
+ +((1. +rcon)*adem(ik)) 
end if 
if(model eq. 1) then 
cdem(ik)=(a*tw(ik)/((1. +rcon)*pc (ik) *rcw)) 
+ +((l. +rcon)*adem(ik)) 
slab(ik)=elab(ik)-(cdem(ik)-adem(ik))* (l . +rcon) 
+ *(1. -a)*pc(ik)/(a*(1. -rlab)*plab(ik)) 
end if 
C 
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C Calculation of instantaneous utility level at the revised case 
C 
ul(ik)=(esh/(esh- 1. ))*((cdem(ik)-adem(ik))**((esh- 1. )/esh)) 
C Consumption of Specific Consumer Goods 
do 35 m=l, ncom 
demc j (m) =ac (m) *pc (ik) *cdem(ik) 
+ /(pjj(ik, m)*fvt(m)*fst(m)) 
35 continue 
C Converting consumer goods into producer goods 
demc (ik, 1)=demcj (1) 
demc(ik, 2)=O. O 
do 36 i=2,5 
demc (ik, 2)=demc(ik, 2)+demcj (i) 
36 continue 
demc(ik, 3)=O. O 
do 37 i=6,21 
demc(ik, 3)=demc(ik, 3)+demcj (i) 
37 continue 
demc(ik, 4)=O. O 
do 38 i=22, ncom-1 
demc (ik, 4)=demc (ik, 4)+demcj (i) 
38 continue 
demc (ik, 5)=demcj (2 8) 
C Disposable Income 
yd(ik)=O. O 
do 40 i=l, ngood-1 
yd(ik)=yd(ik)+fmyt*div(ik, i)/fdtc+fmyt*rb(ik)*bond(ik, i) 
40 continue 
yd (ik)=yd (ik) -rgt* wv (ik)+fmyt* (sr (1) * div (ik, 5))/fdtc 
1 +fmyt*rb(ik)*(bond(ik, 5)-wbond(ik))+((1. -0.35) 
2 *er(ik)*rw+(0.0))*bondw(ik)+(1. -sr(1))*div(ik, 5) 
3 +( 1. -rlab) *plab(ik) * slab(ik)+ft(ik)+p (19)+tran(ik) 
4 +fmyt*rb(ik)*bondg(ik) 
C Savings 
sav(ik)=yd(ik)-(1. +rcon)*pc(ik)*cdem(ik) 
C Government Expenditures on Indivudiual Commodities 
do 50 m=l, ncom 
demgj (ik, m)=sgrc*demgj (l, m) 
50 continue 
C Converting consumer goods demanded by government 
C into producer goods 
demg(ik, 1)=demgj (ik, l) 
demg(ik, 2)=O. O 
do 51 i=2,5 
demg(ik, 2)=demg(ik, 2)+demgj (ik, i) 
51 continue 
demg(ik, 3)=0.0 
do 52 i=6,21 
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demg(ik, 3)=demg(ik, 3)+demgj (ik, i) 
52 continue 
demg(ik, 4)=O. O 
do 53 i=22, ncom-1 
demg(ik, 4)=demg(ik, 4)+demgj (ik, i) 
53 continue 
C Total production and capital formation 
tsup(ik)=O. O 
gdpn(ik)=O. O 
tcap(ik)=O. O 
tacf=0.0 
p(l8)=0.0 
p(17)=0.0 
p(16)=0.0 
p(15)=0.0 
tinv(ik)=0.0 
tret(ik)=0.0 
do 60 i=l, nfirm 
tsup(ik)=tsup(ik)+sup(ik, i) 
gdpn (ik)=gdpn (ik) +( 1. -rit(i)) *pj d(ik, i) *sup (ik, i) 
+ -pn(i)*supj(i) 
tcap(ik)=tcap(ik)+scap(ik, i) 
tacf=tacf+acf(i) 
p(l 8)=p(l 8)+div(ik, i) 
p(17)=p(17)+de(i) 
tiny (ik)=tinv (ik)+dinv (ik, i) 
tret(ik)=tret(ik)+ret(ik, i) 
p(l 6)=p(l 6)+sdep(ik, i) 
p(l 5)=p(l 5)+earn(ik, i) 
60 continue 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE GVREV 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C Simplification: Steady-state Growth Rate 
sgrO=1. +sgr 
sgrc=sgrO**(ik-1) 
C Import Duties 
tmt=0.0 
dcpi(ik)=O. O 
do 10 i=l, ngood 
tmt=tmt+rmt(i) *pjm(ik, i) *demm(ik, i) 
dcpi(ik)=dcpi(ik)+ac 1(i)*pjd(ik, i)/((l . +rin 
f)**(ik-1)) 
10 continue 
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C Intermediate Taxes 
tit=0.0 
do 20 i=1, nfirm 
tit=tit+rit(i) *pj d(ik, i) *sup (ik, i) 
20 continue 
C Value Added Taxes 
tvt=0.0 
do 30 m=l, ncom 
tvt=tvt+rvt(m) *pj j (ik, m) *f st(m) *demcj (m) 
30 continue 
C Value Added Taxes 
tst=0.0 
do 35 m=l, ncom 
tst=tst+rst(m)*pjj (ik, m)*demcj (m) 
35 continue 
C Corporate taxes 
tct=0.0 
do 40 i=l, nfirm 
if(i eq. 2) then 
tct=tct+rct(i) *((1. -rpt)*((1. -rit(i))*pjd(ik, i)*sup (ik, i) 
1 -pn(i)*supj(i)-plab(ik)*flt*dlab(ik, i))-rb(ik)*bond(ik, i)) 
2 -rct(i)*((rtf(i)+rti(i))*pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i)+rta(i) 
3 *sdep(ik, i))-ritc(i)*pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i) 
else 
tct=tct+rct(i) * (( 1. -rit(i))*pj d(ik, i) * sup(ik, i)-pn(i) 
1 *supj(i)-plab(ik)*flt*dlab(ik, i)-rb(ik)*bond (ik, i)) 
2 -rct(i)*((rtf(i)+rti(i))*pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i)+rta(i) 
3 *sdep(ik, i))-ritc(i)*pcap(ik)*dinv(ik, i) 
end if 
40 continue 
C Capital Gains Taxes 
tgt=0.0 
do 50 i=l, nfirm 
if(i eq. 5) then 
tgt=tgt+0.5*rgt*dv(ik, i) 
else 
tgt=tgt+rgt*dv (ik, i) 
end if 
50 continue 
C Labour Taxes 
tlt=0.0 
do 60 i=1, nfirm 
tlt=tlt+rlt*plab(ik) *dlab(ik, i) 
60 continue 
C Personel Income Taxes 
tyt=-(ft(ik)/fmyt)+rmyt* (yd(ik)+rgt*wv(ik)-tran(ik) 
1 -(1. -sr(1))*div(ik, 5)-p(19)-((1. -0.35)*er(ik)*rw+(0.0 
2 ))*bondw(ik))/fmyt-rdtc*tdiv(ik)/fdtc-rmyt*sr(3) 
ýk 
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3 *rb(ik)*bond(ik, 5) 
if(ipol5 eq. 1) then 
tyt=rcon*(yd(ik)-sav(ik))/(1. +rcon) 
end if 
C Wealth Taxes 
twt=0.0 
do 70 i=l, nfirm 
twt=twt+rwt(i)*fcap(i, 3)*pcap(ik)*scap(ik, i) 
70 continue 
C Petroleum Revenue Tax 
tpt=rpt*((1. -rit(2))*pjd(ik, 2)*sup(ik, 2) 
+ -pn(2)* supj (2)-flt*plab(ik)*dlab(ik, 2)) 
C Total Taxes 
tax (ik) =tmt+tit+tvt+tst+tct+tlt+tgt+tyt+twt+tpt 
C Base case Transfer Payments to Household 
if(ifin eq. 0) then 
gexp(1)=tax(1)-tran(1) 
C Government Expenditures 
do 75 m=l, ncom 
demgj (ik, m)=ag(m)* (tax(ik)-tran(ik))/pjj (ik, m) 
75 continue 
else 
C Government Expenditures 
gexp(ik)=O. O 
do 80 m=l, ncom 
demgj(ik, m)=demgj(l, m)*(sgr0*(1. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
gexp(ik)=gexp(ik)+pj j (ik, m)*demgj (ik, m)/((1. +rinf)* *(ik-1)) 
80 continue 
C Converting consumer goods demanded by the government 
C into producer goods 
demg(ik, 1)=demgj (ik, 1) 
demg(ik, 2)=0.0 
do 120 i=2,5 
demg(ik, 2)=demg(ik, 2)+demgj (ik, i) 
120 continue 
demg(ik, 3)=0.0 
do 130 i=6,21 
demg(ik, 3)=demg(ik, 3)+demgj (ik, i) 
130 continue 
demg(ik, 4)=0.0 
do 140 i=22, ncom-1 
demg(ik, 4)=demg(ik, 4)+demgj (ik, i) 
140 continue 
demg(ik, 5)=demgj(ik, 28) 
sv(ik, 12)=er(ik) 
return 
end 
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SUBROUTINE OPEN 
include 'com. lib' 
C Capital flows 
if(iflow eq. 1) then 
if(ifin eq. 1) then 
dbondf=(((l. +sgr)*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1))*bond0 
+ *((1. -0.35)*rw+(sv(ik+1,12)-er(ik))/er(ik)-fmyt*rb(ik)) 
if(dbondf gt. 0.0) then 
dbondw(ik)=dbondf 
dwbond(ik)=0.0 
tdb(ik)=tdb(ik)+dbondw(ik)/er(ik) 
else 
dwbond(ik)=(-1. )*dbondf 
dbondw(ik)=0.0 
tdb(ik)=tdb(ik)-dwbond(ik) 
end if 
else 
dbondw(ik)=O. O 
end if 
end if 
return 
end 
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SUBROUTINE BPROD 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C Simplification 
sgrO=1.0+sgr 
C Interest Rate 
rh(ik)=fmyt*rb(ik) 
dpcap=rinf 
C Initial Investment Level 
tinv(ik)=O. O 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
dinv (ik, i) =(sgr+redep (i)) * sc ap (ik, i) 
tiny (ik)=tinv (ik)+dinv (ik, i) 
C Tobin Tax AdJusted Q-Ratio 
sq(i)=((dinv (ik, i)/scap(ik, i))-aca) * acb 
C Depreciable capital stock 
sdep(ik, i)=(sgr+redep(i)) * (1. -rti(i))* (1. -ritc(i)) 
1 *scap(ik, i)/((l. +rinf)*(l . +sgr)-(1. -rta(i))) C Equation of Motion for Capital 
dcap(ik, i)=dinv(ik, i)-redep(i)* scap(ik, i) 
C Adjustment Cost Function 
acf(i)=((acb/2. )*(dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i)-aca)**2) 
1 /(dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i)) 
C Net Supply 
supj (i)=vad(i)/ajv(i) 
sup (ik, i)=supj (i)-acf(i) *dinv(ik, i) 
20 continue 
C PRICES 
C Import Prices 
do 30 j=l, ngood-1 
pj m(ik, j)=pw() *er(ik) 
C Export Prices 
pj z(ik, j)=pjd(ik, j)/er(ik) 
C Export 
ddem(ik, j)=sup(ik, j)-demzO(ik, j) 
C Import Share Parameters 
a 10=((demmO(ik, j)/ddem(ik, j))**(1.0/esm(j)))*pjm(ik, j) 
+ /pjd(ik, j) 
am(j, 1)=a 10/(1. O+a 10) 
am(j, 2)=1.0-am(j, l) 
C Composite Prices (of Import and Domestic Goods) 
a20=(am(j, l)**esm(j))*(pjm(ik, j))**(1. O-esm(j)) 
a30=(am(j, 2)**esm(j))*(pjd(ik, j))**(1.0-esm(j)) 
am 1(j)=((a20+a30)**(1. /(1.0-esm(j))))/pj(ik, j) 
30 continue 
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aml(5)=1.0 
do 35 i=l, nfirm-1 
pn(i)=0.0 
do 40 j=l, ngood-1 
C Leontief Prices 
pn(i)=pn(i)+aj (i, j)*pj (ik, j) 
C Input Demand 
demj i (i, j) =aj (i, j) * sup j (i ) 
40 continue 
35 continue 
C Total retained earnings 
tret(ik)=0.0 
pn(5)=0.0 
gdpn0(ik)=0.0 
tsup0(ik)=0.0 
tcap(ik)=0.0 
do 45 i=l, nfirm 
C Production Share Parameter 
aO(i, 1)=flt*dlab(ik, i)/(vad(i)) 
aO(i, 2)=1. -aO(i, l) 
C Efficiency Parameter 
al(i)=vad(i)/((dlab(ik, i)**aO(i, 1))*(scap(ik, i)**aO(i, 2))) 
C Earnings 
earn (ik, i)=((1. -rit(i))*pjd(ik, i)*sup (ik, i)-pn(i)*supj(i) 
1 -flt*plab(ik)*dlab(ik, i))*fct(i)+rct(i)*(rtf(i)+rti(i)) 
2 *dinv(ik, i)+rct(i)*rta(i)*sdep(ik, i)- 
3 rwt(i)*(fcap(i, 3)*scap(ik, i)) 
C Total Investment Expenditures 
vexp(i)=fitc(i) *dinv (ik, i) 
C Dividend payout ratio 
rpe(i)=sgrO*(1. +rinf)-1. 
if(i eq. 5) then 
dpr (i) =f dtc * ((fmyt*rb (ik) +erp (i) - (1. -0.5 * rgt) * 
+ rpe(i)))/(fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc)) 
else 
dpr(i)=fdtc*(fmyt*rb(ik)+erp(i)-fgt*rpe(i))/fmyt 
end if 
C Agency Cost Parameter 
c1 =dpr(i)+rpe(i) 
c2=agb*der(ik, i)+(agb*der(ik, i) *der(ik, i)/2. ) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
c3=c 1-(fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)*((fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc))*dpr(i) 
+ /fdtc+(1. -0.5 *rgt) *rpe(i)-erp (i))/fmyt 
else 
c3=c 1-fct(i)*(dpr(i)/fdtc+fgt*rpe(i)/fmyt-erp(i)/fmyt) 
end if 
aga(i)=(-agb+sgrt(agb*agb-4. *agb*(c3-c2)/2. ))/agb 
C Agency Cost Function 
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agf(i)=(agb/2. )*((der(ik, i)-aga(i))**2. )/der(ik, i) 
C Cost of Capital 
rc(ik, i)=((fct(i)*rb(ik)+agf(i))*der(ik, i)+rpe(i)+dpr(i)) 
+ /(l . +der(ik, 
i)) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rc(ik, i)=(((fct(i)-sr(3)*rmyt)*rb(ik)+agf(i)) 
+ *der(l, i)+rpe(i)+dpr(i))/(l. +der(l, i)) 
end if 
C CALCULATION OF MARKET VALUE OF FIRMS 
C Depreciation allowances on new capital 
sv(ik, i)=rct(i)*rta(i)/(rta(i)+rc(ik, i)) 
C Investment incentives 
dn(i)=(ritc(i)+rct(i)*(rtf(i)+rti(i))+sv(ik, i)) 
C Depreciation allowances on existing capital 
de(i)=(1. -rta(i))*sdep(l, i)* 
+ (sv(l, i)+rct(i)*rta(i)/(1. -rta(i))) C Market value of firms 
sv(1,5+i)=(earn(ik, i)-vexp(i))/ 
+ ((1. +rc(ik, i))-(l. +rinf)*(l. +sgr)) 
fv(l, i)=sv(1,5+i) 
C Bond Stock of Firms 
bond(ik, i)=der(l, i)*sv(1,5+i)/(1. +der(l, i)) 
C Calculate bond/capital ratio (Gearing ratio) 
dcr(i)=bond(ik, i)/scap(ik, i) 
C Equity Stocks 
seqy(ik, i)=sv(1,5+i)/(l. +der(l, i)) 
C Dividend Payments 
div (ik, i)=dpr(i) * seqy(ik, i) 
C Retained Earnnings 
if(i eq. 5) then 
ret(ik, i)=earn(ik, i)-div(ik, i)-(agf(i)+(fct(i) 
+ -sr(3)*rmyt)*rb(ik))*bond(ik, i) 
else 
ret(ik, i) =earn (ik, i)-div (ik, i) - (agf(i) +fct(i) *rb(ik)) 
+ *bond(ik, i) 
end if 
tret(ik)=tret(ik)+ret(ik, i) 
C New Bond Issues of Firms 
dbond(ik, i)=(sgr0*(l. +rinf)-1. )*bond(ik, i) 
dbond(ik, i)=vexp (i)-ret(ik, i) 
C Equation of Motion for Market Value of Firms 
dv(l, i)=rpe(i)* segy(l , 
i) 
CQ Ratios 
q(ik, i)=((sv(ik, 5+i)-de(i))/(pcap(ik)*scap(ik, i)) 
1 -1.0+dn(i))* (pcap(ik)/(pjd(ik, i)* (1.0-rct(i)))) 
C Assign Base Year Values to certain variables 
earn0(l, i)=earn(l, i) 
v0(1, i)=fv(l, i) 
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sO(l, i)=segy(l, i) 
derO(l, i)=der(l, i) 
rcO(l, i)=rc(l, i) 
dinvO(l, i)=dinv(l, i) 
supO(l, i)=sup(l, i) 
gdpnO(1)=gdpn0(ik)+(1. -rit(i))*pjd(ik, i)*sup (ik, i) 
+ -pn(i)*supj(i) 
tsup0(1)=tsup0(1)+sup(l, i) 
scapO(l, i)=scap(l, i) 
tcap(1)=tcap(1)+scap(l, i) 
dlabO(l, i)=dlab(l, i) 
45 continue 
rbO=rb(1) 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE BDMND 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C Simplification 
sgrO=1.0+sgr 
C 
C Composite Good Price 
C 
C Conversion of producer prices into consumer prices 
pjj(ik, l)=pj(1,1) 
do 101 i=2,5 
pjj (ik, i)=pj (1,2) 
101 continue 
do 102 i=6,21 
PJj(ik, i)=PJ(1,3) 
102 continue 
do 103 i=22, ncom-1 
pjj (ik, i)=pj (1,4) 
103 continue 
pjj(ik, 28)=pj(1,5) 
pc(ik)=1.0 
do 105 m=l, ncom 
pc(ik)=pc(ik)*(pjj (ik, m)*fvt(m)*fst(m) 
+ /ac(m))**ac(m) 
105 continue 
slab(1)=0.0 
do 10 i=l, ngood 
slab (1)=slab(1)+dlab( l, i) 
10 continue 
elab(1)=1.5*slab(1) 
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C 
C TOTAL WEALTH OF THE CONSUMER 
C 
C Nonhuman Wealth And Current Capital Income 
we(1)=0. 
wb(1)=0. 
tdb(1)=0. 
yk(1)=0. 
wv(1)=0. 
tv(1)=0. 
p(19)=0.0 
tdemmO(ik)=0.0 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
we(1)=we(1)+segy(l, i) 
wb(1)=wb(1)+bond(l, i) 
tdb(1)=tdb(1)+dbond(l, i) 
if(i eq. 5) then 
yk(1)=yk(1)+(fdtc-sr(1)*(rmyt-rdtc))*div(l, i)/fdtc 
+ +(1. -0.5*rgt)*dv(l, i) 
wv(1)=wv(1)+0.5*dv(l, i) 
else 
yk(1)=yk(1)+fmyt*div(l, i)/fdtc+fgt*dv(l, i) 
wv(1)=wv(1)+dv(1, i) 
end if 
tv(1)=tv(1)+fv(1, i) 
p(19)=p(19)+agf(i)*bond(ik, i) 
tdemmO(ik)=tdemmO(ik)+demmO(ik, i) 
20 continue 
wb(1)=wb(1)+bondg(1) 
tdb(1)=tdb(1)+dbondg(1) 
C Rate of Return on Equities 
re(1)=yk(1)/we(1) 
C Portfolio Share: Bond Share 
bps=wb(1)/(we(1)+wb(1)) 
C Average After-tax Return on the Household Portfolio 
rp(ik)=bps*rh(ik)+(1. -bps) *re(ik) 
C Pure time preference 
stp=(((1. +rh(ik))/(sgr0*(1. +rinf))**esh)-1.0 
C Human Wealth 
sv(ik, l 1)=(l . +rh(ik))*(tran(ik)+p(19)+fmyt*slab(1))/ 
+ ((l . +rh(ik))-(1. 
O+rinf)*sgrO) 
wk(ik)=wb(ik)+we(ik) 
C The ratio of consumtion to wealth 
sv(ik, 13)=((pc(ik))**(1. -esh))/(1. -((((l . +rinf))**(1. -esh)) 
+ *((l. +stp)**(-esh))*((1. +rp(ik))**(esh-1. )))) 
rcw=(pc(ik)**(esh- 1. ))*sv(ik, 13) 
C National Income 
yd(l)=O. 
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yk(1)=0.0 
tdiv(ik)=O. O 
do 30 i=l, ngood-1 
yd(1)=yd(1)+div(l, i)/fdtc+(rb(1))*bond (1, i) 
yk(1)=yk(1)+fmyt*(div(l, i)/fdtc+rb(1)*bond(1, i)) 
+ +fgt*dv(1, i) 
tdiv(ik)=tdiv(ik)+div(1, i) 
30 continue 
tdiv(ik)=tdiv(ik)+sr(1)*div(1,5) 
yd(1)=yd(1)+sr(1)*div(1,5)/fdtc+rb(1)*bond (1,5) 
+ +slab( 1)+rb(ik) * bondg (ik) 
yk(1)=yk(1)+(fdtc-sr(1) *(rmyt-rdtc))*div(1,5)/fdtc 
1 +fmyt*rb(1)*(bond(1,5))+(1. -0.5*rgt) 
2 *dv(1,5) 
C Income Tax Intercept 
ryt=(tyt+rmyt* sr(3)*rb(ik)*bond(ik, 5 ))/yd(1) 
ftO=rmyt*yd(1)-ryt*yd(1)-rdtc*tdiv(ik)/fdtc 
ft(ik)=ftO 
C The present value of income tax intercept 
sv(ik, 14)=(l . +rh(ik))*ftO/((1. +rh(ik))+0.0-(l. +rinf)*sgrO) C Disposable Income 
yd(l)=ft(ik)+fmyt*yd(1)+tran(ik)+p(19) 
+ +(1. -sr(1))*div(ik, 5)-rgt*wv(1) 
C Now Total Wealth 
tw(ik)=we(ik)+wb(ik)+sv(ik, 11)+sv(ik, 14)+yk(ik) 
cdem(ik) =tw (ik)/(pc (ik) *rcw) 
if(esh eq. 1.0) then 
cdem(ik)=stp*tw(ik)/(pc(ik)*(1. +stp)) 
end if 
adem(ik)=0.75 *cdem(ik) 
wh(ik)=sv(ik, 11)-(1. +rp(ik))* (tran(ik)+p(19)) 
+ /((1. +rp(ik))-(1. +rinf)*sgrO) 
rfdisO=wk(ik)/wh(ik) 
radisO=wb(ik)/we(ik) 
C 
C Assign total wealth to two, which will be used to welfare assessment 
C 
two=tw(ik)-(1. +rh(ik)) *pc(ik) *adem(ik)/ 
+ ((1. +rh(ik))-(1.0+rin f)*sgrO) 
demcj(28)=sup(ik, 5)-demzO(ik, 5) 
ac(28)=(1. +rvt(28))*(1. +rst(28))*pjj(ik, 28)*demcj(28) 
+ /(pc(ik)*cdem(ik)) 
acsum=0.0 
do 15 i=l, ncom-1 
ac sum=ac sum+ac (i) 
15 continue 
do 25 m=l, ncom-1 
ac(m)=ac(m)*(1. O-ac(28))/acsum 
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25 continue 
ac sum=0.0 
do 35 m=l, ncom 
ac sum=ac sum+ac (m) 
35 continue 
C Savings 
sav (ik)=yd(ik)-pc (ik) *cdem(ik) 
C Consumption of Specific Consumer Goods 
do 45 m=l, ncom 
demcj (m)=ac(m)* (yd(ik)-sav(ik)) 
+ /(pjj(ik, m)*fvt(m)*fst(m)) 
45 continue 
C Converting consumer goods into producer goods 
demc (ik, l)=demcj (1) 
demc(ik, 2)=O. O 
do 46 i=2,5 
demc(ik, 2)=demc(ik, 2)+demcj (i) 
46 continue 
demc(ik, 3)=O. O 
do 47 i=6,21 
demc (ik, 3)=demc(ik, 3)+demcj (i) 
47 continue 
demc(ik, 4)=O. O 
do 48 i=22, ncom-1 
demc(ik, 4)=demc(ik, 4)+demcj (i) 
48 continue 
demc(ik, 5)=demcj (28) 
C Assign Base Year Values 
savO(ik)=sav(1) 
cdemO(1)=cdem(1) 
pcO=pc(1) 
tdemz(ik)=O. O 
do 50 i=l, ngood-1 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+demz0(ik, i) 
50 continue 
do 60 i=1, ngood-1 
az(i)=demz0(ik, i)/tdemz(ik) 
60 continue 
uO=0.0 
do 70 k=l, nyear 
C 
C Calculation of instantaneous utility level at the base case 
C 
ul(k)=(esh/(esh-1. ))*(((sgrO**(k-1))*(cdem(1)-adem(1))) 
+ **((esh-1. )/esh)) 
C 
C Calculation of intertemporal utility level at the base case 
C 
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uO=uO+ul(k)/((l. +stp)**(k-1)) 
70 continue 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE BGEXP 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
gexp(ik)=0.0 
do 10 m=l, ncom 
gexp(ik)=gexp(ik)+demgj(ik, m) 
10 continue 
do 20 m=l, ncom 
ag(m)=demgj (ik, m)/gexp(ik) 
20 continue 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE RESULT 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C Assign Base Year Values to certain variables 
gdpr(ik)=O. O 
dcpi(ik)=O. O 
do 10 i=l, nfirm 
earnO(ik, i)=earnO(l, i)*(sgrO*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
vO(ik, i)=vO(l, i)*(sgr0*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
sO(ik, i)=sO(l, i)*(sgr0*(1. +rinf))** (ik-1) 
dinvO(ik, i)=sgrc*dinvO(l, i) 
supO(ik, i)=sgrc* supO(l, i) 
scapO(ik, i)=sgrc*scapO(l, i) 
dlabO(ik, i)=sgrc*dlabO(l, i) 
demmO(ik, i)=sgrc*demmO(l, i) 
demzO(ik, i)=sgrc*demzO(l, i) 
gdemO(ik, i)=sgrc*gdemO(l, i) 
gdpr(ik)=gdpr(ik)+demc (ik, i)+demg(ik, i)+demi(ik, i) 
+ +demz(ik, i)-demm(ik, i) 
dcpi(ik)=dcpi(ik)+ac 1(i)*pjd(ik, i)/((l. +rin f)**(ik-1)) 
10 continue 
do 15 i=l, ngood-1 
demjO(ik, i)=sgrc*demjO(l, i) 
15 continue 
gdem(ik, 5)=sup(ik, 5) 
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savO(ik)=savO(1)*(sgrO* (1. +rinf)) * *(ik-1) 
cdemO(ik)=sgrc*cdemO(1) 
taxO(ik)=sgrc*taxO(1)* (l . +rinf)**(ik-1) 
gdprO(ik)=sgrc*gdprO(1) 
tsupO(ik)=sgrc*tsupO(1) 
pdef(ik)=gexp (ik) +tran (ik) -tax (ik) 
fdef(ik) =gexp (ik) +tran(ik) +rb(ik) *bondg (ik) -tax (ik) 
C Calculation of aggregate variables 
team(ik)=O. O 
tearnO(ik)=0.0 
tcap0(ik)=0.0 
tv0(ik)=0.0 
ts0(ik)=0.0 
tinv0(ik)=0.0 
tv(ik)=0.0 
ts(ik)=0.0 
tlabO(ik)=0.0 
tdemm0(ik)=0.0 
tdemz0(ik)=0.0 
tdemm(ik)=0.0 
tdemz(ik)=0.0 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
tearn(ik)=tearn(ik)+earn(ik, i) 
teamO(ik)=tearnO(ik)+earnO(ik, i) 
tlabO (ik)=tlabO (ik)+dlabO (ik, i) 
tcapO(ik)=tcapO(ik)+scapO(ik, i) 
tdemmO (ik)=tdemmO (ik)+demmO (ik, i) 
tdemzO(ik)=tdemzO(ik)+demzO(ik, i) 
tdemm(ik)=tdemm(ik)+er(ik)*pw(i)*demm(ik, i) 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+er(ik)*pjz(ik, i)*demz(ik, i) 
tvO(ik)=tvO(ik)+vO(ik, i) 
tsO(ik)=tsO(ik)+sO(ik, i) 
tinvO(ik)=tinvO(ik)+dinvO(ik, i) 
tv (ik)=tv (ik)+fv (ik, i) 
ts(ik)=ts(ik)+seqy(ik, i) 
20 continue 
bot(ik)=tdemz(ik)-tdemm(ik) 
bos(ik)=(1. -0.35)*rw*bondw(ik)-fmyt*rb(ik)*wbond(ik) 
boc(ik)=er(ik) *dbondw(ik)-dwbond(ik) 
bop(ik)=bot(ik)+bos(ik)+boc(ik) 
cpi(ik)=O. O 
do 25 m=l, ncom 
cpi(ik)=cpi(ik)+ac(m)*pjj (ik, m)*fvt(m) *fst(m) 
25 continue 
err(ik)=er(ik)/dcpi(ik) 
tdemm(ik)=0.0 
tdemz(ik)=0.0 
do 30 i=l, nfirm 
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tdemm(ik)=tdemm(ik)+demm(ik, i) 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+demz(ik, i) 
rearn(ik, i)=100.0*(earn(ik, i)/earn0(ik, i)-1.0) 
rs(ik, i)=100.0* (segy(ik, i)/sO(ik, i)-1.0) 
rv(ik, i)=100.0*(fv(ik, i)/v0(ik, i)-1.0) 
rder(ik, i)= 1 00.0*(der(ik, i)/der0(1, i)- 1.0) 
rrc (ik, i) =100.0 * (rc (ik, i)/rc0 (1, i) -1.0 ) 
rdinv(ik, i)=100.0*(dinv(ik, i)/dinv0(ik, i)-1.0) 
anum=dinv(ik, i)/scap(ik, i) 
aden=dinvO(1, i)/scapO(1, i) 
rik(ik, i)=100.0*((anum/aden)-1.0) 
rdlab(ik, i)=100.0*(dlab(ik, i)/dlabO(ik, i)-1.0) 
rscap(ik, i)=100.0*(scap(ik, i)/scap0(ik, i)-1.0) 
rsup(ik, i)=100.0*(sup(ik, i)/sup0(ik, i)-1.0) 
30 continue 
pen(ik)=O. O 
rwel(ik)=O. O 
rwel l =0.0 
tot(ik)=0.0 
dtot(ik)=0.0 
do 35 i=l, ngood-1 
rwel 1=rwel 1 +pj (ik, i) *gdem(ik, i) 
rwel0=rwel0+gdem0(ik, i) *((1. +rinf)**(ik-1)) 
tot(ik)=tot(ik)+ 100. *er(ik)*((pjz(ik, i)/(l. +rinf)**(ik-1))-1.0) 
dtot(ik)=dtot(ik)+er(ik)*((pjz(ik, i)/(l. +rinf)**(ik-1))-1.0) 
+ *demz0(ik, i)/gdpr(ik) 
rdemm(ik, i)= 100.0 * (demm(ik, i)/demm0(ik, i)-1.0) 
rdemz(ik, i) = 100.0 * (demz(ik, i)/demz0 (ik, i)-1.0) 
pen(ik)=pen (ik)+((pjd(ik, i)/(l . +rinf)**(ik-1))*(sup(ik, 
i) 
1 -supO(ik, i))-(pjd(ik, i)/(1. +rinf)**(ik-1)) 
2 *(demj(ik, i)-demjO(ik, i))-(demm(ik, i)-demmO(ik, i)) 
3 *er(ik))/gdpr(ik) 
35 continue 
rwel(ik)=rwel l/rwelO 
pen(ik)=pen(ik)+(pjd(ik, 5)/(1. +rinf) **(ik-1))* (sup(ik, 5) 
+ -supO(ik, 5))/gdpr(ik) 
fre(ik)=dbondw(ik)*er(ik)/gdpr(ik) 
cri(ik)=fre(ik)+dtot(ik)+pen(ik) 
wkwh=wk(ik)/wh(ik) 
wbwe=wb(ik)/we(ik) 
rfdis(ik)=100.0*(wkwh/rfdis0-1.0) 
radis(ik)=100.0*(wbwe/radis0-1.0) 
atw0=(sgr0*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
rtw(ik)=100.0*(tw(ik)/(atw0*tw0)-1.0) 
rtearn(ik)=100.0* (tearn(ik)/tearn0(ik)-1.0) 
rtv(ik)= 100.0*(tv(ik)/tvO(ik)-1.0) 
its(ik)=100.0*(ts(ik)/ts0(ik)-1.0) 
rtinv(ik)=100.0*(tinv(ik)/tinv0(ik)-1.0) 
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rtcap(ik)=100.0* (tcap(ik)/tcapO(ik)-1.0) 
rtlab(ik)=100.0*(tlab(ik)/tlab0(ik)-1.0) 
rtsup(ik)=100.0*(tsup(ik)/tsup0(ik)-1.0) 
rgdpr(ik)=100.0* (gdpr(ik)/gdpr0(ik)-1.0) 
cf 1=er(ik)*dbondw(ik) 
if(cfl gt. 0.0) then 
rsav(ik)=100.0*(sav(ik)/sav0(ik)-1.0) 
else 
rsav (ik)=100.0* ((sav(ik)-cf 1)/sav0(ik)-1.0) 
end if 
rtax (ik) =100.0 * (ft(ik)- (ftO * ((1.0+rinf) * (1.0+s gr) ) 
+ **(ik-1)))/taxO(ik) 
rcdem(ik)=100.0*(cdem(ik)/cdem0(ik)-1.0) 
rtdemm(ik)=100.0*(tdemm(ik)/tdemm0(ik)-1.0) 
rtdemz(ik)=100.0*(tdemz(ik)/tdemz0(ik)-1.0) 
rrb(ik)=100.0*(rb(ik)/rb0-1.0) 
rplab(ik)=100.0* (plab(ik)/(l. +rinf) **(ik-1)-1. ) 
rer(ik)=100.0*(er(ik)-1.0) 
rerr(ik)= 100.0*(err(ik)- 1.0) 
rcpi(ik)=100.0*(pc(ik)/(pc0*(l. +rinf)* *(ik-1))-1.0) 
gdpd(ik)= 100.0*(gdpn(ik)/(gdpr(ik)*(l. +rinf) **(ik-1))-1.0) 
rdcpi(ik)= 100.0* (dcpi(ik)-1.0) 
rpdef(ik)=pdef(ik)/gdpn(ik) 
rfdef(ik)=fdef(ik)/gdpn(ik) 
rbot(ik)=1d-3*bot(ik)/((l. +sgr)*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
rboc(ik)=1 d-3*boc(ik)/((l . +sgr)*(1. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE UTIL 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C Calculation of intertemporal utility level at the revised case 
C 
U=0.0 
do 10 k=l, nyear 
u=u+ul (k)/((l . +stp) ** (k-1) 
) 
10 continue 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
C 
C Calculation of total transition 
C Investment transition 
tsit(i)=O. O 
C Market value of firm transition 
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tsvt(i)=O. O 
do 30 k=l, nyear 
tsit(i)=tsit(i)+rdinv(k, i) 
tsvt(i)=tsvt(i)+rv(k, i) 
30 continue 
20 continue 
do 40 i=1, nfirm 
tsi5(i)=0.0 
tsv5(i)=0.0 
do 50 k=1,5 
tsi5(i)=tsi5(i)+rdinv(k, i) 
tsv5(i)=tsv5(i)+rv(k, i) 
50 continue 
40 continue 
do 60 i=1, nfirm 
tsi10(i)=0.0 
tsv 1 O(1)=O. O 
do 70 k=1,10 
tsi 10 (i) =tsi 10 (i)+rdinv (k, i) 
tsv 1O(i)=tsv 1O(i)+rv(k, i) 
70 continue 
60 continue 
do 80 i=l, nfirm 
tsi20(i)=O. O 
tsv20(i)=O. O 
do 90 k=1,20 
tsi20(i)=tsi2O(i)+rdinv(k, i) 
tsv20(i)=tsv2O(i)+rv(k, i) 
90 continue 
80 continue 
do 110 i=l, nfirm 
tsi50(i)=0.0 
tsv50(i)=0.0 
do 120 k=1,50 
tsi50(i)=tsi5O(i)+rdinv(k, i) 
tsv50(i)=tsv5O(i)+rv(k, i) 
120 continue 
110 continue 
do 130 i=l, nfirm 
rtsi5(i)=100.0*tsi5(i)/tsit(i) 
rtsi 10(i)=100.0*tsi 10(i)/tsit(i) 
rtsi20(i)= 1 00.0*tsi20(i)/tsit(i) 
rtsi50(i)=100.0*tsi5O(i)/tsit(i) 
rtsv5(i)=100.0*tsv5(i)/tsvt(i) 
rtsv 10(i)=100.0*tsv 10(i)/tsvt(i) 
rtsv20(i)= 1 00.0*tsv20(i)/tsvt(i) 
rtsv50(i)= 1 00.0*tsv50(i)/tsvt(i) 
130 continue 
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C Calculation of equivalent variation 
ev=twO*(u-u0)/u0 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE SCALE 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
do 10 i=l, nfirm 
sup (ik, i)=qmov * sup (ik, i) 
scap(ik, i)=gmov*scap(ik, i) 
dlab(ik, i)=qmov*dlab(ik, i) 
dinv(ik, i)=qmov*dinv(ik, i) 
if(ifin eq. 0) then 
acf(i)=acf(i)*dinv(ik, i) 
end if 
sdep(ik, i)=gmov*sdep(ik, i) 
seqy(ik, i)=gmov* seqy(ik, i) 
fv(ik, i)=qmov*fv(ik, i) 
bond(ik, i)=qmov*bond(ik, i) 
de(i)=qmov*de(i) 
div(ik, i)=qmov*div(ik, i) 
dpr(i)=div (ik, i)/seqy(ik, i) 
earn(ik, i)=gmov*earn(ik, i) 
ret(ik, i)=qmov *ret(ik, i) 
dbond(ik, i)=qmov*dbond(ik, i) 
dv(ik, i)=qmov*dv(ik, i) 
demc (ik, i) =gmov *d emc (ik, i) 
demz (ik, i) =gmov * demz (ik, i) 
demm(ik, i)=qmov*demm(ik, i) 
demg(ik, i)=qmov*demg(ik, i) 
demi(ik, i)=qmov*demi(ik, i) 
ddem(ik, i)=qmov*ddem(ik, i) 
10 continue 
do 20 i=l, ngood-1 
demj (ik, i)=gmov*demj (ik, i) 
20 continue 
slab(ik)=qmov * slab(ik) 
wb(ik)=qmov*wb(ik) 
wv(ik)=qmov*wv(ik) 
we(ik)=qmov*we(ik) 
ts(ik)=gmov*ts(ik) 
tv(ik)=qmov*tv(ik) 
tdb(ik)=qmov*tdb(ik) 
sav(ik)=qmov*sav(ik) 
dbondw(ik)=qmov*dbondw(ik) 
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bondg(ik)=qmov*bondg(ik) 
dbondg(ik)=qmov*dbondg(ik) 
tw(ik)=qmov*tw(ik) 
yd(ik)=qmov*yd(ik) 
yk(ik)=qmov*yk(ik) 
wh(ik)=gmov*wh(ik) 
p(19)=qmov*p(19) 
cdem(ik)=qmov *cdem(ik) 
ge xp (ik) =qm ov*g exp (ik ) 
tax (ik) =qm ov * tax (ik) 
tran(ik)=qmov*tran(ik) 
tct=qmov*tct 
tlt=gmov*tlt 
tyt=qmov*tyt 
tgt=gmov*tgt 
tvt=qmov*tvt 
tst=gmov*tst 
twt=gmov*twt 
tpt=gmov *tpt 
C Total production and capital formation 
tsup(ik)=O. O 
tcap(ik)=O. O 
tacf=0.0 
p(18)=0.0 
p(17)=0.0 
p(16)=0.0 
p(15)=0.0 
tiny 1(ik)=0.0 
tret(ik)=O. O 
do 30 i=l, nfirm 
tsup(ik)=tsup(ik)+sup(ik, i) 
tcap(ik)=tcap(ik)+scap(ik, i) 
tacf=tacf+acf(i) 
p(18)=p(18)+div(ik, i) 
p(17)=p(17)+de(i) 
tiny 1(ik)=tinv 1(ik)+dinv(ik, i) 
tret(ik)=tret(ik)+ret(ik, i) 
p(16)=p(l 6)+sdep(ik, i) 
p(l 5)=p(l 5)+eam(ik, i) 
30 continue 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE EXPFOR 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
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include 'com. lib' 
if(ifin eq. 0) then 
C Adjust the nominal interest rate according to the rate of inflation 
rh0=(1. -rmyt0)*rb(1)-rinf0 
rb(1)=(rh0+rinf)/(1. -rmyt0) 
C Initial Guess for Supply of Goods 
vad(1)=05000.0 
vad(2)=45000.0 
vad(3)=25000.0 
vad(4)=60000.0 
vad(5)=20000.0 
do 5 i=l, ngood 
gdem(l, i)=supj(i) 
5 continue 
bondw(ik)=O. O 
wbond(ik)=O. O 
bondO=1.0*bond0 
if(igovd eq. 0) then 
bondg(ik)=0.0 
end if 
dbondg(ik)=((1. +sgr)*(1. +rinf)-1. )*bondg(ik) 
C 
c policy parameters 
c taxes 
rmyt=rmytO 
rlab=rmyt 
rlab 1 =rlabO 
rcon=0.0 
fmyt=l. -rmyt 
rw=rb(1) 
flt=1. +rlt 
C Calculation of the rate of capital gains tax 
rgt=0.1 *rgt/(0.1 +rh0+rinf) 
fgt=1. -rgt 
rdtc=rdtcO 
fdtc=l. -rdtc 
do 10 m=l, ncom 
rvt(m)=rvt0(m) 
fvt(m)=1. +rvt(m) 
rst(m)=rst0(m) 
fst(m)= 1. +rst(m) 
10 continue 
do 15 i=l, nfirm 
rct(i)=rctO 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rct(i)=sr(1) *rctO 
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end if 
fct(i)= 1. -rct(i) 
fitc(i)=1. -ritc(i) 
15 continue 
C Benchmark prices 
er(0)=1.0 
er(1)=1.0 
pf(ik)=1.0 
pr(1)=1.0 
do 20 i=l, ngood 
rc(l, i)=rb(1) 
pj(l, i)=1.0 
pjd(l, i)=1.0 
20 continue 
plab(1)=1.0 
pcap(l)=1.0 
sv(1,12)=er(ik) 
end if 
C 
c Replacement Case 
c 
if(ifin eq. 2) then 
plab(ik)=(1.0+rinf) ** (ik-1) 
rb(ik)=rb(1) 
er(ik)=er(1) 
er(ik-1)=er(1) 
pf(ik)=1.0 
pr(ik)=1.0 
ft(ik)=ftO*((1.0+sgr)*(l. +rinf))**(ik-1) 
do 30 i=l, nfirm 
p(i)=I. 0 
p(5+i)=1.0 
p(9+i)=1.0 
q(ik, i)=q(1'i) 
dinv(ik, i)=dinv(l, i) *(1. +sgr)**(ik-1) 
scap(ik, i)=scap(l, i)*(l. +sgr)**(ik-1) 
seqy(ik, i)=segy(l, i)*(1. +sgr)**(ik-1) 
pjd(ik, i)=pjd(l, i)*(1.0+rinf)**(ik-1) 
pj(ik, i)=pjd(ik, i) 
bond(ik, i)=bond (1, i) 
30 continue 
sv(ik, 12)=er(ik) 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1) then 
C First Define Expected Lead Variables 
do 40 i=l, nsvar 
c rsv(i)=(sv(nyear, i)-sve(nyear, i))/sve(nyear, i) 
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40 continue 
pf(1)=1.0 
do 75 1=2, nyear- 1 
ft(1)=ftO*((1. O+sgr)*(1. +rinf))**(1-1) 
er(1)=1.0 
pcap(1)=1.0 
pf(1)=1.0 
pr(1)=1.0 
rb(1)=1.0 
plab(1)=(1.0+rinf)**(1-1) 
do 80 i=l, nfirm 
pjd(1, i)=(1. O+rinf) * *(1- 1) 
pj(1, i)=pjd(1, i) 
dinv(1, i)=dinvO(l, i)*((1.0+sgr)**(1-1)) 
seqy (1, i)= (1. +rinf) * sO (l , 
i) * (1. +s gr) ** (1-1) 
C Firms 
sve(1, i)=sv(nyear, i) 
sv(1, i)=sve(1, i) 
sve(1,5+i)=(l. +rsv(5+i))*sv(nyear, 5+i) 
+ *((1.0+rinf)*(1.0+sgr))**(1-nyear) 
sv(1,5+i)=sve(1,5+i) 
80 continue 
C Household Wealth 
sve(1,11)=(l . +rsv(11))*sv(nyear, 11)*((1. O+rinf) 
+ *(1.0+sgr))**(1-nyear) 
sve(1,12)=er(nyear) 
sve(1,13)=sv(nyear, 13)*(((1. +rinf)**(1-nyear))**(1.0-esh)) 
if(model eq. 1) then 
sve(1,13)=sv(nyear, 13)*(((l . +rinf)**(1-nyear))**(1.0-esh)) 
+ *((l. +rcon)**((esh-1. )*(1. -a))) 
end if 
sve(1,14)=(l. +rsv(14))*sv(nyear, 14)*((1. O+rinf) 
+ *(1. O+sgr))**(1-nyear) 
sve(1,15)=(l. +rsv(15))*sv(nyear, 15)*((1.0+rinf) 
+ *(1. O+sgr))**(1-nyear) 
sve(1,16)=(l . +rsv(16))*sv(nyear, 
16)*((1. O+rinf) 
+ *(1. O+sgr))**(1-nyear) 
sve(1,16)=sv(nyear, 16)*(((l. +rinf)**(1-nyear))**(1. O-esz(1))) 
sv(1,11)=sve(1,11) 
sv(1,12)=sve(1,12) 
sv(1,13)=sve(1,13) 
sv(1,14)=sve(1,14) 
sv(1,15)=sve(1,15) 
sv(1,16)=sve(1,16) 
75 continue 
end if 
return 
end 
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SUBROUTINE POLEX 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
if(ipoll eq. 2) then 
if(ik It. 5) then 
do 105 i=l, nfirm 
rct(i)=rct0 
if(i eq. 5) then 
rct(i)=sr(1) *rct0 
end if 
fct(i)=1. -rct(i) 
105 continue 
else 
do 106 i=l, nfirm 
rct(i)=rct 1 
if (i 
. eq. 5) then 
rct(i)=sr(1)*rctl 
end if 
fct(i)=1. -rct(i) 
106 continue 
end if 
end if 
if(ipol2 eq. 2) then 
do 107 i=l, nfirm 
if(ik It. 5) then 
rtf(i)=rtf0(i) 
rti(i)=rti0(i) 
else 
rtf(i)=rtf 1(i) 
rti(i)=rti 1(i) 
end if 
107 continue 
end if 
if(ipo13 eq. 2) then 
if(ik At. 5) then 
rmyt=rmytO 
rdtc=rdtcO 
else 
rmyt=rmyt 1 
rdtc=rdtc 1 
fmyt=1. -rmyt 
fdtc=1. -rdtc 
end if 
end if 
ä. 
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if(ipol4 eq. 2) then 
do 108 m=l, ncom 
if (ik . It. 5) then 
rvt(m)=rvt0(m) 
fvt(m)=1. -rvt(m) 
else 
rvt(m)=rvtl (m) 
fvt(m)=1. -rvt(m) 
end if 
108 continue 
end if 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE CALIB(n5, x5, f5, IFLAG) 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
integer iflag, n5 
real*8 f5(n5), x5(n5) 
do 10 i=l, nfirm 
vad(i)=x5(i) 
10 continue 
call bprod 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
f5(i)=q(l, i)-sq(i) 
20 continue 
if(iprint eq. 1) then 
write (1,11) f5(1), f5(2), f5(3), f5(4), f5(5) 
11 format(1 x, 'excess dem', 2x, 5f 13.4) 
end if 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE DISRAT 
C This subroutine uses a Newton method to solve the time preference rate 
C Excess demand functions are defined as follows. 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
c calculation of jacobian matrix of excess demands 
c 
stp=0.015 
call bprod 
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call bgexp 
500 call bdmnd 
call gvrev 
call bdmnd 
fexs=sav(1)-tdb(1) 
fexsl=fexs 
stp=stp+0.1 d-4 
call bdmnd 
call gvrev 
call bdmnd 
call gvrev 
fexs=sav(1)-tdb(1) 
delta=fexs l -fexs 
stp=stp-0.1 d-4 
fexs=fexsl 
qmov=fexs 1/delta 
stp=stp+gmov*0. ld-4 
c 
c equilibrium solution criterion 
c 
if(dabs(fexs) gt. Id-9) go to 500 
call bdmnd 
call gvrev 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE ADJUST 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
C CONSISTENCY ADJUSTMENT 
C 
iprint=l 
call optn 
C Excess demand 
fexs=0.0 
do 10 i=l, nfirm-1 
exs(i)=ddem(ik, i)+demz0(ik, i)-sup (ik, i) 
+ -demm0(ik, i)+demm(ik, i) 
fexs=fexs+exs(i) 
10 continue 
do 20 i=1, ngood-1 
demj (ik, i)=0.0 
do 30 j=l, nfirm-1 
demj (ik, i) =demj (ik, i)+demj i (i, j) 
30 continue 
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20 continue 
tbdem=0.0 
do 40 i=l, ngood-1 
tbdem=tbdem+demj (ik, i) 
40 continue 
tinv(ik)=O. O 
do 50 i=l, nfirm-1 
tinv (ik)=tinv (ik)+demi (ik, i) 
do 60 j=l, ngood-1 
demji(i, j)=demji(i, j)-exs (j) *demj (ik, i)/tbdem 
aj (i, j) =demj i (i, j)/sup j (i) 
60 continue 
50 continue 
do 70 i=l, ngood-1 
ai(i)=demi(ik, i)/tinv (ik) 
70 continue 
call bprod 
call bdmnd 
call gvrev 
call bdmnd 
call optn 
do 80 i=l, nfirm-1 
C Import 
a20=(am(i, l)/am(i, 2))**esm(i) 
a30=(pj d(ik, i)/pj m(ik, i)) * *esm(i) 
demm(ik, i)=a20*a30*ddem(ik, i) 
gdemO(l, i)=qdem(ik, i) 
80 continue 
gdemO(1,5)=sup(ik, 5) 
taxO(1)=tax(t ) 
gdprO(ik)=O. O 
do 90 i=l, ngood 
gdpr0(ik)=gdpr0(ik)+demc (ik, i)+demg(ik, i)+demi(ik, i) 
+ +demz(ik, i)-demm(ik, i) 
90 continue 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE ETRA 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
include 'opt-lib' 
C Calculation of the rate of return to savings 
rrh=rh(ik)-rinf 
do 10 i=l, nfirm 
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C Calculation of the rate of return to capital 
qk(i)=((1. -dn(i))/(1. -rct(i) )) * (rc(ik, i)+ 
+ redep(i)-rinf)-redep(i) 
C Calculation of the tax wedge (qk-rrh) 
qr(i)=qk(i)-rrh 
10 continue 
soetr=0.0 
do 15 i=l, nfirm 
C Calculation of the effective tax rates 
etr(i)=qr(i)/qk(i) 
C Calculation of the overall marginal effective tax rate 
soetr=soetr+(etr(i)*dinv(ik, i))/tinv(ik) 
15 continue 
aetr=soetr/5.0 
sumv=0.0 
do 20 i=l, nfirm 
C Calculation of the variance of the effective tax rates 
sumv=sumv+((etr(i)-aetr)**2.0)*dinv(ik, i)/tinv(ik) 
20 continue 
vetr=sumv 
setr=sqrt(vetr) 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE OPTN 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
include 'opt. lib' 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE LRUN(N13, X13, F13, IFLAG) 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
c set up prices 
integer iflag, n 13 
real*8 f13(n13), x13(n13) 
c 2) Steady-state Growth Rate 
sgrO= 1. +sgr 
sgrc=sgrO* * (ik-1) 
do 10 i=l, ngood 
p(i)=x l3 (i) 
pjd(ik, i)=p(i)*(1.0+rinf)**(ik-1) 
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p(5+i)=x13(5+i) 
scap(ik, i)=p(5+i)*scap0(l, i)*sgrc 
10 continue 
p(l1)=x13(11) 
plab(ik)=p(11)*(1.0+rinf)**(ik-1) 
p(12)=x13(12) 
rb(ik)=p(12)*rb(1) 
p(13)=x13(13) 
er(ik)=p(13)*er(1) 
if(igovd ne. 2) then 
p(14)=x13(14) 
ft(ik)=p(14)*ft0*((1.0+sgr)*(1.0+rinf))**(ik-1) 
if(ipol5 eq. 1) then 
ft(ik)=0.0 
rcon=p(14)*0.3 
end if 
end if 
include 'opt. lib' 
C Define the excess demand functions 
C 1-) Product markets 
do 80 i=l, ngood-1 
f 13 (i)=(ddem(ik, i)+demz(ik, i)-sup(ik, i)) 
80 continue 
f 13(5)=(demc(ik, 5)-sup(ik, 5)) 
C 2-) Q-ratios 
do 90 i= I 
Infirm 
f 13(5+i)=(q(ik, i)-sq(i)) 
90 continue 
C 3-) Labour market 
f 13(11)=(tlab(ik)-slab(ik)) 
C 4-) Funds market 
f 13(12)=(sav(ik)-tdb(ik)) 
C 5-) Balance of Payments Condition 
tdemm(ik)=O. O 
tdemz(ik)=O. O 
do 100 i=l, ngood 
tdemm(ik)=tdemm(ik)+pw(i) *demm(ik, i) 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+pj z(ik, i) *demz(ik, i) 
f 13(13)=tdemm(ik)-tdemz(ik) 
+ +fmyt*rb(ik)*wbond(ik)/er(ik)-(1. -0.35)*rw*bondw(ik) 
100 continue 
C 6-) Equal yield equilibrium 
f 13(14)=tax(ik)-gexp(ik)-tran(ik) 
return 
end 
SUBROUTINE SRUN(N8, X8, F8, IFLAG) 
l. IL 
268 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
C 
c set up prices 
integer iflag, n8 
real*8 f8(n8), x8(n8) 
do 10 i=l, ngood 
P(i)=O(i) 
pjd(ik, i)=p(i)*(1. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
10 continue 
p(6)=x8(6) 
plab(ik)=p(6)*(1. O+rinf)**(ik-1) 
p(7)=x8(7) 
rb(ik)=p(7)*rb0 
p(8)=x8(8) 
er(ik)=p(8) 
if(igovd ne. 2) then 
p(9)=x8(9) 
ft(ik)=p(9)*ftO*((1.0+sgr)*(1.0+rinf))* * (ik-1) 
if(ipol5 eq. 1) then 
ft(ik)=O. O 
rcon=p(9)*0.3 
end if 
end if 
C Adjustment of investment levels 
do 15 i=l, nfirm 
dine(i)=dinv(ik, i) 
15 continue 
call prod 
199 acc=0.0 
do 25 i=l, nfirm 
acc=acc+(dinv(ik, i)-dine(i)) 
25 continue 
if(dabs(acc) gt. Id-2) then 
do 35 i=l, nfirm 
dine(i)=dinv(ik, i) 
35 continue 
call prod 
go to 199 
end if 
include 'opt. lib' 
C EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
C Product markets 
do 80 i=l, ngood-1 
f8(i)=(ddem(ik, i)+demz(ik, i)-sup (ik, i)) 
80 continue 
f8(5)=(demc(ik, 5)-sup(ik, 5)) 
C Labour market 
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f8(6)=(tlab(ik)-slab(ik)) 
C Funds market 
f8(7)=sav(ik)-tdb(ik) 
C Balance of Payments Condition 
tdemm(ik)=O. O 
tdemz(ik)=O. O 
do 100 i=l, ngood 
tdemm(ik)=tdemm(ik)+pw(i) *demm(ik, i) 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+pj z(ik, i) *demz(ik, i) 
f8(8)=dwbond(ik)/er(ik)+tdemz(ik)/er(ik)-tdemm(ik)-dbondw(ik) 
100 continue 
C Equal yield equilibrium 
f8 (9)=tax(ik)+dbondg(ik)-gexp (ik)-tran(ik) 
return 
end 
OPT. LIB 
if(ifin eq. 0) then 
ac1(1)=ac(1) 
rvtj(1)=rvt(1) 
ac l (2)=0.0 
rvtj (2)=0.0 
do 41 m=2,5 
ac 1(2)=ac 1(2)+ac(m) 
rvtj (2)=rvtj (2)+rvt(m) 
41 continue 
ac1(3)=0.0 
rvtj (3)=0.0 
do 42 m=6,21 
ac 1(3)=ac 1(3)+ac(m) 
rvtj (3)=rvtj (3)+rvt(m) 
42 continue 
ac 1(4)=0.0 
rvtj(4)=O. O 
do 43 m=22,27 
ac 1(4)=ac 1(4)+ac(m) 
rvtj (4)=rvtj (4)+rvt(m) 
43 continue 
ac 1(5)=ac(28) 
rvtj(5)=rvt(28) 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1 or. ifin eq. 2) then 
do 40 i=1, nfirm-1 
C Import Prices 
pw(i)=(1. +rinf)**(ik-1) 
pjm(ik, i)=pw(i) *er(ik) 
C Composite Prices (of Import and Domestic Goods) 
a20=(am(i, 1)**esm(i))*(pjm(ik, i)**(1.0-esm(i))) 
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a30=(am(i, 2)**esm(i))*(pjd(ik, i)**(1.0-esm(i))) 
pj (ik, i)=((a20+a30)**(1.0/(1.0-esm(i))))/am 1(i) 
40 continue 
pj(ik, 5)=pjd(ik, 5) 
psum=0.0 
do 45 i=l, ngood-1 
psum=psum+pj(ik, i) 
45 continue 
do 50 i=l, nfirm-1 
pj (ik, i)=4.0*pj (ik, i) *((1. +rinf)* (ik- 1))/p sum 
50 continue 
end if 
if(ifin eq. 1 or. ifin eq. 2) then 
call prod 
call dmnd 
call gvrev 
call dmnd 
else 
call bprod 
call bdmnd 
call bgexp 
call gvrev 
end if 
tlab(ik)=0. 
tinv=O. 
do 55 i=l, nfirm 
tlab(ik)=tlab(ik)+dlab(ik, i) 
tinv=tinv+dinv (ik, i) 
55 continue 
do 60 i=l, ngood-1 
demj(ik, i)=0.0 
do 65 j=l, nfirm-1 
demj (ik, i)=demj (ik, i)+demji(j, i) 
65 continue 
demi(ik, i)=ai(i) *tinv 
60 continue 
C Domestic Demand 
pz(ik)=1.0 
tdemm(ik)=0.0 
tdemz(ik)=0.0 
do 70 i=l, ngood-1 
qdem(ik, i)=demc(ik, i)+demg(ik, i)+demi(ik, i)+demj (ik, i) 
C Domestic Use Ratio 
dm 1=(am(i, l)/am(i, 2))* *esm(i) 
dm2=(pjd(ik, i)/pjm(ik, i))**esm(i) 
dm3=dml *dm2 
dm4=am(i, l)*(dm3**((esm(i)-1.0)/esm(i))) 
d 1=am 1(i)*((dm4+am(i, 2))**(esm(i)/(esm(i)-1.0))) 
ý, L 
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ddem(ik, i)=qdem(ik, i)/d 1 
C Import 
a20=((am(i, 1)/am(i, 2))**esm(i)) 
a30=(pjd(ik, i)/pjm(ik, i))**esm(i) 
demm(ik, i)=a20*a30*ddem(ik, i) 
if(itot eq. 1) then 
demm(ik, i)=sgrc*demmO(l, i) 
ddem(ik, i)=qdem(ik, i)-demm(ik, i) 
end if 
tdemm(ik)=tdemm(ik)+pw(i) *demm(ik, i) 
pz(ik)=pz(ik)*(pjz(ik, i)/az(i))**az(i) 
C Export 
demz(ik, i)=sgrc*demzO(l, i)*((pw(i)/pjz(ik, i))**esz(i)) 
if(itot eq. 1) then 
demz(ik, i)=sgrc*demzO(l, i) 
end if 
tdemz(ik)=tdemz(ik)+pjz(ik, i)*demz(ik, i) 
70 continue 
if(iflow eq. 1) then 
if(ifin eq. 0) then 
stz=(1. +(1. -0.35)*rw)/((l . +rinf)*((1. +sgr)**(1. 
/esz(1))))-1.0 
end if 
C Export 
do 85 i=l, ngood-1 
demz(ik, i)=az(i) *pz(ik)*tdemz(ik)/pj z(ik, i) 
85 continue 
end if 
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COMMON. LIB 
common/prmt/ifin, iprint, ik, ngood, nfirm, ncap, nyear, iflow 
1 
, igovd, model, ider, ipol1, ipol2, ipol3, ipol4, ipol5, ipol6, itot 2 , ncom, nsvar, sgr, rinf, stp, stz, crp, aca(5), acb, agb, aga(5), esh 3 , esm(5), esz(5), esc, al(5), aO(5,2), ajv(5), aj(4,4), ac(28) 4 ac 1(5), ai(5), am(5,2), aml (5), az(5), ag(28), fcap(5,3), pw(5) 
5 , rw, dpr(5), atp(5), bps, pspO, psp, redep(5), rpe(5), rpe1(5), rta(5) 6 , rtfO(5), rtfl(5), rtf(5), rtiO(5), rtil(5), rti(5), rtdf(5,3) 
7 , rtdi(5,3), rtda(5,3), rlt, flt, rctO, rctl, rct(5), sr(4), fct(5) 8 
, rpt, rgt, 
fgt, rmytO, rmyt l , rmyt, ryt, fmyt, rlab, rdiv, rint, ft(76) 9 
, 
ftO, rit(5), rwt(5), fwt(5), rvtO(28), rvtl (28), rvt(28), fvt(28) 
common/prmt_ctnd/rvtj (5), rstO(28), rst 1(28), rst(28), fst(28) 
1 , rmt(5), fmt(5), rcon, ritc(5), fitc(5), rdtcO, rdtc l, rdtc, fdtc 2 , cdiv(5), afgt(5), bondO 
common/vrbl/rb(76), re(76), rh(76), rp(76), erp(5), rc(76,5) 
1 , pg(76), pc(76), pcap(76), dpcap, pz(76), plab(76), pjd(76,5) 
2 , pjm(76,5), pjz(76,5), pj(76,5), pjj(76,28), pn(5), er(0: 76) 3 
, vad(5), supj(5), sup(76,5), gdem(76,5), ddem(76,5), demj(76,4) 4 
, 
demji(4,4), rcw, cdem(76), demc(76,5), demcj(28) 
5 , demg(76,5), demgj(76,28), demm(76,5), demz(76,5), demi(76,5) 
6 , slab(76), dles(76), dlab(76,5), scap(76,5) 
7 , sdep(76,5), dcap(76,5), earn(76,5), ebit(76,5), div(76,5) 8 , tdiv(76), acf(5), tacf, vexp(5), de(5), dn(5), q(76,5) 9 , dinv(76,5), tinv, agf(5), der(76,5), dcr(5), bond(76,5) 
common/vrbl_ctnd/dbond(76,5), wbond(76), bondf, dwbond(76) 
1 , dbondw(76), bondg(76), dbondg(76), bondw(76), dbondf 2 , segy(76,5), tdb(76), sav(76), tw(76), wb(76), we(76), dv(76,5) 3 , wv(76), wv 1(76), yk(76), yd(76), tct, tlt, tit, tmt, tst, tgt, tyt 
4 , tvt, twt, tpt, tax(76), tran(76), gexp(76) 
common/sltn/sq(5), dine(5), sv(76,14), sve(76,14), rms(76,14) 
1 , niter, ntrys, iter, sgrO, sgrc, acc, demmO(76,5), demzO(76,5) 2 , exs(4), dl, psum, p(20), pf(76), pr(76), bsup(5), bdemji(4,4) 3 
, bdemj(4), tdemm(76), tdemz(76), delta, fexs, fexs l, gmov 4 , gdpn(76), gdpr(76), tlab(76), tcap(76), ret(76,5), tret(76) 5 
, rsv(16), acsum, atol 
common/bncmk/earnO(76,5), rearn(76,5), tearn(76), tearn0(76) 
1 , rtearn(76), 
derO(76,5), rder(76,5), vO(76,5), rv(76,5), tv(76) 
2 , tvO(76), rtv(76), 
fv(76,5), sO(76,5), rs(76,5), ts(76), tsO(76) 
3 , rts(76), 
dinvO(76,5), rdinv(76,5), tinv 1(76), tinvO(76) 
4 , rtinv(76), scapO(76,5), rscap(76,5), tcapO(76), tlabO(76) 
5 , rtlab(76), rtcap(76), 
dlabO(76,5), rdlab(76,5), supO(76,5) 
6 , rsup(76,5), tsup(76), tsupO(76), rtsup(76), gdprO(76), rgdpr(76) 
7 , gdpnO(76), savO(76), rsav(76), taxO(76), rtax(76), rdemm(76,5) 
8 , rdemz(76,5), rtdemm(76), rtdemz(76), tdemmO(76), tdemzO(76) 
9 , pdef(76), 
fdef(76), rpdef(76), rfdef(76), bot(76), bos(76) 
common/bctnd/boc(76), bop(76), rbot(76), rboc(76), rwel(76) 
IL 
273 
1 , tot(76), dtot(76), fre(76), pen(76), cri(76), rcO(76,5) 2 
, rrc(76,5), rbO, rrb(76), rplab(76), rer(76), err(76), rerr(76) 3 
, cdemO(76), pcO, cpi(76), dcpi(76), rcpi(76), rdcpi(76), gdpd(76) 4 , rcdem(76), wh(76), wk(76), rfdisO, rfdis(76), radisO, radis(76) 5 
, gdemO(76,5), demjO(76,4), rik(76,5), dtemm(76), dtemz(76) 6 
, rtw(76), ul(76), u, u0, ev, twl, tw0, tsit(5), tsi5(5), tsi10(5) 
7 , tsi20(5), tsi5O(5), rtsi5(5), rtsi 10(5), rtsi20(5), rtsi50(5) 8 , tsitt, tsitt5, tsitt 10, tsitt20, tsitt50, rtsitt5 9 rtsitt 10, rtsitt20, rtsitt50 
common/eftax/gk(5), qr(5), etr(5), aetr, vetr, setr, rinf0, rh0 
1 , rrh, soetr, sumv 
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DATDES. LIB 
C Set up the NAG routine C05NCF 
C BENCHMARK CASE 
integer n5, ldfjac5, lr5 
parameter (n5=5, ldfjac5=n5,1r5=(n5*(n5+1))/2) 
C TRANSITION (WITHIN PERIOD) 
integer n8, ldfjac8, lr8 
parameter (n8=8+1, ldfjac8=n8, lr8=(n8*(n8+1))/2) 
C NEW STEADY STATE 
integer n13, ldfj ac l3, h13 
parameter (n13=13+1, ldfjacl3=nl3, lrl3=(nl3*(n13+1))/2) 
C Common part 
integer pout 
parameter (nout=6) 
real*8 fnorm 
integer ifail 
real*8 epsfcn, factor, xtol 
integer maxfev, ml, mode, mu, nfev, nprint 
C Benchmark case variables defined 
real*8 diag5(n5), fjac5(ldfjac5, n5), f5(n5), gtf5(n5), r5(lr5), 
+ w5(n5,4), x5(n5) 
C New steady state variables defined 
real*8 diagl3(n13), fjacl3(ldfjacl3, n13), f13(n13), gtfl3(nl3), 
+ r13(lr13), w13(n13,4), x13(n13) 
C Transition variables defined 
real*8 diag8(n8), fjac8(ldfjac8, n8), f8(n8), gtf8(n8), r8(lr8), 
+ w8(n8,4), x8(n8) 
C Common subroutines called in NAG 
real*8 f06ejf, x02ajf 
external f06ejf, x02ajf 
C Subroutines defined in the program which call CO5NCF, the NAG solution 
c algrithm: CALIB subroutine is used to solve the producer side of 
c calibration; LRUN subroutine is designated to solve the new steady state 
c equilibrium; and SRUN subroutine solves within period equilibrium. 
external c05ncf, calib, lrun, srun 
C Define the values for NAG subroutine variables 
intrinsic sqrt, dabs 
xtol=sgrt(x02ajf()) 
do 10 j=1, n5 
diag5(j)=1. Od0 
10 continue 
do 15 j=l, n8 
diag8(j)=l. 0d0 
15 continue 
do 20 j=1, n13 
diagl3(j)=1.0dO 
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20 continue 
maxfev=2000*(n 13+1) 
m15=n5-1 
mu5=n5-1 
m18=n8-1 
muß=n8-1 
ml13=n13-1 
mul3=n13-1 
epsfcn=0. OdO 
mode=2 
factor=100. OdO 
nprint=0 
C Open an output file 
open(unit=l, file='tk. out', status='new') 
C Data are supplied through a librariry file, 'DAT. LIB' 
include 'dat. lib' 
C 
c setup code 
c 
C To initiate cases, whether benchmark or others, IFIN label is used. 
c IFIN=0,1,2 stand for the benchmark, the transition, and 
c the new steady state cases, respectively. 
ifin=O 
C To initiate the structure of the model, the 'MODEL' line 
c is used. 
model=0 
itot=O 
c IFLOW distinguishes the economy's stituation in regard to 
c foreign financial capital flows; if IFLOW=O, no capital flows is 
c allowed but if IFLOW=1, then capital flows take place between the 
c UK economy and the rest of the world 
iflow=O 
C 
c Benchmark sequencing 
c 
write(1,11) 
11 format(lx, 63('*')) 
write(1, *) 'BENCHMARK' 
write(1,12) 
12 format(lx, 63('*')) 
ik=1 
C 
c Composite Consumption Level 
C 
cdem(1)=0.0 
do 25 m=l, ncom 
cdem(1)=cdem(1)+demcj (m)*(1. +rvtO(m))*(1. +rstO(m)) 
25 continue 
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do 26 i=l, ngood 
do 27 j=l, ncap 
if(fcap(i, j) ne. 0.0) then 
C Initial Investment Level 
dinv(ik, i)=(sgr+redep(i))*scap(ik, i) 
C Depreciation Rates for Tax Purposes 
rtdf(i, j)=rtdf(i, j)/(fcap(i, j)*dinv(ik, i)) 
rtdi(i, j)=rtdi(i, j)/(fcap(i, j)*dinv(ik, i)) 
end if 
27 continue 
26 continue 
c Production parameter 
c Leontief coefficients 
do 30 i=l, nfirm-1 
ajv(i)=vad(i)/bsup(i) 
do 35 j=l, ngood-1 
aj (i, j) =bdemj i (i, j )/b sup (i) 
35 continue 
30 continue 
ajv(5)=1.0 
Consumption Share Parameter 
do 31 m=l, ncom 
ac (m)=(l . +rvt0(m))*(1. +rst0(m))*demcj (m)/cdem(1) 31 continue 
do 50 i=l, nfirm 
x5(i)=vad(i) 
50 continue 
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DATA SET 
c Number of Firms, producer goods, consumer goods, capital assets, lead variables and 
Years 
Data NFIRM, NGOOD, NCOM, NCAP, NSVAR, NYEAR 
+ /5,5,28,3,14,76/ 
c PARAMETERS 
c structural parameters 
c Adjustment Cost Parameters 
Data (ACA(I), i=1,5), ACB/5*0.035,15.0/ 
c Agency Cost parameter 
Data AGB/0.5/ 
C Elasticity Parameters 
c Intertemporal elasticity of subtitution 
Data ESH/0.8/ 
c Import demand elasticity 
Data (ESM(J), j=1,5)/0.325,0.65,1.30,0.325,0.0/ 
c Export supply elasticity 
Data (ESZ(J), j=1,5)/0.240,0.48,0.96,0.75,0.0/ 
c International Capital Mobility Parameter 
Data bond0/1d7/ 
c policy parameters 
c Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and Steady-state Growth Rate 
Data RB(1), RINFO, SGR/0.175,0.075,0.0275/ 
c TAX RATES 
c Corporate tax rates 
Data RCTO/0.52/ 
c Housing sector shares 
Data (SR(I), i=1,4)/0. l, 0.3,0.6,0.5/ 
c Income Tax Rates (Marginal and average) and Dividend Tax Credit 
Data RMYTO, TYT, RDTCO/0.35,25000.0,0.3/ 
c Wealth Tax Rates 
Data (RWT(I), i=1,5)/0.02,0.02,0.02,0.02,0.02/ 
c Capital Gains Tax Rate 
Data RGT/0.075/ 
c Consumer Tax Rates 
Data (RVTO(J), j=1,28)/0.08, 
1 0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08, 
2 0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08, 
3 0.08,0.00,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08, 
4 0.08,0.08, 
5 0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08,0.08, 
6 0.00/ 
c Specific Excise Duties 
Data (RSTO(J), j=1,28)/0.0, 
1 0.0,0.0,2.4,0.0, 
2 0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.2, 
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3 0.0,0.0,2.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0, 
4 0.0,0.0, 
5 0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.10, 
6 -0.30/ 
c Import Taxes Rates 
Data (RMT(J), j=1,5)/0.021,0.000,0.050,0.000,0.0/ 
C Labour Taxes Rates 
Data RLT/0.09/ 
C Demand for Labour by Firms 
Data (DLAB(1, I), I=1,5)/ 
+ 1302.0,6568.0,43202.0,93549.0,995.0/ 
C Capital Stock By Firms 
Data (SCAP(1, J), j=1,5)/ 
+ 15800.0,90600.0,136700.0,263100.0,246000.0/ 
C Capital Stock Proportion to Assets 
Data ((FCAP(I, J), j=1,3), i=1,5)/ 
1 0.092,0.400,0.508, 
2 0.013,0.495,0.492, 
3 0.076,0.692,0.232, 
4 0.154,0.307,0.539, 
5 0.000,0.000,1.000/ 
C Capital Economic Depreciation Rates 
Data (REDEP(J), j=1,5)/0.070,0.050,0.045,0.057,0.016/ 
C Tax depreciation allowances 
C First Year Tax Depreciation 
Data (RTDF(I, ), i=1,5)/0.250,0.400,0.600,0.350,0.0/ 
C Initial Tax Deprecition 
Data ((RTDI(I, J), j=1,3), i=1,5)/0.01,0.015,0.06,0.01,0.0/ 
C Annual Tax Depreciation Rate 
Data ((RTDA(I, J), j=1,3), i=1,5)/0.05,0.055,0.02,0.04,0.04/ 
C Rate of investment grants 
Data (RITC(J), j=1,5)/0.0,0.0,0.066,0.003,0.0/ 
C Supply of Goods by Firms 
Data (BSUP(I), I=1,5)/ 
+ 15119.0,59682.0,180466.0,235418.0,12147.0/ 
C Value Added by Firms 
Data (VAD(I), I=1,5)/ 
+ 4019.0,19356.0,52872.0,125000.0,12147.0/ 
C Demand for Intermediate goods 
Data ((BDEMJI(I, J), j=1,4), i=1,4)/ 
1 2725.0,687.0,4646.0,2139.0, 
2 0.0,24576.0,3443.0,5553.0, 
3 10454.0,7902.0,72254.0,28325.0, 
4 605.0,7977.0,30035.0,61350.0/ 
C Demand for Imported Goods 
Data (DEMMO(1, J), j=1,5)/ 
+ 2226.0,7014.0,41040.0,9720.0,0.0/ 
C Demand for Exported Goods 
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Data (DEMZO(1, J), j=1,5)/ 
+ 930.0,11424.0,32994.0,14652.0,0.0/ 
C Share Parameter of Consumer Demand for Goods 
Data (DEMCJ(J), j=1,28)/3307.0, 
1 606.0,5.0,2688.0,9150.0, 
2 7.0,550.0,2409.0,677.0,212.0,3605.0,3653.0, 
3 612.0,18221.0,5613.0,2457.0,6029.0,1400.0,2881.0, 
4 726.0,1354.0, 
5 1836.0,53009.0,7347.0,3532.0,11205.0, 
6 13954.0, 
7 24203.0/ 
C Government Demand for Goods 
Data (DEMGJ(1, J), j=1,28)/132.0, 
1 103.0,5.0,1080.0,1293.0, 
2 51.0,190.0,2307.0,290.0,1225.0,2986.0,394.0, 
3 3987.0,834.0,32.0,81.0,276.0,163.0,473.0, 
4 120.0,189.0, 
5 2740.0,3495.0,850.0,695.0,1717.0, 
6 49503.0, 
7 0.0/ 
C Share Parameter of Investment Good 
Data (AI(J), j=1,5)/ 
+ 0.0000,0.0004,0.4818,0.5178,0.0000/ 
C Taxes on Intermediate Goods 
Data (RIT(J), J=1,5)/-0.042, -0.0163,0.0155,0.07,0.0/ 
C Debt-equity Ratios 
Data (DER(1, J), j=1,5)/0.190,0.224,0.251,0.363,0.500/ 
C Dividend-payout Ratios 
Data (DPR(J), j=1,5)/0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
C Imported Goods World Prices 
Data (PW(J), j=1,5)/5* 1.0/ 
C Expoted Goods World Prices 
Data (PW(J), j=1,5)/5*1.0/ 
C Transfers at Base Case 
Data TRAN(1)/12500.0/ 
C Government Expenditure 
Data GEXP(1)/70000.0/ 
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SUBROUTINE PRNT 
implicit real*8 (a-h, o-z) 
include 'com. lib' 
if(iprint eq. 1) then 
write (1,1) 
1 format(lx, ' Production Prameters ') 
write (1,2) 
2 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
write (1,3) al(1), al(2), al(3), al(4), al(5) 
3 format(lx, 'scale fac', 5f9.3) 
write (1,4) aO(1,1), aO(2,1), aO(3,1), aO(4,1), aO(5,1) 
4 format(lx, 'share fac', 5f9.3) 
write (1,5) aO(1,2), aO(2,2), aO(3,2), aO(4,2), aO(5,2) 
5 format(lx, 'share fac', 5f9.3) 
write (1,6) redep(1), redep(2), redep(3), redep(4), redep(5) 
6 format(lx, 'dep rate', 5f9.3) 
write (1,7) rta(1), rta(2), rta(3), rta(4), rta(5) 
7 format(lx, 'wd d rate', 5f9.3) 
write (1,8) rti(1), rti(2), rti(3), rti(4), rti(5) 
8 format(lx, 'iy d rate', 5f9.3) 
write (1,9) rtf(1), rtf(2), rtf(3), rtf(4), rtf(5) 
9 format(lx, 'fy d rate', 5f9.3) 
write (1,10) ritc(1), ritc(2), ritc(3), ritc(4), ritc(5) 
10 format(lx, 'inv grant', 5f9.3) 
write (1,11) rct(1), rct(2), rct(3), rct(4), rct(5) 
11 format(lx, 'cor tax r', 5f9.3) 
write (1,12) dpr(1), dpr(2), dpr(3), dpr(4), dpr(5) 
12 format(lx, 'Div/V ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,13) der(1,1), der(1,2), der(1,3), der(1,4), der(1,5) 
13 format(1 x, 'B/E ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,14) esz(1), esz(2), esz(3), esz(4), esz(5) 
14 format(lx, 'ESZ ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,15) esm(1), esm(2), esm(3), esm(4), esm(5) 
15 format(lx, 'ESM ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,34) 
34 format(lx, ' Consumption Prameters' ) 
write (1,35) ac(1), ac(2), ac(3), ac(4), ac(5) 
35 format(lx, 'share con', 5f9.3) 
write (1,36) esh 
36 format(lx, 'con sigma', f9.1) 
write (1,37) stp 
37 format(lx, 'time dis', f 12.8) 
write (1,38) pspO 
38 format(lx, 'Bd/Bw ', f9.4) 
write (1,39) rmyt 
39 format(lx, 'mit rate ', f9.3) 
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write (1,40) rgt 
40 format(lx, 'cgt rate ', f9.3) 
write (1,41) sgr 
41 format(lx, 'ssg rate ', f9.3) 
write (1,42) rb(1) 
42 format(lx, 'interest ', f9.4) 
write (1,44) aca(1), aca(2), aca(3), aca(4), aca(5) 
44 format(lx, 'cost par ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,45) acb 
45 format(lx, 'acost par', f9.3) 
write (1,46) agb 
46 format(lx, 'gcost par', f9.3) 
write (1,47) bondO 
47 format(lx, 'BondO ', f16.5) 
end if 
if(iprint eq. 2 or. iprint eq. 1) then 
write (1,49) 
49 format(lx, 63('*')) 
write (1,50) 
50 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
write (1,51) sup(ik, 1), sup(ik, 2), sup(ik, 3), sup(ik, 4), sup(ik, 5) 
+ , tsup(ik) 
51 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,53) scap(ik, l), scap(ik, 2), scap(ik, 3), scap(ik, 4) 
+ , scap(ik, 5), tcap(ik) 53 format(lx, 'K ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,55) dlab(ik, l), dlab(ik, 2), dlab(ik, 3), dlab(ik, 4) 
+ , dlab(ik, 5), slab(ik) 55 format(lx, 'L ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,57) acf(1), acf(2), acf(3), acf(4), acf(5), tacf 
57 format(lx, 'adj cost', 6f9.1) 
write (1,59) sdep(ik, l), sdep(ik, 2), sdep(ik, 3), sdep(ik, 4) 
+ , sdep(ik, 5), p(16) 
59 format(lx, 'KDEP ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,61) fv(ik, l), fv(ik, 2), fv(ik, 3), fv(ik, 4), fv(ik, 5) 
+ , tv(ik) 
61 format(lx, 'V ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,62) segy(ik, l), segy(ik, 2), segy(ik, 3), seqy(ik, 4) 
+ , segy(ik, 
5), we(ik) 
62 format(1 x, 'E ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,63) bond(ik, l ), bond(ik, 2), bond(ik, 3), bond(ik, 4) 
+ , bond(ik, 
5), wb(ik) 
63 format(lx, 'B ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,65) dn(1), dn(2), dn(3), dn(4), dn(5) 
65 format(1 x, 'DN ', 5f9.1) 
write (1,67) de(1), de(2), de(3), de(4), de(5), p(17) 
67 format(lx, 'DE ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,69) q(ik, 1), q(ik, 2), q(ik, 3), q(ik, 4), q(ik, 5) 
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69 format(lx, 'Q ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,71) dinv(ik, l), dinv(ik, 2), dinv(ik, 3), dinv(ik, 4) 
+ , 
dinv(ik, 5), tinv 1 (ik) 
71 format(l x, 'I ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,73) earn (ik, 1), earn(ik, 2), earn(ik, 3), earn(ik, 4) 
+ , earn(ik, 
5), p(15) 
73 format(lx, 'EARN ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,75) div(ik, l), div(ik, 2), div(ik, 3), div(ik, 4) 
+ , 
div(ik, 5), p(18) 
75 format(lx, 'Div ', 6f9.3) 
write (1,79) ret(ik, l), ret(ik, 2), ret(ik, 3), ret(ik, 4) 
+ )ret(ik, 
5), tret(ik) 
79 format(lx, 'retained ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,81) dbond(ik, 1), dbond(ik, 2), dbond(ik, 3), dbond(ik, 4) 
+ , dbond(ik, 5), tdb(ik) 81 format( l x, 'borrowing', 6f9.1) 
write (1,83) dv(ik, l), dv(ik, 2), dv(ik, 3), dv(ik, 4), dv(ik, 5), wv(ik) 
83 format(lx, 'cap gains', 6f9.1) 
write (1,85) der(ik, 1), der(ik, 2), der(ik, 3), der(ik, 4), der(ik, 5) 
85 format(1 x, 'B/E ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,87) agf(1), agf(2), agf(3), agf(4), agf(5), p(19) 
87 format(1 x, 'agencycos', 6f9.3) 
write (1,89) rc(ik, l), rc(ik, 2), rc(ik, 3), rc(ik, 4), rc(ik, 5) 
89 format(lx, 'costofcap', 5f9.3) 
write (1,100) 
100 format(lx, 63('*')) 
write (1,80) pc(ik) 
80 format(l x, 'com price', f 15.6) 
write (1,82) re(ik) 
82 format(l x, 'equity rt', f 15.6) 
write (1,84) rp(ik) 
84 format(lx, 'porfo rt', f l 5.6) 
write (1,88) yk(ik) 
88 format(lx, 'YK ', f15.1) 
write (1,90) yd(ik) 
90 format(lx, 'YD ', f 15.1) 
write (1,96) wh(ik) 
96 format(l x, 'WH 'f 15.1) 
write (1,98) tw(ik) 
98 format(lx, 'TW ', f 15.1) 
write (1,102) cdem(ik) 
102 format(lx, 'PC ', f 15.1) 
write (1,104) sav(ik) 
104 format(lx, 'Saving J15.1) 
write (1,110) boc(ik) 
110 format(lx, 'cap flow', f 15.1) 
write (1,112) 
112 format(lx, 63('*')) 
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write (1,114) tct 
114 format(lx, 'Tc ', f 15.3) 
write (1,116) tgt 
116 format(lx, 'TCG ', f15.3) 
write (1,118) tyt 
118 format(l x, 'Ty ', f 15.3) 
write (1,119) t1t 
119 format(lx, 'TL 
if 
15.3) 
write (1,120) tvt 
120 format(lx, 'VAT 
, 
f15.3) 
write (1,121) tst 
121 format(lx, 'Excise ', f 15.3) 
write (1,122) twt 
122 format(1 x, 'Tw If 15.3) 
write (1,123) tpt 
123 format(lx, 'Tp 
If 15.3) 
write (1,124) tax(ik) 
124 format(lx, 'TAX ', f 15.3) 
write (1,126) tran(ik) 
126 format(lx, 'Tr ', f 15.3) 
write (1,128) gexp(ik) 
128 format(lx, 'G ', f 15.3) 
write (1,130) bondg(ik) 
130 format(l x, 'Bg ', f 15.3) 
write (1,132) rpdef(ik) 
132 format(lx, 'PSBR ', f 15.3) 
write (1,134) 
134 format(lx, 63('*')) 
write (1,135) 
135 format(lx, 'final dem cGyI 
+Z M') 
write (1,136) demc(ik, 1), demg(ik, l ), demj (ik, 1), demi(ik, l) 
+ , demz(ik, 1), demm(ik, 1) 136 format(lx, 'Agricul ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,138) demc(ik, 2), demg(ik, 2), demj(ik, 2), demi(ik, 2) 
+ , demz(ik, 2), demm(ik, 2) 138 format(lx, 'Energy ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,140) demc(ik, 3), demg(ik, 3), demj(ik, 3), demi(ik, 3) 
+ , 
demz(ik, 3), demm(ik, 3) 
140 format(l x, 'Manufac ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,142) demc(ik, 4), demg(ik, 4), demj(ik, 4), demi(ik, 4) 
+ , demz(ik, 
4), demm(ik, 4) 
142 format(lx, 'Services ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,144) demc(ik, 5), demg(ik, 5), demi(ik, 5), demi(ik, 5) 
+ , 
demz(ik, 5), demm(ik, 5) 
144 format(1 x, 'Housing ', 6f9.1) 
write (1,146) 
146 format(lx, 63('*')) 
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write (1,148) 
148 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
write (1,150) pjd(ik, l), pjd(ik, 2), pjd(ik, 3), pjd(ik, 4), pjd(ik, 5) 
150 format(lx, 'PD ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,152) pj (ik, 1), pj (ik, 2), pj (ik, 3), pj (ik, 4), pj (ik, 5) 
152 format(lx, 'P ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,154) pn(1), pn(2), pn(3), pn(4), pn(5) 
154 format(1 x, 'PN ', 5f9.3) 
write (1,156) rb(ik) 
156 format(lx, 'rb ', f9.8) 
write (1,158) rplab(ik) 
158 format(lx, 'w ', f9.3) 
write (1,160) er(ik) 
160 format(lx, 'ER ', f9.3) 
write(1, *) ° RESULT ° 
write (1,162) 
162 format(/12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
write(1,164) ream(ik, 1), rearn(ik, 2), rearn(ik, 3), rearn(ik, 4) 
+ , rearn(ik, 5), rtearn(ik) 164 format(lx, 'EARN ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,165) rder(ik, 1), rder(ik, 2), rder(ik, 3), rder(ik, 4), rder(ik, 5) 
165 format(lx, 'B/E ', 5f9.4) 
write (1,166) rrc(ik, l), rrc(ik, 2), rrc(ik, 3), rrc(ik, 4), rrc(ik, 5) 
166 format(lx, 'WACC ', 5f9.4) 
write(1,167) rs(ik, l), rs(ik, 2), rs(ik, 3), rs(ik, 4), rs(ik, 5), rts(ik) 
167 format(lx, 'E 1,6f9.4) 
write(1,168) rv(ik, l), rv(ik, 2), rv(ik, 3), rv(ik, 4), rv(ik, 5), rtv(ik) 
168 format(lx, 'V ', 6f9.4) 
write(1,170) rdinv(ik, 1), rdinv(ik, 2), rdinv(ik, 3), rdinv(ik, 4) 
+ , rdinv(ik, 5), rtinv(ik) 
170 format(l x, 'I ', 6f9.4/) 
write(1,172) rdlab(ik, l), rdlab(ik, 2), rdlab(ik, 3), rdlab(ik, 4) 
+ , rdlab(ik, 5), rtlab(ik) 
172 format(lx, 'L ', 6f9.4) 
write(1,173) rscap(ik, 1), rscap(ik, 2), rscap(ik, 3), rscap(ik, 4) 
+ , rscap(ik, 
5), rtcap(ik) 
173 format(lx, 'K ', 6f9.4) 
write(1,174) rsup(ik, l), rsup(ik, 2), rsup(ik, 3), rsup(ik, 4) 
+ , rsup(ik, 
5), rtsup(ik) 
174 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.4) 
write(1,175) rdemz(ik, l), rdemz(ik, 2), rdemz(ik, 3), rdemz(ik, 4) 
+ , rdemz(ik, 
5), rtdemz(ik) 
175 format(lx, 'Z ', 6f9.4) 
write(1,176) rdemm(ik, 1), rdemm(ik, 2), rdemm(ik, 3), rdemm(ik, 4) 
+ , rdemm(ik, 
5), rtdemm(ik) 
176 format(l x, 'M '6f9.4/) 
write(1,177) rgdpr(ik) 
177 format(lx, 'GDP ', f9.4) 
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write(1,178) rcdem(ik) 
178 format(1 x, 'C ', f9.4) 
write(1,179) rsav(ik) 
179 format(lx, 'S ', f9.4) 
write(1,180) bondw(ik) 
180 format(lx, 'bondw ', f 13.4) 
write(1,181) wbond(ik) 
181 format(lx, 'wbond ', f 13.4) 
write(1,182) rtax(ik) 
182 format(lx, 'dTAX ', f9.4) 
write(1,183) rpdef(ik) 
183 format(lx, '(G-T)/GDP', f9.4) 
write(1,184) rfdef(ik) 
184 format(lx, 'PSBR ', f9.4) 
write(1,186) rbot(ik) 
186 format(lx, 'BOT °, f9.4) 
write(1,188) rplab(ik) 
188 format(lx, 'w ', f9.4) 
write(1,190) rb(ik) 
190 format(lx, 'rb ', f9.4) 
write(1,192) rcpi(ik) 
192 format(lx, 'CPI index', f9.4) 
write(1,194) gdpd(ik) 
194 format(lx, 'GDP index', f9.4) 
write(1,195) rerr(ik) 
195 format(l x, 'ER^R ', f9.4) 
write(1,196) er(ik) 
196 format(lx, 'ER , f9.4) 
write(1,197) tot(ik) 
197 format(lx, 'TOT ', f9.4) 
write(1,201) fre(ik) 
201 format(lx, 'dBOC*ER ', f9.4) 
write(1,202) dtot(ik) 
202 format(lx, 'dTOT ', f9.4) 
write(1,203) pen(ik) 
203 format(lx, 'output of , f9.4) 
write(1,205) cri(ik) 
205 format(lx, 'd REAL YD', f9.4) 
write(1,198) rwel(ik) 
198 format(lx, 'Welfare ', f9.4) 
write (1,199) ik 
199 format(lx, 'year : ', 1 x, i2) 
end if 
if(iprint eq. 3) then 
write (1,501) 
501 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 502 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,503) rearn(ik, l), rearn(ik, 2), rearn(ik, 3), rearn(ik, 4) 
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+ , rearn(ik, 
5), rtearn(ik) 
503 format(lx, 'EARN ', 6f9.4) 
502 continue 
write (1,505) 
505 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
do 506 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,507) rder(ik, 1), rder(ik, 2), rder(ik, 3), rder(ik, 4), rder(ik, 5) 
507 format(lx, 'B/E ', 5f9.4) 
506 continue 
write (1,510) 
510 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
do 511 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,512) rrc(ik, l), rrc(ik, 2), rrc(ik, 3), rrc(ik, 4), rrc(ik, 5) 
512 format(lx, 'WACC ', 5f9.4) 
511 continue 
write (1,520) 
520 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 521 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,522) rv(ik, l), rv(ik, 2), rv(ik, 3), rv(ik, 4) 
+ , rv(ik, 5), rtv(ik) 522 format(lx, 'V ', 6f9.4) 
521 continue 
write (1,530) 
530 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 531 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,532) rik(ik, l), rik(ik, 2), rik(ik, 3), rik(ik, 4) 
+ , rik(ik, 
5) 
532 format(l x, 'I/K ', 5f9.4) 
531 continue 
write (1,535) 
535 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 536 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,537) rdinv(ik, l), rdinv(ik, 2), rdinv(ik, 3), rdinv(ik, 4) 
+ , rdinv(ik, 
5) 
537 format(lx, 'I ', 5f9.4) 
536 continue 
write (1,540) 
540 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 541 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,542) rscap(ik, l), rscap(ik, 2), rscap(ik, 3), rscap(ik, 4) 
+ , rscap(ik, 
5), rtcap(ik) 
542 format(lx, 'K ', 6f9.4) 
541 continue 
write (1,550) 
550 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 551 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,552) rdlab(ik, l), rdlab(ik, 2), rdlab(ik, 3), rdlab(ik, 4) 
+ , rdlab(ik, 
5) 
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552 format(lx, 'L ', 5f9.4) 
551 continue 
write (1,560) 
560 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 561 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,562) rsup(ik, l), rsup(ik, 2), rsup(ik, 3), rsup(ik, 4) 
+ , rsup(ik, 
5), rtsup(ik) 
562 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.4) 
561 continue 
write (1,570) 
570 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing total') 
do 571 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,572) rdemz(ik, 1), rdemz(ik, 2), rdemz(ik, 3), rdemz(ik, 4) 
+ , rdemz(ik, 
5) 
572 format(lx, 'Z ', 5f9.4) 
571 continue 
write(1,600) 
600 format(12x, 'interest investment saving consmptn GDP ') 
do 601 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,602) rb(ik), rtinv(ik), rsav(1k), rcdem(ik), rgdpr(ik) 
602 format(lx, 'Macro var', 5f9.4) 
601 continue 
write(1,610) 
610 format(12x, 'exchange export trade ac capflow dTAX ') 
do 611 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,612) er(ik), rtdemz(ik), rbot(ik), rboc(ik), rtax(ik) 
612 format(lx, 'Foreign v', 5f9.4) 
611 continue 
write (1,615) 
615 format(12x, 'tot effect wages TW WK/WH WB/WE') 
do 616 ik=l, nyear 
write (1,617) tot(ik), rplab(ik), rtw(ik), rfdis(ik), radis(ik) 
617 format(lx, 'Returns ', 5f9.4) 
616 continue 
end if 
if(iprint eq. 4) then 
write(1,701) bondw(ik) 
701 format(lx, 'bondw ', f 13.4) 
write(1,702) wbond(ik) 
702 format(lx, 'wbond ', f 13.4) 
write(1,703) ev 
703 format(1 x, 'eq-va ', f 13.4) 
write (1,705) 
705 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
write(1,706) rtsi5(1), rtsi5(2), rtsi5(3), rtsi5(4), rtsi5(5) 
706 format(l x, 'trns-5 I, 5f9.4) 
write(1,707) rtsi l0(1), rtsi 10(2), rtsi 10(3), rtsi 10(4), rtsi 10(5) 
707 format(l x, 'trns-10 I', 5f9.4) 
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write(1,708) rtsi20(1), rtsi20(2), rtsi2O(3), rtsi2O(4), rtsi2O(5) 
708 format(l x, 'trns-20 I', 5f9.4) 
end if 
if(iprint eq. 5) then 
write (1,805) 
805 format(12x, 'agricul energy manufac service housing') 
write(1,810) gk(1), qk(2), qk(3), qk(4), qk(5) 
810 format(lx, 'ret to K', 5f9.4) 
write(1,812) rrh 
812 format(lx, 'ret toSAV', f9.4) 
write(1,815) gr(1), qr(2), qr(3), qr(4), qr(5) 
815 format(lx, 'tax wedge', 5f9.4) 
write(1,820) etr(1), etr(2), etr(3), etr(4), etr(5) 
820 format(lx, 'ef taxrat', 5f9.4) 
write(1,825) aetr 
825 format(lx, 'overall r', f9.4) 
write(1,830) vetr 
830 format(l x, 'variance ', f9.4) 
write(1,835) setr 
835 format(lx, 'stand dev', f9.4) 
end if 
if(iprint eq. 6) then 
write (1,1501) 
1501 format(12x, 'earning B/PeE Cost Asset I/K I K') 
write(1,1503) rearn(1,1), rder(1,1), rrc(1,1), rv(1,1), rik(1,1) 
+ , rdinv(1,1), rscap(1,1) 
1503 format(lx, 'Year 1', 7f9.3) 
write(l, 1505) rearn(5,1), rder(5,1), rrc(5,1), rv(5,1), rik(5,1) 
+ , rdinv(5,1), rscap(5,1) 
1505 format(lx, ' 5', 7f9.3) 
write(l, 1507) rearn(76,1), rder(76,1), rrc(76,1), rv(76,1), rik(76,1) 
+ , rdinv(76,1), rscap(76,1) 1507 format(lx, ' INF', 7f9.3) 
write(l, 1509) rearn(1,2), rder(1,2), rrc(1,2), rv(1,2), rik(1,2) 
+ . rdinv(1,2), rscap(1,2) 
1509 format(1 x, 'Year 1', 7f9.3) 
write(l, 1511) rearn(5,2), rder(5,2), rrc(5,2), rv(5,2), rik(5,2) 
+ , rdinv(5,2), rscap(5,2) 
1511 format(lx, ' 5', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1513) rearn(76,2), rder(76,2), rrc(76,2), rv(76,2), rik(76,2) 
+ , rdinv(1,2), rscap(1,2) 
1513 format(1 x, ' INF', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1515) rearn(1,3), rder(1,3), rrc(1,3), rv(1,3), rik(1,3) 
+ , rdinv(1,3), rscap(1,3) 
1515 format(1 x, 'Year 1', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1517) rearn(5,3), rder(5,3), rrc(5,3), rv(5,3), rik(5,3) 
+ , rdinv(5,3), rscap(5,3) 
1517 format(lx, ' 5', 7f9.3) 
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write 1,1519) rearn(76,3), rder(76,3), rrc(76,3), rv(76,3), rik(76,3) 
+ 
, rdinv(76,3), rscap(76,3) 1519 format(1 x, ' INF', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1521) rearn(1,4), rder(1,4), rrc(1,4), rv(1,4), rik(1,4) 
+ , rdinv(1,4), rscap(1,4) 1521 format(lx, 'Year 1,7f9.3) 
write(1,1523) rearn(5,4), rder(5,4), rrc(5,4), rv(5,4), rik(5,4) 
+ , rdinv(5,4), rscap(5,4) 1523 format(lx, ' 5', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1525) rearn(76,4), rder(76,4), rrc(76,4), rv(76,4), rik(76,4) 
+ , rdinv(76,4), rscap(76,4) 1525 format(lx, ' INF', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1527) rearn(1,5), rder(1,5), rrc(1,5), rv(1,5), rik(1,5) 
+ , rdinv(1,5), rscap(1,5) 1527 format(lx, 'Year 1,7f9.3) 
write(1,1529) rearn(5,5), rder(5,5), rrc(5,5), rv(5,5), rik(5,5) 
+ , rdinv(5,5), rscap(5,5) 1529 format(lx, ' 5', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1531) rearn(76,5), rder(76,5), rrc(76,5), rv(76,5), rik(76,5) 
+ , rdinv(76,5), rscap(76,5) 1531 format(1 x, ' INF', 7f9.3) 
write(1,1545) rdlab(l, l), rdlab(1,2), rdlab(1,3), rdlab(1,4) 
+ , rdlab(1,5) 1545 format(lx, 'L ', 5f9.3) 
write(1,1547) rdlab(5,1), rdlab(5,2), rdlab(5,3), rdlab(5,4) 
+ , rdlab(5,5) 1547 format(lx, 'L 1,5f9.4) 
write (1,1549) rdlab(76,1), rdlab(76,2), rdlab(76,3), rdlab(76,4) 
+ , rdlab(76,5) 1549 format(lx, 'L ', 5f9.4) 
write (1,1551) rsup(1,1), rsup(1,2), rsup(1,3), rsup(1,4) 
+ )rsup(1,5), rtsup(l ) 1551 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1553) rsup(5,1), rsup(5,2), rsup(5,3), rsup(5,4) 
+ , rsup(5,5), rtsup(5) 1553 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1555) rsup(76,1), rsup(76,2), rsup(76,3), rsup(76,4) 
+ , rsup(76,5), rtsup(76) 
1555 format(lx, 'X ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1557) rdemz(1,1), rdemz(1,2), rdemz(1,3), rdemz(1,4) 
+ , rdemz(1,5) 
1557 format(1 x, 'Z ', 5f9.4) 
write (1,1559) rdemz(5,1), rdemz(5,2), rdemz(5,3), rdemz(5,4) 
+ , rdemz(5,5) 
1559 format(1 x, 'Z ', 5f9.4) 
write (1,1561) rdemz(76,1), rdemz(76,2), rdemz(76,3), rdemz(76,4) 
+ , rdemz(76,5) 
1561 format(1 x, 'Z ', 5f9.4) 
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write(1,1600) 
1600 format(12x, 'interest investment saving consmptn GDP ') 
write (1,1602) rb(1), rtinv(1), rsav(1), rcdem(1), rgdpr(1) 
1602 format(lx, 'Macro var', 5f9.4) 
write (1,1604) rb(5), rtinv(5), rsav(5), rcdem(5), rgdpr(5) 
1604 format(l x, 'Macro var', 5f9.4) 
write (1,1606) rb(76), rtinv(76), rsav(76), rcdem(76), rgdpr(76) 
1606 format(lx, 'Macro var', 5f9.4) 
write(1,1610) 
1610 format(12x, 'exchange export trade ac capflow dTAX CPI index') 
write (1,1612) er(1), rtdemz(1), rbot(1), rboc (1), rtax(1), rcpi(1) 
1612 format(1 x, 'Foreign v', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1614) er(5), rtdemz(5), rbot(5), rboc(5), rtax(5), rcpi(5) 
1614 format(lx, 'Foreign v', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1616) er(76), rtdemz(76), rbot(76), rboc(76), rtax(76) 
+ , rcpi(76) 1616 format(lx, 'Foreign v, 6f9.4) 
write (1,1620) 
1620 format(12x, 'tot effect wages TW WH/WK WB/WE GDP index') 
write (1,1622) tot(1), rplab(1), rtw(1), rfdis(1), radis(1), gdpd(1) 
1622 format(l x, 'Returns ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1624) tot(5), rplab(5), rtw(5), rfdis(5), radis(5), gdpd(5) 
1624 format(lx, 'Returns ', 6f9.4) 
write (1,1626) tot(76), rplab(76), rtw(76), rfdis(76), radis(76) 
+ , gdpd(76) 1626 format(lx, 'Returns ', 6f9.4) 
end if 
return 
end 
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APPENDIX E: EFFECTIVE TAX RATE CALCULATION 
To summarize the impact of pre-reform and post-reform UK tax law on capital 
allocation, we employ the notion of an effective tax rate for each type of Maximization 
of private wealth results in an effecient allocation of capital only if the effective rate is 
the same for all assets. Discrepancies in the tax treatment of different types of assets 
result in sizable obstacles to efficient capital allocation. 
In order to represent the effect of the UK tax structure on capital allocation 
we distinguish among assets held in the agriculture, energy, manufacturing, services, and 
housing serives sectors. Since assets held in different sectors differ enormously in tax 
treatment under the individual and corporate income taxes, we would expect to find that 
UK tax law presents formidiable barriers to the efficient allocation of capital. In 
addition, the tax rules for capital recovery within a sector, including the investment tax 
credit and capital consumption allowances, differ drastically among different types of 
assets, giving rise to further obstacles to efficient allocation. Summing up the effective 
tax rates may vary, they depend upon the asset and industry in which the funds are 
invested, and the nature of of the financial calims on the profits (equity versus debt). 
King and Fullerton (1984) defines the effective tax rate, te, as to be the tax 
"wedge" between the rate of return on investment and the rate of return on savings for 
industries' marginal investment divided by the rateof return on savings, rS; 
t, ý tej = with j=1...... J=5 rs 
Since with distortionary taxes the rate of return on investment and the rate of return on 
savings can differ, the effective tax rate then is expected to move from zero. A negative 
value for the effective tax rate of any sector means that the tax system favours 
investment in that sector while a positive value means that investment in that sector is 
discouraged. This implies that as the effective tax rate measures the degree of 
misallocation of capital the tax wedge provides a qualitative information in defining the 
sign of the effective tax rate. 
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To define the tax wedge we should first derive formulas for the post-tax real 
rate of return to saving and the rate of return net of depreciation to capital. The post-tax 
real rate of return to the saver, r, is, in terms of instantaneous rates, given by 
rs=(1-t )rB-n 
where tip, is the margianl personal income tasx rate, rB, denotes the nominal interst rate, 
and it stands for the inflation rate. As for the latter, the rate of return net of depreciaton 
to capital, it is derived by King and Fullerton (1984) as 
(1-DNj-z) RR 
rv =j (I'j+ö; (1 -z) 
where DNS is the tax savings from depreciation allownces, and z represents the 
investment grants. 
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